CONFLICTS, RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE ACROSS BORDERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF PREVAILING THEORIES AND MODELS

By
Adekunle Ajisebiyawo, PhD
Department of Political Science & Public Administration
Igbinedion University, Okada, Edo State, Nigeria
adekunle.ajisebiyawo@iuokada.edu.ng

Tunde Agara, PhD
Department of Political Science
Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, Edo State, Nigeria.
&
Subair Alexander, PhD
Department of International Relations & Strategic Studies
Igbinedion University, Okada, Edo State, Nigeria

Abstract

The study examined the problems of internal and international migration occasioned by conflicts and relative deprivation of people. The study also identified theories and models on factors that spur peoples' migration which are traditionally grouped into initiation and perpetuation theories, these theories offer part explanations: many did not take cognizance of the present causes of Africans' internal and international mass migration to Europe. The Theory of Protracted Social Conflict was adopted. While extant literature was used, the study concluded that conflict within the zones of war can be a push factor, whereas, relative peace and freedom in the zones of peace could be a pull factor. Thus, within the African continent and Middle East, and North Africa (MENA), conflict and the relative deprivation it enhances are important variables for understanding migration. Effective conflict management at its early stage and government of inclusiveness were recommended as solutions.

Keywords: conflict, deprivation, migration, people, theory

Introduction

Migration is not a recent or new phenomenon. The causes and reasons for it now may be peculiar to this epoch but throughout history and from antiquity till now, hordes of people have been moving from one part of the world to another for various reasons, spreading languages, civilisation, culture, religions and the myths associated with them. For instance, early migration took the form of nomadic peoples migrating from the broad steppes of Russia and Central Asia into Iran in search of new and more hospitable lands (McKay et al., 2007:27). Such mass movement of peoples has led a group of people who called themselves Aryans to dominate northern India and their language Sanskrit has become so accepted that aspects of it have been adulterated into the English language. For instance, the Sanskrit word for ship 'nava' is related

to the English 'naval', while 'deva' (god) is now found in the form of 'divine'; 'raja' (ruler) is now 'regal'.

The word 'Aryan' itself means 'pure' or 'noble' and is the root word for Iran and Eire (McKay et al., 2007:42), and also adopted by Nazis German as a basis for their brand of racism or superior race. The migration of peoples from one area to another has been a continuing feature of history and there is no doubt that such mass movements of peoples have had profound implications and effect both on the regions peoples moved from and the one they moved to. For instance, the migration of the Germanic peoples had a profound effect on the decline of the Roman Empire and in the making of European civilisation. Migration therefore led to an increase in population in certain areas and a decrease in population in other areas. As McKay et al (2007, p. 769) have noted, the growing number of Europeans fuelled by the migrating Germanic hordes was a driving force behind emigration and western expansion. The rapid increase in numbers led to relative overpopulation in area after area in Europe.

The Industrial Revolution and the concomitant need for external overseas markets for goods further accentuated migratory movements of peoples, albeit from the industrial world to the developing ones. Imperialism gave impetus to migration in the form of the extensive movement of people into, across, and out of Asia throughout the 19th century. As McKay et al (2007, p. 819) have equally noted, "in no earlier period had so many Europeans lived in Asia or so many Asians taken up residence in other countries" than during this period. Imperialism brought Europeans to Asia in unprecedented numbers, leading to significant expatriate communities of Europeans and Americans in most countries of Asia and Africa in the early 1900s. The most singular and extreme case was India, perhaps followed by countries within the southern Africa axis such as Rhodesia, South Africa, and Angola. By the eve of World War I, hundreds of thousands of expatriates lived in India alone and in these countries. Inspired by the impact that migration, colonialism, and imperialism had on the development of Western European states, transforming them into positions of world powers, politically and economically, the Argentine political philosopher, Juan Bautista Alberdi, was forced to declare that "to govern is to populate," implying that the development of his country and by extension, all of Latin America depended on immigration. It is no secret that industrial America developed on the sweat and brawn, the cheap labour, of immigrant millions.

This paper is divided into 5 sections to address the problem of both internal and international migration as occasioned by conflicts and relative deprivation of people. The paper

takes cognizance of prior theories and models that have attempted to theorise why people migrate and the fact that these theories have traditionally been grouped into initiation and perpetuation theories. However, this paper contends that while these theories offer partial explanations, many do not take cognizance of the present causes of Africans' internal and international mass migration to Europe. Of course, these new causes, generating the 'push' factor for migration, have been there before this time but were not well recognized during the Cold War era, or perhaps were less important then, because the East-West struggle absorbed all concerns. With the superpower threats like that of the Cold War no longer salient, these other challenges to international stability have become a higher priority. It would, of course, be a traditionalist conceit to ignore the emergence of novel grounds of conflict and the exacerbating reality of failed states in Africa and the Middle East generated by incessant conflicts (religious and political terrorism), relative deprivation, failure to provide political space and accommodation for minorities, and the importance and struggle for control of natural resources among ethnic tribes generated by globalisation as vivid and empirical evidence for the sudden influx of human beings from Africa and the Middle East. This paper argues that although theories and models abound to explain, none has been able to capture the present reality which this paper intends to expound upon. The blame for the present human migration is therefore put on conflict, relative deprivation, and failed states occasioned by virulent globalisation which had made Southern nations poorer and their peoples impoverished, hence the need to search for other options occasioning the mass exodus being experienced globally now.

Current Migration Theories: A Critical Summary

The volume of literature and theorisations on migration especially after the Cold War has increased substantially over the years. This leads us to ask why migration is so important as to attract much theorisation and literature on it. However, Castles and Miller (2009) have answered by saying that we are living in the "Age of Migration," a period in which the roving instinct intrinsic to human nature has now become globalised, accelerated, feminized, diversified, and increasingly politicised due to many factors. As Cresswell (2006) has noted, everyone is now "on the move," and in a bid to account for this, many scholars from different disciplines have attempted explanations from within their academic paradigm. Thus, as King (2012, p. 10) has noted, much research on migration has been conducted "within the narrow disciplinary boundaries, reinforced by the academic and institutional landscape of most universities… (with) each discipline (tending) to bring its own epistemological orthodoxy, scale of analysis and privileged types of data."

Several scholars have argued against this academic habitus, stating that the disciplinary and paradigmatic closure this engendered is the enemy of an effective study of human migration (Castles 2010, pp.15-25). Arango (2004, p.15) has also argued that limiting inquiry to single disciplines reduces our understanding of the full complexity of human migration and holds back the possibility of arriving at a general theory of migration. Other scholars have argued for an interdisciplinary approach (Favell, 2008, King, 2002, 2012a), while some have attempted to achieve this (Brettell and Hollifield 2008, and Samers 2010). However, the bulk of the literature has focused on aspects of migration that are of most intellectual and academic concern for the various disciplines, neglecting other aspects of the phenomenon.

For instance, most of the literature has focused on migration from the global south to the global north, thereby being Western-centric. Others have focused attention on the receiving countries to the detriment of the contributing countries, international migration as against internal migration, the pull aspect of international migration as against the push aspect of the contributing countries, voluntary migration as against involuntary migration occasioned by conflict and deprivation, and human security in the receiving countries as against human security in the contributing areas. This focus has therefore generated a lot of theories attempting to discuss human migration for these reasons. The apparent failure to look at the other aspects or areas of migration has thereby left a knowledge gap that needs to be closed. This is the objective of this paper even though we cannot touch on all the areas within the limits of space an article allows us. Our focus is on the contributing country, the push factor generated by conflicts and relative deprivation. We, however, hope to do this after an initiation appreciation of existing theories which because of their focus, have been classified broadly into two types – initiation and perpetuation theories.

Initiation Theories of Migration

A variety of theories have been propounded to explain why migration begins using different concepts, assumptions, and frames of reference. The most popular and perhaps the oldest and dominant of these theories is the Neo-classical Economics (Macro and Micro) Theory. The macro version was originally propounded to explain labour migration in the process of economic development (Lewis, 1954; Harris & Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1976).

The theory is based on the fact that people in labour-rich countries will move to countries with less labour but higher wages, arguing that "differential in wages causes workers from low-wage country to move to the high wage country" (Massey et al, 1993, p. 433). It

postulates that migration is stimulated by rational economic considerations and by the weighing of relative benefits and costs, mostly financial but also psychological (Todaro and Smith, 2006, p. 342). Deriving from the macroeconomic theory above is the microeconomic model (also called the human capital theory) which hinges on the rational choice of the individual (Todaro, 1969, 1976, 1989; Todaro & Maruszko, 1987). It argues that individuals, as rational actors, decide to migrate based on a cost-benefit calculation that leads them to expect a positive net return, usually of the monetary kind. This theory implies that people choose to migrate to where they perceive that they can be most productive given their level of skills. However, part of the rational thinking that goes into this decision is also the investment that this migration will require in terms of travel costs, the cost of maintenance while looking for work, the effort involved in learning a new language and culture, the difficulty to be experienced before adapting to a new labour market and the psychological costs of cutting old ties and forging new ones (Massey et al., 1993, p. 434).

While these theories have been variously criticized on conceptual (Arango, 2000) and empirical grounds (Massey et al 1998), the major shortcoming of the micro theory is derived from the basis of its argument that wage differential causes men to migrate. If this is the case, therefore, it follows that migration should cease if and when there are no wage differentials anymore. As Massey et al (1993, p. 455) have put it, "international flows that occur in the absence of a wage gap, or that end before a gap has been eliminated, represent anomalous conditions that constitute prima facie evidence challenging the assumptions of neoclassical economic theory." Major refinements made to the microeconomics theory by Sjaadstad (1962) incorporated socio-demographic characteristics of the individual as an important determinant of the choice of whether to migrate or not. Such human characteristics include skills, age, marital status, gender, occupation, and labour market status. However, empirical evidence has shown that the propensity to migrate decreases with an increase in age and an increase in educational level (Bauer & Zimmerman, 1999)

Dissatisfaction with these theories to offer an acceptable theory of migration has led to scholars arguing that decisions to migrate are not made by isolated individuals alone but by a larger unit of family members. This implies that the migrant may be an individual, but the final decision to migrate is collectively made. Thus, the decision to migrate is taken as part of assigning economic activities to members of the family which may lead to some being sent to work in foreign labour markets. Called the New Economics Theory, its main argument is hinged on the involvement of families or households in the decision-making process as to

whether an individual (and which one) should migrate or not. This is done if the local economic condition has deteriorated and local economic activities cannot bring in sufficient income and funds to cater to and meet the needs of the family (Stark & Levhari, 1982; Katz & Stark, 1986; Taylor, 1986; Stark, 1984, 1991). This happens frequently in developing economies where institutional mechanisms for managing risks to household income are absent or imperfect thereby giving incentives to diversify risks through migration of selected members of the family. The difference that this theory introduced is that "families, households or other culturally defined units of production and consumption are the appropriate units of analysis for migration research and not the autonomous individual" (Massey et al., 1993, p. 439). Unfortunately, while this theory has not received much following and empirical testing (Kurekova, 2011, p. 8), it nevertheless, from interviews conducted by us, presents the realities of much migration in the West African sub-region, especially the movement of child-labour across the border from Benin Republic to Nigeria as house-helps and internal migration from the northern part to the southern part of Nigeria for similar work.

All these theories conceptualised migration as a long thought-out and reasoned decision whether by families or the individual – rationality is implicit in these theories. The theories did not consider the possibility that the decision to migrate may be imposed on the family or individual due to other exigencies such as environmental or conflict. However, standing very distinct from this rational choice is the dual labour market theory which postulates that migration stems from the labour demands made by modern industrial societies. Piore (1979) has made a forceful argument for the fact that international migration is caused by a permanent demand for labour which is made by the economic structure of the developed Western nations. According to him, migration is not caused by the 'push factors' in sending countries (low wages or high unemployment), but by the 'pull factors' in receiving countries, manifested through a chronic and unavoidable need for foreign cheap labours. The character of the economy in the developed countries generates the demand for low-skilled jobs which domestic workers and indigenous people deemed as being demeaning and of low status, thereby creating a social distribution of labour. As McKay et al (2007, p. 853) have pointed out, America (and perhaps the entire Western world) developed from the sweats and brawns of their immigrants. The theory has been criticised for being Western-centric, for focusing on the receiving Western countries and neglecting the sending LDC countries.

The last of the initiation theories is the world systems theory which built on the works of Wallerstein (1974), to link the origin of migration to the structure of the world market

(Petras, 1981; Castells, 1989; Sassen, 1988, 1991). The argument is that the penetration of capitalist economic relations into the peripheral non-capitalist economies has created a mobile population that is prone to migrate abroad. The penetration thesis argues that in search for more wealth and riches, capitalist owners of production penetrate the economies of peripheral states in search of land, raw materials, and labour. This penetration is assisted by colonialism and imperialism and today, it is made possible by neo-colonialism and multinational corporations "that perpetuate the power of national elites who either participate in the world economy as capitalists themselves or offer their nation's resources to global firms on acceptable terms" (Massey et al., 1993, p. 445). Thus, world systems theorists agreed that migration is a natural offshoot of the disruptions and dislocations that inevitably occur in the process of capitalist development.

Perpetuation Theories of Migration

The sets of theories under this heading allude to the conditions that perpetuate migration across time and space. First in the series of theories used to explain the continued phenomenon of migration is the Network theory which postulates that there are sets of migrant networks of interpersonal ties such as kinship, friendship, and shared community origin that connect former migrants with would-be migrants together. These sets of interpersonal ties and relationships increase the likelihood of migration because they serve as buffers against risks and costs that new migrants may likely face, thereby increasing the expected net returns to migration. As Massey et al (1993, p. 448) contend, "network connections constitute a form of social capital that people can draw upon to gain access to foreign employment."

This opportunity further increases the possibility of more migration which later enhances and expands the network to encompass segments of the sending society (Taylor, 1986; Massey, 1990a, 1990b). The bottom line of this argument is that the existence of a diaspora or network is likely to influence the decision of migrants when they choose their destination (Dustman & Glitz, 2005). Closely aligned with this is the Migration Systems Theory (Mabogunje, 1970) whose main assumption is based on the argument that migration alters the social, cultural, economic, and institutional conditions at both ends – the sending and receiving countries. This model, has its roots in geography, whereas the migration network theory is of sociological and anthropological origin (Castles & Miller, 2009), stresses that migration restructures the entire societal context of the concrete spaces in which it takes place, both at the receiving and at the sending end (de Haas, 2008).

The institutional theory is based on the fact that the onset of migration produces and generates the need for and the existence of several public and private institutions and voluntary organizations geared towards satisfying the demands created by an imbalance between the large number of people who seek entry into the receiving countries and the limited number of immigrants that can be issued visas into these countries. These organizations provide a range of services to migrants in exchange for agreed fees; services ranging from surreptitious smuggling across borders, clandestine transport to internal destinations, labour contracting between employers and migrants, provision of counterfeit documents and papers, arranged marriages, lodging, credit, and other assistants to facilitate a smooth transition and blending in for the immigrants. Legal and humanitarian organizations provide counselling, social services, legal advice, and other services.

In addition to these two theories, Myrdal (1957) has added another called Cumulative Causation which argues that every act of migration alters the social context within which other migration decisions are made and thereby, most likely, influence additional migration. Thus, the argument posits that migration is a self-perpetuating and self-sustaining phenomenon. Massey et al (1993, p. 451) have identified certain factors that have made this possible. First is the distribution of income which argues that "as a household's sense of relative deprivation increases, so does the motivation to migrate." This tendency is often propelled by the fact that as some families are perceived to have improved their income through migration, others with low income are likely to follow suit. Thus, perceived income inequality will increase the sense of relative deprivation among non-immigrants, thereby inducing and motivating more families to migrate (Massey et al, 1993, p. 452).

Second is the fact that with remittances from abroad, families located in rural communities can purchase more farmland but with the likelihood that that land, which acts as insurance for the future, may be left fallow and uncultivated. This reduces and lowers the demand for farmhands and labourers but most likely increases the pressure for other families to migrate (Rhoades, 1978; Mines, 1984; Wiest, 1984). Deriving from the second factor is the third, that when migrant households do use the land purchased to farm, they are likely to employ mechanisation since they have access to funds. This further displaces local farmhands from work and hence increases the migration pressure. Fourth is that, inadvertently, with the advantages realised from the three factors above, non-immigrant families become motivated to migrate thereby creating a culture of migration. This is further confirmed by the fact that once a person has migrated before, he is likely to do so and continue to do so in the future because

the odds of taking additional trips rise with the number of successful trips already taken (Massey, 1986).

Theoretical Framework

This paper is hinged on Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) as theorised by Edward Azar (1986, 1990, and 1991). Azar (1991, p. 93) has explained PSC as "the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation." PSC deals with relationships between intra-state actors such as communities, tribes, and ethnics. The traditional preoccupation with inter-state relations is seen as obscuring the more realistic domestic relations among ethnic groups. Thus, the distinction between domestic and international politics is rejected as being rather "artificial" because "there is only one social environment and its domestic face is the more compelling" (Azar & Burton, 1986, p. 33). Thus, the role of the state in the domestic relationship among intra-state ethnic actors is to satisfy or frustrate basic communal needs and by so doing preventing or promoting conflict (Azar, 1990, pp.10-12).

The term "Protracted Social Conflict" (PSC) emphasized that the sources of conflicts lie predominantly within (and across) rather than between states. To explain this, PSC identifies four clusters of variables. The first is the "communal content" of a conflict which as Azar has argued is the most useful unit of analysis in protracted social conflict situations because it identifies the groups involved in terms such as racial, religious, ethnic, cultural, and others (Azar, 1986, p. 31). In its analysis of the communal content of any conflict, Azar (1990, p. 7) insists that it is the relationship between the identity group and states which is at the core of the conflict (that is, the "disarticulation between the state and society as a whole," and how individual's interests and needs (such as security, identity, recognition and others (Azar, 1986, p. 31) are mediated through membership of social groups. This disjunction and disarticulation between state and society Azar (1990, p. 8) has linked to the colonial legacy which artificially created states made up of a "multitude of communal groups" on the principle of "divide and rule" thereby resulting in many postcolonial multi-communal societies whose state machinery is either "dominated by a single communal group (the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy) or a coalition of a few communal groups that are unresponsive to the needs of other groups (the minorities) in the society."

The second is that Azar (1990, p. 9) identified deprivation of human needs as the underlying source of PSC. He argues that "grievances resulting from need deprivation are

usually expressed collectively. The failure to redress these grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for a protracted social conflict." Azar further affirms that needs are unlike interests because they are ontological and non-negotiable and so if they result in conflict, such conflict is likely to be intense, vicious, and from a traditional Clausewitzean perspective, irrational. Azar identified these needs as security needs, development needs, political access needs, and identity needs. Arguing that security is at the root of development and political access, Azar (1990, p. 155) opined that,

> reducing overt conflict requires reduction in levels of underdevelopment. Groups which seek to satisfy their identity and security needs through conflict are in effect seeking change in the structure of their society. Conflict resolution can only occur and last if satisfactory amelioration of under-development occurs as well. Studying protracted conflict leads one to conclude that peace is development in the broadest sense of the term.

Third is that Azar (1990, p. 10) cited "governance and the state's role" as a critical factor in the satisfaction or frustration of individual and identity group needs. Simply put, he agrees that the state has the authority to govern and use force where necessary to regulate society, protect citizens, and provide collective goods; therefore, most states that experience protracted social conflict tend to be characterized by incompetent, parochial, fragile, and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs. The notion of a liberal democratic government is that the state is an aggregate of individuals who are entrusted to govern effectively and act as an impartial arbiter of conflicts among the constituent parts. However, this is not the case particularly in states of Africa, Asia and Latin America origins where political authority and power "tends to be monopolized by the dominant identity group or a coalition of hegemonic groups" which use the state to maximize their interests at the expense of others (Azar, 1990, p. 10).

The monopolization of power and authority by individuals and dominant ethnic groups limits the access to power by others and precipitates a crisis of legitimacy so that "regime type and the level of legitimacy come to be seen as important linkage variables between needs and protracted social conflict" (Azar, 1990, p. 11). As Azar has pointed out, PSCs tend to be a developing countries' phenomenon, especially those countries that are characterized by rapid population growth and limited resource base, especially those whose "political capacity is limited by a rigid or fragile authority structure which prevents the state from responding to, and meeting the needs of various constituents" (Azar, 1990, p. 11).

Finally, Azar identified the "international linkages" dimension of PSC; in particular, the political-economic relations of economic dependency within the international economic system and the network of political-military linkages constituting regional and global patterns of clientage and cross-border interests. He submits that the "formation of domestic social and political institutions and their impact on the role of the state are greatly influenced by the patterns of linkages within the international system" (Azar, 1990, p. 11). Drawing heavily from the works of Sumner (1906), Gurr (1970), and Mitchell (1981) among others, Azar attempted to trace the process by which one group's experiences, fears and belief systems generate a reciprocal negative image which perpetuate communal antagonisms and solidify protracted social conflict. In particular, this negative image of another group's intentions and history serves to justify discriminatory policies and legitimize atrocities.

Actions from antagonistic groups are mutually interpreted as threatening, with the worst motivations attributed to the other side and this shrinks the space for compromise and accommodation. So, "proposals for political solutions become rare and tend to be perceived on all sides as the mechanism for gaining relative power and control" (Azar, 1990, p.15). Thus, Azar (1991, p.95) perceives PSC as a model or framework that synthesises "the realist and structuralist paradigms into a pluralist framework" more suitable for explaining protracted and prevalent patterns of conflict than the more limited alternatives. The PSC theory is part of the myriad of theories underscoring the Push and Pull factors of migration. This cannot constitute a framework of analysis for this research. If the PSC constitutes the gap to be filled, it should be discussed separately in the form of findings with compelling justification to be an addition to knowledge.

The Migration-Conflict Nexus

The argument on which this section is hinged and which is the main concern of this paper is that all the theories reviewed above and generally accepted by scholars interested in this subject matter have been narrow in their focus and blinded by western-centric prejudice and bias focused more on immigrant-receiving western nations. The most popular of the theories have assumed economic determinism as the major reason for migration and this has, rather dismally, made them leave out a systematic examination of internal conflict, internal migration, and involuntary migration within the developing world. This failure has also led to the neglect by scholars to examine the effects and impact of internal conflict, the involuntary migration it engendered in the developing world and especially Africa, on both the sending and

receiving states' national security, sovereignty, the capacity and autonomy of states' actors and the balance of power among the states. This consideration is important because of the limited capabilities of the developing countries to absorb and cope with the influx of migrants dislocated from their homes as a result of conflicts. The spread of particular ethnic groups and clans across borders due to the colonial creation of artificial boundaries between African nations that have separated peoples of similar culture has also resulted in further escalation and transference of conflict into the receiving states. This movement forged kinship networks but also had the effect of "providing resources that help to fuel internal conflicts, by providing opportunities for networks of organized crime and by providing conduits for international terrorism" (Adamson, 2006, p. 191).

The present experience of mass migration within Africa, the Middle East, and North Africa (MENA) has confirmed the fact that conflict is playing a great part in engendering involuntary and forced migration of people across borders. Many seminal works and studies have been carried out concerning the issue of conflicts and violence generally, thereby leading to classifying conflicts according to: (1) the parties involved in the conflict (Chazan et al, 1992, pp.189-210), (2) the issues that generate the conflict (Holsti, 1991 pp. 306-34), and (3) the factors that cause the conflict (Furley, 1995, pp. 3-4). However, there is a consensus that with the ending of the Cold War, regional patterns of conflict have become all the more significant (Ramsbotham et al., 2007, p. 62). The problem with this is that geographical regions do not always coincide with political groupings (for instance, Arab North Africa is often included as part of the Middle East), while some states are difficult to place (for instance, is Turkey part of the Middle East, or is Greece to be included as part of the Balkan States, or where should Afghanistan be – Central or South Asia?). To find a way out of this dilemma, Singer and Wildavsky (1993) have divided the globe into two: the zone of peace implies the industrialized world, and the zones of turmoil imply the developing world. Not to be outdone, Kacowicz (1995) has also suggested two zoning formulas; "the zones of peace" and "the zones of war." Recent events and data have shown that migratory pattern flows from the "zones of war" or "turmoil" to the "zones of peace" further implicating the fact that violence and conflict have been the most notorious causal factors of migration today.

Conflict in Africa can be divided into two major epochs – the Cold War period and the post-Cold War period with totally different reasons precipitating them but leading to involuntary migration and mass exodus of peoples across borders. Three variants of conflicts have been identified during the Cold War period. The first variant consists of the various anti-

colonial insurrections and wars of national liberation. Most notable of this period were the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and the various national liberation wars in Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau. The racist and authoritarian policies of the former imperial powers, coupled with their refusal to acknowledge the global rejection of colonialism and the self-assertiveness of the former colonies, assisted in escalating these conflicts. These were also conflicts that had to do with territorial boundaries. Of course, the colonial territorial boundaries were created without regard to traditional demarcations either agreed to by the pre-colonial nations or rightfully won as a result of wars or as a result of proximity or similarity in culture, language, religion, or some other form of bonding. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU, now African Union (AU) had, however, anticipated this and had declared in its charter that the boundaries inherited at independence by African nations remain inviolable. This has not proved effective in preventing boundary-related wars or skirmishes. Where full-scale war had been prevented, tensions were nevertheless heightened as was the case between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula.

The second is the anti-apartheid wars in South Africa, Namibia, and against the racist regime in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). These were insurrections and wars by the predominant native Blacks against foreign interests in coalition with some white minority elements within the state desirous of subjecting the majority black population to inhuman treatment and segregation. These wars were waged through the 1970s and in the case of Namibia, all through the 1980s until eventual independence in 1990. During this period, the apartheid regime in South Africa equally put all the countries in the Southern part of the continent in a perpetual state of siege basically because of the belief that these neighbouring states were cooperating with internal forces against its apartheid policies. Finally, the major conflicts of the 1970s were the East-West Cold War. The Cold War-related conflicts in Africa during this period merely made African nations proxies of the larger conflict between the West (represented by the U.S. and its NATO allies) and the East (represented by the former Soviet Union and its WARSAW Pact allies). The East-West divide was reflected in Africa through direct or indirect support of warring parties. For instance, during the crisis in Angola, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) enjoyed the support of the East and the anti-West African states like Nigeria under General Murtala Mohammed while the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) had the support of the West. So, Africa became a battleground for the face-off between the West and the East during the Cold War period and was thus incorporated into the global crisis of this period.

The nature of conflict in Africa has changed considerably since the end of the Cold War and this change has been equally influenced and intensified by the advent of globalization since the 1990s. The nature of conflict has changed from conflicts among states to conflicts within states (intra-state). The nature of the conflicts in Africa is now more of ethnic-related killings and cleansing, bordering on genocide. Thus, post-Cold War conflict in Africa has intensified ethnic differences and identity. In part, the intensification of conflict has been occasioned by the economic crises most African states are experiencing and as a result of the fact that globalization has made African nations revert to their post-independence position of producers of raw materials rather than finished goods. The importance of Africa as a primary producer of raw materials has made such raw materials of paramount importance and the struggle for control of the sources of these raw materials is of utmost importance. The need to have a monopoly control of the raw materials has created a struggle between those who have them and those who covet them. Thus, resource control is a major cause of conflict between individuals and groups within political systems and between nations (Agara, 2015). As Khotari (1979, p. 6) also put it, "the control and use of natural resources lie at the heart of the deepening crisis in the world today".

Involuntary migration has therefore been encouraged by Horowitz's "fear of extinction" thesis, Volkan's "fear of dying off" thesis, and Rothchild's "fear of the future" thesis resulting from the escalation of conflicts which has been triggered by "distributional conflicts" (Rodrik, 1997, p. 8), resulting in what Longhorne (2002, p. 3) has called the "collapsed state" syndrome. As Alli (2005, p. 323) has noted, this struggle for access to economic resources; "has led to many social upheavals…conflicts between the people and the government and sometimes between the different ethnic groups fighting for political positions or influence, a critical instrument and platform for accumulation in Africa". For instance and just to cite a few examples, the right to extract oil had been one of the reasons for the continuation of the civil war in Angola. the Democratic Republic of Congo's civil war is also connected to the struggle for rights by the different ethnic groups to extract the vast and various minerals resources the country had been endowed with (Garfinkel et al., 2004, p. 1). The same can also be said of the ethnic struggle going on in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria where ethnic groups are clamouring for denied right to resources in their land. The rich diamond fields of Liberia and Sierra Leone had thrown up the concept of "blood diamonds". Smith (1992) has noted the close relationship between economic crisis and conflict, and Brown (1995) has equally noted that only four

countries – Niger, Sao Tome, Senegal, and Tanzania – out of Africa's thirty-three most indebted and economically distressed nations have so far not been engulfed by wars and conflicts.

Given the fact that most migratory movement in Africa is induced by violence and conflict in a particular area, there is a need for due consideration of its implication for societal security, particularly in the receiving country as migrants, inadvertently, have the potential to spread and carry the conflict along with them as they traversed from country to country in their bid to escape the conflict at home, thereby making them unwelcome and a threat to stability in the accepting country. Weiner (1992/93, pp. 105-06) has argued that there are "five broad categories of situations in which refugees or migrants may be perceived as a threat to the country that produces emigrants to the country that receives them, or to relations between sending and receiving countries." The first is when refugees and migrants are regarded as a threat – or at least a thorn – in relations between sending and receiving countries. This may occur in a situation where refugees and migrants are fleeing their country as a result of their collective or ethnic opposition to the regime in power in their home country.

The second is when migrants are perceived as a political threat or security risk to the regime of the host country. This may happen if the influx of migrants or refugees swells the number of a particular ethnic group that is in the minority and not in power in the host country, thereby exacerbating a smouldering situation in the host country. The third is when immigrants are seen as a cultural threat or, fourth, as a social and economic problem for the host country as in the case of the recent xenophobia experienced in South Africa. Fifth is when the host society uses immigrants as an instrument of threat against the country of origin. Although a causal relationship between conflict and migration, whether internal or international, has been established on one hand, Reuveny (2007, p. 660), on the other hand, has contended that "the process leading from migration to conflict works through four channels which may act concurrently." These channels are (1) through competition over resources, (2) tension between specific or particular ethnic groups, (3) distrust between migrant and host populations, and (4) tensions among socio-economically distinct groups. Another threat to societal security can also come from what the literature has popularly called "sons of the soil" conflicts; conflicts that pit local autochthonous communities against the migrant population, the type experienced between the Yorubas and Liberian migrants fleeing from Samuel Doe's pogrom.

Extensive literature exists to show that this type of conflict is very common throughout Sub-Saharan Africa (Weiner, 1978; Dunn, 2009; Mitchell, 2012), while a more recent study

stated that nearly one-third of all 'ethnic civil wars' in Africa can be classified as, or are caused by the "sons of the soil" syndrome (Fearon and Laitin, 2011). Thus, given the fact that most migratory movements in sub-Sahara Africa and perhaps in most Third World countries have been occasioned by conflict, they are forced and involuntary migration as a consequence of violence. The overall implication of this to the receiving and host country is enormous because, unlike voluntary migration, such forced migration usually involves people that (1) are less likely to contribute to productive economic activity in the receiving country, (2) are not selected for their skills, (3) are less employable as a result of having suffered war trauma, (4) have fewer assets due to the nature of their flight from insecurity, and (5) may need medical and psychological help to overcome the trauma of war and the effects of been forced out of their zone of comfort and the problem of adapting to new environment, culture, language and religion, help which the host country and people may be unable to render.

Conclusion

One of the very earliest theories of migration was propounded by Ravenstein (1885, 1889), who stated seven propositions of migration and which was later refined by Lee (1966) and has now been popularly accepted and termed as the "push-pull" theory of migration. In simple terms, the theory sees migration as caused by certain 'push' factors operating from the country of origin such as poverty, unemployment, landlessness, rapid population growth, political repression, low social status, poor marriage prospects, and a host of other factors.

The 'pull' factors operating from the host or receiving country include the possibility of better income, job prospects, better education and welfare system, good living conditions, freedom, and a host of other factors. Lee's contribution is in identifying what he called "intervening obstacles" which must first be overcome such as language and cultural barriers, distance of the journey and its cost, and others. However, conflict straddles both spectrums of the divide, whether we see migration from the perspective of initiation and perpetuation or the push-pull perspective. Conflict in one area may act as an initiator or cause for the movement of people, to escape and, if continued or sporadic can also act as the perpetuation of further and continued movement of people from that area. On the other hand, conflict within the zones of war can also be a push factor, whereas relative peace and freedom in the zones of peace could be a pull factor. Thus, within the African continent and MENA, conflict and the relative deprivation it engenders are important variables for understanding migration within this part of the globe. This is not to shut out other reasons, but it is to argue that it is a major reason that is

worthy of further consideration and the elimination or absence of which may bring migration to a trickle from the scale of a global epidemic which it is now.

References

Adamson, F. (2006). Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security, *International Security,* 31(1) pp. 191

Agara, Tunde (2015). "The Tragedy of Endowments": Globalisation, Natural Resources and Conflicts in West Africa. *Paper presented at the 5th International Conference on Livelihoods, Sustainability, and Conflict.* Center for Conflict Management, Kennesaw State University, Atlanta, Georgia, USA. April 17-18, 2015.

Alli, W.O. (2005). The Impact of Globalisation on Conflicts in Africa in Shedrack Gaya Best (ed), *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa: A Reader.* Ibadan, Spectrum Books.pp. 323

Arango, J. (2004). Theories of International Migration. In D. Joly (ed.), *International Migration and the New Millennium.* Aldershot: Ashgate.

Arango, J. (2000). Explaining migration: A critical view, *International Social Science Journal, 52*(165),15

Azar, E. (1986). Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Proportions. In E. Azar, & J. Burton (Eds.). I*nternational Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice* Sussex, England. Wheatsheaf. *Pp 31*

Azar, E. (1990). *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases.* Aldershot, England. Dartmouth. Pp.8-12; 155

Azar, E. (1991).The Analysis and Management of Protracted Social Conflict. In J. Volkan, J. Montville, & D. Julius (Eds.).*The Psychodynamics of International Relationships.* 2, Lexington, MA.: D.C. Heath, pp. 93-120.

Azar, E. and Burton, J. (1986). *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice.* Sussex, England. Wheatsheaf pp. 33

Brettell, C.B., and Hollifield, J.F. (eds.) (2008). *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines.* New York: Routledge.

Brown, M.B. (1995). Africa's Choices after Thirty Years of the World Bank. Penguin Books, Hammondsworth.

Bauer, T. and Zimmerman, K.F. (1999). Assessment of Possible Migration Pressure and its Labour Market Impact following EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: A Study for the Department of Education and Employment, UK. *IZA Research Paper,* No.3, July.

Castells, M. (1989). *The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring and the Urban-Regional Process.* Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. (2009). *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World.* Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Castles, S. (2010). Understanding Global Migration: A Social Transformation Perspective, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* 36 (10). Pp. 15-25

Chazan, N., Mortimer, R., Ravenhill, J., and Rothchild, D. (1992). *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa.* Boulder, Col. Lynne Rienner. Pp.189-210

Cresswell, T. (2006). *On the Move: Mobility in the Modern Western World.* London: Routledge

de Haas, H. (2008). Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective. *International Migration Institute Working Paper,* no. 9, University of Oxford.

Dunn, K.C. (2009). "Sons of the Soil" and Contemporary State Making: Autochthony, Uncertainty, and Political Violence in Africa. *Third World Quarterly,* 30(1)

Dustman, C. and Glitz, A. (2005). *Immigration, Jobs and Wages: Theory, Evidence and Opinion.* Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, CEPR, London.

Favell, A. (2008). Re-booting Migration Theory: Interdisciplinary, Globality and Post-disciplinary in Migration Studies. In C.B. Brettell and J.F. Hollifield (eds.), *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines.* New York, Routledge.

Fearon, J.D. and Laitin, D.D. (2011). Sons of the Soil, Migrants, and Civil War, *World Development,* 39(2)

Furley, O. (ed.) (1995). *Conflict in Africa.* London, I.B. Tauris. Pp.3-4

Garfinkel, M.R., Skapendes, S., Syropoulos, S. (2004), *Globalisation and Domestic Conflict.* Univ. of California, Irvine. Pp. 1

Gurr, T. (1970). *Why Men Rebel,* Princeton. NJ. Princeton University Press.

Harris, J.R. and Todaro, M.P. (1970). Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis, *American Economic Review,* 60.

Holsti, K. (1991). *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989.* Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press. Pp 306-334

Kacowicz, A. (1995). Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers? *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 32, (3).

Katz, E. and Stark, O. (1986). Labour Migration and Risk Aversion in Less Developed Countries. *Journal of Labour Economics,* 4.

King, R. (2002). Towards a New Map of European Migration. *International Journal of Population Geography,* 8(2).

King, R. (2012). Theories and Typologies of Migration: An Overview and A Primer. *Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations,* Sweden, Malmo Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare. Pp.10

King, R. (2012a). Geography and Migration Studies: Retrospect and Prospect, *Population, Space and Place,* 18(2).

Kothari, R. (1979). The North-South Issue. *Mazingira,* no. 10 pp.6

Kurekova, L. (2011). Theories of Migration: Conceptual Review and Empirical Testing in the Context of the EU East-West Flows. *Paper prepared for Interdisciplinary Conference on Migration, Economic Change, Social Challenge.* University College, London. April 6-9,

Lee, E.S. (1966). A Theory of Migration, *Demography,* 3(1)

Lewis, W.A. (1954). Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor, *The Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies,* 22.

Longhorne, R. (2002).The Consequences of Globalisation for Contemporary Conflict. *Paper presented for Australian Defense Headquarters,* July 29. Pp 3

Mabogunje, A. (1970). Systems Approach to the Theory of Rural-Urban Migration. *Geographical Analysis,* 2

Massey, D.S., Arrango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaci, A., Pellegrino, A., Taylor, J.E. (1993). Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal. *Population and Development Review,* 19(3) pp. 433-455

Massey, D.S., Arrango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaci, A., Pellegrino, A., Taylor, J.E. (1998). *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium.* Oxford, *Clarendon* Press

Massey, D.S. (1990a). The Social and Economic Origins of Immigration. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.* 510.

Massey, D.S. (1990b). Social Structure, Household Strategies and the Cumulative Causation of Migration. *Population Index.* 56.

Massey, D.S. (1986). The Settlement Process among Mexican Migrants in the United States. *American Sociological Review,* 51.

McKay, J.P.**,** Hill, B.D., Buckler, J., Ebrey, P.B., and Beck, R.B. (2007). *A History of World Societies,* 7th ed. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co. pp. 27-42, 769,819, 853

Mines, R. (1984). Network Migration and Mexican Rural Development: A Case Study. In Richard C. Jones (ed.), *Patterns of Undocumented Migration: Mexico and the United States.* Totowa, N.J., Rowman and Allanheld.

Mitchell, C. (1981). *The Structure of International Conflict.* London, England. Macmillan

Mitchell, M.I. (2012). Migration, Citizenship and Autochthony: Strategies and Challenges for State-Building in Cote d'Ivoire, *journal of Contemporary African Studies,* 30(2)

Myrdal, G. (1957). *Rich Lands and Poor.* New York, Harper and Row

Petras, E.M. (1981). The Global Labour Market in the Modern World-Economy. In Mary M. Kruz, Charles B. Keely, and Silvano M. Tomasi (eds.), *Global Trends in Migration: Theory and Research on International Population Movements.* Staten Island, N.Y., Center for Migration Studies.

Piore, M.J. (1979). *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labour in Industrial Societies.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Ramsbothan, O., Woodhouse, T., and Miall, H. (2007). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* Cambridge, UK. Polity Press. Pp 62

Ravenstein, E.G. (1885). The Laws of Migration – I, *Journal of the Statistical Society,* 48(2)

Ravenstein, E.G. (1889). The Laws of Migration – II, *Journal of the Statistical Society,* 52(2)

Reuveny, R. (2007). Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict, *Political Geography,* 26 pp. 660

Rhoades, R.E. (1978). Intra-European Migration and Rural Development: Lessons from the Spanish Case. *Human Organisation,* 37.

Rodrick, D. (1997), Globalisation, Social Conflict and Economic Growth. *Being Lecture delivered at Prebisch Lecture,* UNCTAD, Geneva, October 24. Pp. 8

Samers, M. (2010). *Migration.* London: Routledge.

Sassen, S. (1988). *The Mobility of Labour and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labour Flow.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Sassen, S. (1991). *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo.* Princeton, Princeton University Press

Sjaadstad, L.A. (1962). The Costs and Returns of Human Migration. *Journal of Political Economy,* 705.

Smith, D. (1992), Conflicts and Wars in S. George (ed), *The Debt Boomerang: How Third World Debt Harms Us All.* Pluto, London.

Singer, M. and Wildavsky, A. (1993). *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil.* Chatham, N.J. Chatham House.

Stark, O. (1984). Migration Decision Making: A Review Article. *Journal of Development Economics,* 14

Stark, O. (1991). *The Migration of Labour.* Cambridge, Basil Blackwell

Stark, O. and Levhari, D. (1982). On Migration and Risk in LDCs. *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* 31

Summer, W. G. (1906). *Folkways,* Boston, Ginn

Taylor, J.E. (1986). Differential Migration, Networks, Information and Risk. In Oded Stark (ed.), *Research in Human Capital and Development,* vol. 4, *Migration, Human Capital, and Development.* Greenwich, Conn, JAI Press

Todaro, M.P. (1976). *Internal Migration in Developing Countries.* Geneva, ILO.

Todaro, M.P. and Smith, S. (2006). *Economic Development.* Boston, Addison Wesley. Pp 342-439

Wallerstein, I. (1974). *The Modern World System, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century.* New York, Academic Press.

Weiner, M. (1992/93). Security, Stability, and International Migration, *International Security,* 17(3) pp.105-106

Weiner, M. (1978). *Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India.* Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press.

Wiest, R.E. (1984). External Dependency and the Perpetuation of Temporary Migration to the United States. in Richard C. Jones (ed.), *Patterns of Undocumented Migration: Mexico and the United States.* Totowa, N.J., Rowman and Allanheld.

APPLICATION OF STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM THEORY TO THE EVALUATION OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ANTI-CORRUPTION WAR IN NIGERIA.

By

Popoola Olusoji David (Phd)
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Igbinedion University Okada, Edo State.
Email: popoolaolusojidavid@gmail.com &popoola.olusoji@iuokada.edu.ng

+2348063170869 & +2348054096556
and
Ogunbor Isibhakhomen
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Igbinedion University Okada, Edo State

Abstract

Nigeria has consistently maintained high position on the scale of the most corrupt nations in the world as measured by Transparency International. The rating has not only dented the confidence of the international community in doing business with Nigerians but also has far reaching negative consequences on the socio-economic and political lives of Nigerians. Successive administration in Nigeria have made frantic efforts at reversing the trend through the formation of antigraft agencies and commissions. The paper interrogated the effectiveness of the two antigraft agencies of the Federal government, (the EFCC and the ICPC), and noted that while the agencies have made significant efforts at recovering looted funds, not much has been achieved at sanitizing the working environment that promotes and entrenched corruption in Nigeria. Historical research method was used to examine extant literature reviewed in the study. Although the use of agencies and commission to fight corruption started from the colonial days, the approach has been essentially reactive rather than proactive. The statutory functions of these agencies and commissions were mere duplication of duties of certain institutions in government and as such the fight is isolated and sectionalized. Leveraging on the structural functionalism theory, the paper argued that achieving corrupt free society is a function of building strong institutions that engender transparency, accountability and punish offenders appropriately. The in-built mechanism for fighting corruption in government institutions should be reviewed, modified, and reactivated to make the fight more enduring and sustainable.

Wordcount: **248**

Introduction

Nigeria has continued to rank high on corruption ratings in the world despite the commitments of successive administration efforts at fighting it. This is perhaps why the ruling party in Nigeria has anti-corruption fight as a cardinal manifesto that brought it into power in 2015. Currently, corruption perceptions index (CPI) scored Nigeria 24 out of 180 countries on corruption which means Nigeria belongs to the categories of countries that are highly corrupt in world. The implication of this rating is grave for the people and the country as a whole. In the first instance, it painted a gloomy picture of the public space and showed that Nigerians cannot be trusted in doing business with. The international investors are also scared of coming to Nigeria for investment as they stand the chance of being duped or losing their investment to fraudsters. Nigerians, both at home and abroad, are usually stigmatized as fraudsters any time they have course to interact with the nationals of other countries, and this does not only dampen their morale but depress their self-esteem among their contemporaries across the world. The Nigerian government officials are also not spared as they are often ridiculed in the public gathering anytime they go abroad for public functions. Sometimes the way they spend public funds and display affluence tends to confirm the assertion of being corrupt or at least presiding over a corrupt nation. The trends and patterns of anti-corruption war in Nigeria showed that successive administrations have always made it an issue before coming to power, but seem to leave the country worse-off than they met it. Many of the past governments often begin the fight against corruption by setting up of panels and commissions of enquiry to probe the immediate past administration but most times veer off the track to witch-hunting the political opponents or perceived enemies in order to take vengeance. In some cases, looters of public treasury who are smart enough quickly cross over to the ruling party and escape being probed, to get their 'sins forgiven'.

Literature has shown that right from the colonial era in Nigeria, the strategy to fight corruption has been through the panels of enquiry, commissions on asset recovery, anti-graft agencies. The common aims of these agencies and commissions have been to go after the looters of the public treasury, prosecute them and recover part of the looted fund. The resultant effect is that

only a few 'unlucky' looters are caught while several others are left hiding under one form of 'immunity' or the other in government ministries, departments and agencies almost on daily basis. One therefore wonders how the same approach is used by successive administrations and yet different results are expected. One cannot comprehend why a despite a system to punish offenders, looters continue to thrive at the expense of proactive strategies that meant to sanitize government institutions where looting takes place in order to achieve a more enduring success in fighting corruption. This paper examined the trend and strategies of fighting corruption in Nigeria against the backdrop of the positions of the structural functionalism theory with a view to determining the effectiveness of the two anti-graft agencies (the EFCC and the ICPC) in the war against corruption in Nigeria.

Literature Review

The post-colonial era in Nigeria has witnessed accusations and counter-accusations of corruption from one government to the other. Almost every in-coming government accuses the preceding government of corruption and often blames systemic failure of government institutions for massive looting of government treasury, hence their justification for creating agencies and commissions to fight corruption. For instance, the Justice Strafford Forster-Sulton Commission of enquiry was set up in 1956 to probe the immediate past government and later indicted Dr. Nnmadi Azikwe the Premier of Eastern Region of corruption. Justice G. B. Coker's Commission of Inquiry was also set up for a similar purpose in 1962 and subsequently indicted Chief Obafemi Awolowo - the Premier of Western Region. In 1967 a similar Commission of Enquiry was set up and found 15 public officials in the defunct Mid-western Region guilty of corruption (Chukwudum, 2004 cited in Nwaodu; Adam & Okereke, 2004). Major Kaduna Nzeogwu (the leader of military officers that staged a coup to overthrow the civilian government of the first republic) also identified corruption of the politicians as one of the reasons for overthrowing the administration of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa government in 1966 (Adeyemi & Adeoye, 2019). However, various approaches have been adopted for fighting corruption by past Nigerian leaders. President Shehu Shagari administration set up a probe panel headed by Justice Ayo Irekefe, and later proclaimed an ethical revolution for fighting corruption. He also established the Code of Conduct Bureau to guide the conduct of public servants and enforce prescribed behaviours (Chukwudun 2004 cited in Nwaodu, Adam & Okereke, 2004). The Military administration of Buhari/Idiagbon, Ibrahim Babangida General Sanni Abacha and General Abdulsalam Abubakar also set up probe panels at one time

or the other but did not embark of any remarkable step to follow up the probe panel nor issue white paper on their findings.

Through the activities of the public and private sectors, Nigeria economy has been greatly indicted for corruption. Lawal and Tobi (2006) evaluated General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida's administration and identified public funds that were fraudulently mismanaged to include: US billion Gulf War wind-fall in 1991, 30 percent oil revenue diverted to frivolous uses, US$200 Million from the Aluminium Smelter project and others. The General Sanni Abacha led administration set up the Okigbo Panel to probe the Babangida administration and the then Central Bank Governor (Anazodo, Okoye & Chukwuemeka, 2012) but nothing tangible was heard thereafter as General Abacha himself toed the same line (Ijewereme & Dunmade, 2014). Till date, Abacha loot is still being discovered and repatriated to Nigeria. Dr. Christopher Kolade Panel set up to review contracts, licenses and appointments during the regime of General Abdulsalam Abubakar reported that Nigeria was neck-deep in corrupt practices, thereby indicting Abdulsalam administration. Pointing out that 4,072 contracts, 576 licenses, 807 appointments, 768 awards and 111 approvals were made within 5 months of Abdulsalam administration. The panel submitted that 4,072 contracts cost N635.52 billion as against N88 billion budgeted in 1998. Late Musa Shehu Yar-Adua- the successor to President Obasanjo lamented the magnitude of corruption and reaffirmed his determination to fight it headlong but he could not do much before he died in office. President Goodluck Jonathan succeeded Late Musa Shehu Yar-Adua and was completely over-whelmed by corruption as he could not raise enough political will to fight corrupt politicians.

Chief Olusegun Obasanjo succeeded General Abdulsalam in 1999 as a Civilian President and told Nigerians that corruption was a major clog to the wheel of Nigerians Progress. Consequently, he forwarded a bill on the establishment of two agencies to fight corruption in Nigeria: the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) to the National Assembly. The bill was quickly passed and signed into law. President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 did not mince words in his determination to fight corruption. He constituted Alhaji Inuwa Commission of Enquiry to examine the performance of Major Projects in Abuja, set up Idris Kuta Panel to probe contracts awarded and sent a bill to the National Assembly for the establishment of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) which was later passed and became an Act

for fighting corruption in Nigeria. Among other things, the EFCC was established to: investigate, prosecute and convict high ranking administration officials, trace, seize, and confiscate all proceeds of crime, and institute due process mechanism in public sector procurements. The ICPC on the other hand is to: prohibit and prescribe punishments for corruption, fraud, embezzlement, bribery and forgery perpetrated by Nigerians home and abroad with impunity, examine the practices, systems and procedures of public bodies and where such systems harbour corruption, to direct and supervise their reviews, to educate the public on and against bribery, corruption and related offences, instruct, advise and assist any officer, agency, or parastatal on ways by which fraud or corruption may be eliminated or minimized (Salihu, 2019).

There is no doubt that two commissions saddled with these responsibilities in the midst of public servants across the three tiers of government will just be scratching the surface. One also wonders whether the responsibilities carved out for these commissions were not the statutory duties of certain government institutions. For instance, each ministry, department, agency has units for budgetary process and finance sections that handle financial matters while managing public revenue allocation, mobilizing domestic and external financial resources, formulating policies on fiscal and momentary matters, and preparing annual estimates of revenue and expenditures among other functions (Edehi, 2020). The structure also provides limit for the amount each public officer can sign or handle as cash. When there is a proven evidence of missing fund in an agency or other government structures. The police is designed to investigate and prosecute the suspects while the court adjudicates over the matter. Thus, the system has an in-built mechanism for checks and balances that can be effectively and efficiently managed and thus control public finances if properly executed. Apparently, to win the sympathy of the Nigerian electorate, President Mohammed Buhari made the fight against corruption a cardinal point in his manifesto while campaigning in 2015, but Nigerians are back to square one on corruption problem. There is no doubt that the solution to corruption issue in Nigeria does not lie with the political or military class as all their strategies and approaches have not worked. The use of separate agencies such as the EFCC and the ICPC has also not helped matters as they soon turn out to be an instrument of political witch hunting. We should therefore turn into the world of academics and seek scholarly views on the in-built mechanism through which the society can regulate itself, a tool for anti-graft war in Nigeria.

Theoretical Underpinning to the Study

Generally, Sociological theories focus on human society with a view to understanding the nature of human behaviours, patterns of group interactions, nature and functions of institutions with a view to maintaining harmonious and orderly society. In the context of this paper, a society faced with endemic corruption like Nigeria is far from being harmonious and orderly as the consequences of corruption undermine the security of life and properties. For this paper, structural functionalism theory is relevant, not only because it provides explanation on the process of keeping a unified society but also the content of getting it done.

Structural functionalism paradigm holds that when each component of the society (Structure) works together and perform its functions as laid down by the society, then we can have an orderly and stable society. It goes ahead to say that the social structure (various institutions that make up the society) has the responsibility for stability or instability, orderliness or disorderliness in the society as the institutions form the building blocks of the workings of the society.

Consequently, structural functionalists blame the endemic corruption in Nigeria on the failure of government institutions to perform their legitimate functions as entrenched in the extant structures of the society. Therefore, to correct the behavioural anomaly of the public service (or private service) in terms of corruption, the searchlight should be beamed on the structure and functions of governance and not necessarily creating another organs or institutions to perform a similar role where the former institution had failed. Structural functionalism theory advocates dual approaches to solving societal problems like corruption": the functions and structure. Functionalism views society as a system with a set of interconnected parts which together form a whole (Susser, 1992 cited in John, 2010). The argument is that when institutions in the society perform their statutory duties, social order will be created and we can have a corruption-free society, but where not, there will be heavy looting of the treasury. However, the performance of these institutional functions is hinged on how effective and efficient the structures that make them up are (Merten 1968 cited in John, 2010).

Otite and Ogionwu (2006) viewed social structure as an abstraction based on observation of social relationships that make up society and it is an intricate blend of the people, institutions and sub-systems. In the context of this paper, the pattern of relationship, interaction and power distribution in the various institutions that make up the society, especially in the public service, constitutes the structure of public service (which is the focus of this paper). For the society to

exist, unified human interaction, orderly institutions and structures are created to regulate behavioural pattern through norms and values that must be inculcated and internalized by members through socialization process such as staff orientation and training programmes (Otite & Ongionwu, 2006), to forestall such behaviour as corruption. This is the crux of the public service in Nigeria today.

Structural functionalism theory is predicated on the assumptions that the society is a functional unity with internally consistent and harmonized structure which is sustained by its different cultural forms. It holds that all institutions have positive functions in the society which justify their continued retention It holds the view that no society can exist without its established, accepted and shared customs, values, materials (objects and symbols), with inbuilt self-regulating mechanism for behaviour modification and correction.

The views and positions of the structural functionalists could be summarized as follows:

1. Nigeria society consists of structures which perform specialized but integrated functions for the survival of the society.

2. The structures of Nigeria government are the institutions (Ministries, Departments and Agencies) which perform various functions of the government at different levels of governance.

3. These social institutions (structures) are not seen as an isolated entity, rather they are understood with references to the contributions they make to the system as a whole.

4. These social institutions have the duty to ensure social order and solidarity through the establishment of the rules of social behaviour and set up structures to maintain social balance.

5. The structure and functions of the social institutions play complementary roles: the structure designs the parts/units that are to provide specific needs of the society in relation to institutional goals and objectives, while the functions spell out what are to be done to meet the needs in question.

6. Thus, any disorderliness in a system (e.g. public service) is seen a weakness in the structure and /or functions of the relevant ministry, department or agency.

    For corruption in the public sector of Nigerian government, therefore, structural functionalists argued that the structure of the governance in Nigeria is so loose that it allows leakages of public funds. They also argued that those who are assigned to play oversight functions over public funds have failed in their responsibilities or the functions are not adequate to prevent corruption.

7. Failure of the structure to identify and plug loopholes for siphoning public funds and inadequate or lack of statutory punishment to serve as deterrent constitute the bane of fighting corruption in government ministries, departments and agencies.

8. Over time, the structure and functions of government institutions should be reviewed to ensure adequacy of their functions in line with social solidarity and maintenance of social order in the society.

Structural Functionalism Theory and Anti-Graft War in Nigeria

Under a civilian administration like Nigeria, the public service consists of the political office holders and the civil servants. The political office holders form the cabinet in democratic administration while civil servants formed the engine room of the government. The executive arm of the government performs functions of governance through government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). In Nigeria where presidential system of government is practised and three tiers of administration exist (Federal, State, Local), political office holders could be found across the three layers of government. The mode and structure of operations of the political office holders are spelt out in the constitution and other extant laws of the land. The two other arms of government (the legislature and judiciary) also have politicians holding certain public offices and therefore subjected to the whims and caprices of the public service rules and regulations.

The political office holders in the public service are often appointed by the political party in power, usually from the party faithful. Thus, their tenure in office lasts as their party lasts in office or at the discretion of their party that nominated them. Consequently, the approach of political office holders to public service is slightly different from the civil servants because of non-predictability of tenure of service. Unlike the civil servants whose careers are relatively stable and who hold their allegiance to the government of the day (whether military or civilian) the political office holders are more committed to the party that nominated them and often do the political party's biddings rather than the public's while in office. This structure and allegiance have serious implications for access to and management of public funds that may be put in their custody (Subehu, 2009).

The civil servants on the other hand are career officers appointed to governmental Ministries, Departments and Agencies across all tiers of government. They are often guided by civil service rules and regulations which spell out what to do, when to do and how to do them. They

are in most cases professionals in their different fields and as such, they are also guided by the ethics of their profession. They constitute greater percentage of the public service workers and form the engine room of government. As career officers, they work with any government of the day and any party in power. Owing to consistence of tenure they often have long term experience of the workings of government including certain secrets concerning funds and budgeting provisions. In the context of corruption in the public service therefore, each of these categories has access to public funds which they can separately or collaboratively amass to themselves. However, in tandem with the perspectives of the structural functionalist theorists, the structure of governance in Nigeria radiates around three major organs (Executive, Judiciary and Legislature) with distinct functions for each organ and the institutions under them. The executive designs policies for the achievement of constitutional mandates; the legislature makes laws for the achievement of these policies and performs oversight functions on government programs, while the judiciary interprets and adjudicates over matters of conflict between the different stakeholders in government. Consistent with this network of relationship, Herbert Spencer in his work titled "Principles of Sociology" argued in favour of Evolutionary Cyclical Model (EVM) which begins with the differentiation and increasing complication of an organic or super-organic body, followed by fluctuating state of equilibrium and disequilibrium otherwise called a state or adjustment and adaptation and finally, a stage of disintegration or dissolution in a Human Society (Turner, 1985).

Analysing human society from the point of view of a functionalist, Spencer concludes that human society is constantly facing selection pressure (internal and external) that forces it to adapt its internal structure through differentiation. Every solution, however, causes a new set of selection pressure that threatens society's viability. Spencer recognized three functional needs that produce selection pressure in human society: the regulatory need, operative/production need, and distributive need. He further argued that all societies (including Nigeria) need to solve problems of control and coordination, production of goods, services, ideas and finally find ways of distributing these resources (Turner, 1985). With regard to the anti-graft war of the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN), budgetary allocation to public offices, management of internally generated revenue across various arms of government should be built into the institution of governance in order to forestall corruption in public offices. This underscores strong control and co-ordination of oversight functions in-built into the legislative structure of administration.

Parsons (1961) cited in Ritzer and Goodman (2003), while synthesizing the works of other structuralists, developed an action theory which is based on the system-theoretical concept and methodological principle of voluntary action. According to him, the social system is made up of the actions of the individuals which begin with the interaction between the individuals faced with a variety of choices about how they might act and other choices that are influenced and constrained by a number of physical and social factors. Parsons opined that each individual has expectation of the other's action and reaction to his own behaviours and that these expectations would be his own behaviour and that these expectations would be derived from the accepted norms and values of the society they inhabit. However, Parson argued that there would never exist any perfect 'fit' between behaviours and norms. So, such a relation is never complete or perfect. In the context of corruption in the public sector, the position of Parcott Parsons is that both political office holders and career civil servants have expectations from their jobs which might differ from each other. The behavioural expectation of political officer holders (which is usually the norm) is probably to fulfil their political party's aspiration and perpetuate their parties in government. This might be different from the career officers' and, as such, while one is trying to conserve the professional ethics, the other is acting the script of his/her masters. Each of them has expectations of each other's behaviour and choices which put them under the constraint of certain factors.

Another functionalist (Robert K. Merton) agreed with Parson but observed that Parson's model of explaining social action is problematic and too generalized. Holmwood (2005) identified three (3) main limitations in Parson's Social Action perspective, which are functional unity, universal functionalism, and indispensability. While taking a swipe at functional unity proposed by Parson, he argued that not all parts of a modern, complex society work for the functional unity of society. Some institutions and structure may have other functions or may be dysfunctional; some may be functional for a while and dysfunctional for another time. Just like the few who engage in corrupt practices with the public funds, Merton argued that some practices are only functional for a dominant individual or a group of the individuals such as the political elites in the public service (Holmwood, 2005). He therefore introduces the concept of power and coercion into functionalism and identifies the sites of tension which may lead to struggle or conflict. Thus, by recognizing and examining the dysfunctional aspects of society, we can explain the development and persistence of alternatives. Merton noted that the institutions that currently exist are not the same item, and may have multiple functions, so may the same function be diversely fulfilled by alternative items.

In the context of this paper therefore, the EFCC and the ICPC's functions of fighting corruption in the public sector are originally domiciled in the operations a structure provided for by Emile Durkheim, also focused on variables that enhance social order in a society. He called these variables "social solidarity and social differentiation". According to him, the existence of social order could be attributed to a mythical force inherent in the structure of the society called social facts. For him, social facts include beliefs, norms, values, conventions, mores as created and shared in any society (Obiajulu, 2006). He further stated that social facts are external to the individual, general to the society and constrain man to express his free-will. Society is external to the individual and exerts constraints over him. Thus, social institutions confront the individual, not merely as an external fact, which he must take account of in his actions but also as constraining forces which impose themselves upon him irrespective of his individual free will (Giddens, 1997). He opined that social order arises when social facts constrain the individuals and when deviance is punished.

In the context of corruption in the public service, Durkheim's position is that Public Institutions such as the Executive through various Ministries, National Assembly and Judiciary who are involved in allocation and utilization of public funds must ensure social order through the enforcement of "social facts" i.e. beliefs, norms, values, conventions, mores of the public or civil service. If these inherent social facts are religiously enforced as they should, it will constrain the public servant to avoid corrupt practices (individuals' free-will). It also emphasizes that if the society, through the judicial system, punishes offenders (corrupt public servants) it will not only constrain others from doing same but will serve as deterrent to others. If, however, the structure of the society is weak and unable to plug the loose ends where corruption can be perpetrated, and the officials who are supposed to exercise regulatory and oversight functions fail to perform them, then corruption will thrive. The way out is therefore not to float another agency to punish the offenders but to strengthen the institutions and functions associated with prevention and punishing corruption in the public service. For Emile Durkheim, society is greater than the sum of its parts. Once the individuals come together on permanent basis, a greater conscience should be created in the individual wherever he goes in the society and as such the societal interest should come first.

Conclusion

From the historical background of anti-corruption fight in Nigeria, it is evident that the problem of corruption in the public service has been endemic and successive administrations have demonstrated quest to stop it. The paper, however, noted that the most common approach of the past and present administration has been reactive through the policing of the offenders rather than being 'proactive'. This approach has not only refused to work but has compounded the expenditure profile of government through avoidable wage bills and capital expenditure for these needless agencies created to fight corruption in the public service.

Leveraging on structural functionalism perspectives, the paper argued that the disorderliness witnessed in the financial management of public funds in Nigeria was due to failure of the structures and functions of government institutions saddled with such responsibilities as financial management and expenditure control of public funds (Osawe, 2014). Some scholars have argued that government institutions (such as ministries, departments and agencies, MDA) are too bureaucratic in structure and so slow down the activities of government, but this assertion did not translate into financial management and expenditure control of these MDAs. Ironically, these MDAs are custodians of public funds that are being stolen by government officials.

Inherent in the existing structures and functions of public officials working in the MDAs are units in charge of accounts and duties on financial control and expenditure management. The duties are designed explicitly that every aspect of finance beginning from initiating request, to appropriating funds and raising of cheques or transfer of money from government account to another account that will execute the job are all duties/functions of personnel of these MDAs. There is also the national assembly or state/local government legislative houses who are saddled with the appropriation and oversight functions on government expenditure before and after execution. If there is any foul play, the system also provides for alarm to be raised and investigation and prosecution to be made. Thus, if these structure and functions are entrenched and performed, then there is no basis for corruption in the public service as we have today. Now that we are faced with massive corruption, it is either the structure in MDAs has broken down and/or the functions are no longer being performed.

There is no doubt that the civil service system in Nigeria is well structured but the civil service does not constitute the entire public service as politicians or the military constitute the second arm of the public service depending on which administration is in place. While a structure exists for the civil service arm of the public service, no serious structure exists for political

office holders or military officers in governance. Thus, there is no clear line of duties, career path, regulatory administrative control, institutional disciplinary apparatus etc. that can call this category of the public servants to order. Incidentally, they often constitute a significant proportion of officials involved in budgetary and financial matters in government. Studies have shown that these non-career public servants are more prone to corrupt practices and constitute significant proportion of either convicted corrupt government officials or beneficiaries of the looted funds. Amazodo, Okoye, and Chukwuemeka (2012) reported that an assets investigative panel set up by late General Murtala Muhammed while probing governors and other public officers that served under General Gowon Administration indicted ten (10) of the twelve (12) military governors arraigned before it and confiscated their assets. The panel further recommended a great purge of the public service which led to the retirement of more than ten thousand (10,000) public servants across the country (Amazodo et al, 2012). The Paul Omo tribunal under General Mohammadu Buhari regime arraigned most politicians (after seizing power), found them guilty of corruption and sentenced most of them to long terms (Lawal & Tobi, 2006). Thus, the paper concluded that the non-career officers of the public service in Nigeria have no definable structure and constitute great threat to the public finance, if not well handled.

In sheer frustration successive administrations in Nigeria have established tribunals, panels of enquires, and anti-corruption agencies such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) to fight corruption. We also noted that the Acts and legislation establishing these panels and agencies spelt out their functions and gave legitimacy to them. However, they were not rooted institutionally, as many of them were appendages to the administration they serve. Consequently, many of them turned out to be tools of political vengeance or at best one-edged sword in the hands of oppressors. Arising from this, many of their functions are related to policing offenders, whereas reformation of the structure that has institutionalised corruption is unattended to. This post-mortem approach does not only contravene the tenets and principles of structural functionalism, it does not address the defects in the structure and functions of the system but grossly unsustainable. The paper argued that a sustainable and effective fight against corruption is not the one that merely punishes offenders but one that modifies and entrench the right behaviour in human institutions, regardless of who is in governance.

This paper therefore recommends: the review of the civil service act to reinforce financial management and expenditure control, establishment of a Public Service Act which will regulate both the career and non-career officers' activities, disband the EFCC, and ICPC and other anti-graft agencies, re-orientate the public servant to be alive to their statutory financial regulatory functions, and report corrupt public officers to the police for investigation and prosecution.

REFERENCES

Adeyemi, O. & Adeoye, J.O. (2019). Historical dynamics of the anti-corruption war in Nigeria. *Public Policy and Administration Research, 9*(9), 55-64.

Anazodo, R., Okoye, J. C., & Chukwuemeka, E. E. O. (2012). Civil Servants reforms in Nigeria: the journey so far in service delivery. *American Journal of Social and Management Sciences,* e, 17-29

Edih U.O. (2020). Economic gains of whistle –blowing policy in Nigeria: Prospects and Challenges. *International Journal of International Relations, Media and Mass Communication Studies,* 6(2), 1 – 3, August.

Giddens, A. (2009) *The Constitution of Society* in the Giddens Reader Phillip Cassell (eds) MacMillan Press pp.88

Holmwood, J., (2005) Functionalism and its Critics in Harrington, A., (ed) Modern Social Theory: an introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 87 – 109

Ijewereme, O.B. (2013). An Examination of anti-corruption in Nigeria Public Sector: Implications for socio-economic development of Nigeria. *International Journal of Public Administration and Management Research*, 2(3), 24-38.

John, F.R. (2010). 21st Century Political Science, A reference handbook, Vol. 1

Lawal, G., & Tobi, A. (2006). Bureaucratic Corruption, Good Governance and Development: The Challenges and prospects of institution building in Nigeria. *Journal of Applied Sciences Research,* 2, 642-649.

Merton, Robert (1957). *Social Theory and Social Structure,* revised and enlarged. London: The Free Press of Glencoe.

Nwaodu, N., Adam, D. & Okereke, O. (2004). A review of anti-corruption wars in Nigeria. *Africa's Public Service Delivery & performance Review,* 2(3),, 153 – 174, September. Osawe, C. O. (2014). Reengineering professionalism in the Nigerian Public Service towards Service Delivery. *Review of public Administration and management,* 3(6), 63-75, December.

Otite, B.A. & Ogionwo, O. (2006), *an Introduction to Sociological Studies.* Heinemann Educational Books. Ibadan: Nigeria Plc.

Salihu, H.A. (2019). Whistle-blowing policy and anti-corruption struggle in Nigeria: An Overview. *African Journal of criminology and Justice Studies, AJCJS,* 12(1).

Suberu, R.T. (2009). The Travails of Nigeria'.s anti-corruption crusade. In Rotberg, R.I. (eds). *Corruption, Global Security and World Order.* Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

THE NEXUS BETWEEN PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT AND INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA

By

Blessing Ose OLIGBI, Ph.D
Department of Economics and Development Studies,
Igbinedion University Okada Edo State, Nigeria.
Email: osemhentaa@gmail.com
blessing.oligbi@iuokada.edu.ng

&

Mercy Osato Owen-osadiaye
FCA, ACTI

Abstract

The study examined the impact of private sector credit on investment in Nigeria, and the impact of macroeconomic factors on investment in Nigeria. In analysing the objectives, the study used annual time series data from 1985 to 2021, and the ARDL model. Thus, based on the adopted model, the empirical analysis revealed that there is a structural difference in the levels of investment in Nigeria between the periods 1985-2004 and 2005-2021 due to financial sector reforms in Nigeria, which have influenced the private sector credit. The study also found that private sector credit has a significant negative impact on investment in Nigeria, while money supply has a significant positive impact on investment. Therefore, the study recommended among others that government should look inward and address other factors affecting private sector credit that will boost investment in Nigeria.

Section One

Introduction

Nigeria, like every other country in the world, aims to achieve faster economic growth and this is only possible if the country has adequate investments and resources to finance such investments. A lot of economies depend on investments to resolve several economic problems, crises and challenges. Less developed countries in Africa such as Nigeria have put in place various economic policies that will attract as well as keep hold of private investors. This is due

to the fact that investments in certain sectors of the economy can rapidly transform the numerous economic challenges being faced as a nation. Extending access to credit, especially to investors, is a key role of banks and an essential ingredient of development strategies worldwide. This they do through the acceptance of deposits from customers and lending same to a large number of borrowers, thereby reducing the need for self-financing of investments (Nwaeze, Michael & Nwabekee, 2014). The volumes of credits to the private sector have direct influence on private investment activity. In Nigeria, the volume of total credit in the economy allocated to private sector was ₦10,514.17 billion in 2010. It decreased to ₦9600.02 billion in 2011 and later increased to ₦13,293.24 billion in 2012, ₦21,025.24 billion in 2016, ₦22,459.18 billion in 2017 and afterwards ₦2,9051.61 billion in 2020, ₦32,868.49 billion in 2021 (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2021). Nigeria, like every other country in the world, aims to achieve faster economic growth and this is only possible if the country has adequate investments and resources to finance such investments.

The private sector in Nigeria remains heavily constrained by its small economic capacity and credit bottlenecks. This necessitated the financial reforms carried out in the financial sector in the country to boost credits to the private sector. Despite all the reforms in the banking sector, banking credit channels have been dominated by the public sector trying to raise money to run the dwindling economy, thus making banks in Nigeria to favour the public sector with insufficient outreach to the private sector (Okorie & Chikwendu, 2019).

Before now the public sector has dominated investment in industries, banks and other economic and social activities as well as infrastructures with little involvement of the private sector, (Ijaiya, 2005). Given that the Nigerian economy is a mixed economy, one would have expected an impressive credit out-reach figures to the private sector but this has not been so thus, making public sector credits to crowd-out private investment in Nigeria, (Okorie 2013).

There has been a growing concern on the poor output from private sector investments in Nigeria in recent times, despite the fact that the government embarked on several strategies aimed at improving the sector. Many have attributed the unimpressive performance of the private sector investments in Nigeria mainly to lack of credit facility to the investors (Okorie & Chikwendu, 2019). When one notes that researches that portray the magnitude of the impact of the private sector credit on the investments in Nigeria are scanty, the need for this study becomes more evident. Previous studies on the subject matter have concentrated more on the impact of private sector credit on economic growth or one sector of the economy. It would therefore be appropriate to bridge this knowledge gap by finding out the volume of private sector credit and its impact on investments in Nigeria. The broad objective of this study is to examine the impact of private sector credit on investment in Nigeria from 1985-2021.

Section Two

Literature Review

Iheonu, Asongu, Odo and Ojiem (2020) examined the impact of financial sector development on domestic investment in selected countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for the period 1985 - 2017. The study employed the augmented mean group procedure, which accounts for country-specific heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence, and the Granger non-causality test to test for causality in the presence of cross-sectional dependence. The results of the study showed that the impact of financial sector development on domestic investment depends on the financial development variable used. The study also showed that domestic credit to the private sector has an insignificant positive impact on domestic investment in ECOWAS, while the ability of the banks to transform deposits into credit and broad money supply has a significant negative influence on domestic investment.

Oduntan (2020) studied the long-run impacts of foreign direct portfolio investment as well as other determinants of foreign direct portfolio investment in Nigeria over the period 1985-2017.

He used the Ordinary Least Square method of analysis to analyse the data. His result established that foreign portfolio investment, market capitalization and exchange rate have a positive long-run relationship with real gross domestic product in Nigeria. The study therefore recommended that authorities should strengthen the capital market against fraudulent activities to ensure the free flow of foreign capital into the economy.

Gbenga, James and Adeyinka (2019) examined the determinant of private sector credit and its implication on economic growth in Nigeria using data from 2000-2017. The major objective of the researchers was to examine the relationship between private sector credit and gross domestic product using the error correction model and their result showed that there was significant relationship between total credits to the private sector and money supply in Nigeria. The result also showed that there was significant relationship between private sector credit and economic growth in Nigeria. The study recommended that there should be regular increase of money supply to the Nigerian economy in order to increase the flow of credit to the real sector of the Nigerian economy; financial institutions should distribute more credit to the real sector for productive purposes in order to increase the gross domestic product. Okorie and Chikwendu (2019) examined the impact of private sector credit on private investment in Nigeria using data from 1981-2019. The study adopted the Autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) model for data analysis. The results of study showed that private sector credit has a significant positive impact on private sector investment in the short run, but in the long run, private sector credit has an insignificant positive impact on private sector investment in Nigeria. The study recommended that monetary policy makers should pursue policies that will increase availability of private sector credit which include reducing interest rate so as to increase private sector investment in the short run.

Adelegan (2018) examined the dynamic relationship between credit to the private sector, domestic investment, and gross domestic product in Nigeria between 1970 and 2015. The study employed the Vector Autoregressive model and its accessories of impulse response functions (IRFs) and variance decomposition composition to analyse the data. The results of the study indicate that the relationship between growth and domestic credit to the private sector is positive and insignificant. The result of the study also found that increase in prime lending rate reduces output for the period under study, but this was not statistically significant. In addition, the negative relationship between exchange rate and private domestic investment suggests that

the appreciation of the real exchange rate discourages domestic private investment. The study recommended that macroeconomic management policies should be enhanced, be better coordinated and the foreign exchange market stabilized.

Amoo, Eboreime, Adamu and Belonwu (2017) examined the impact of private sector credit on economic growth in Nigeria for the period of 1993 to 2013 using fully modified least squares. The result of the study showed that private sector credit impact on economic growth positively, despite low level of trade openness, monetary policy, investment climate and infrastructure. Also, the study revealed, through composite local condition index analysis, that private sector credit increased economic growth when domestic or local conditions were favourable and the absorptive capacity of the domestic economy for credit was estimated at 29% of the GDP in 2013. Nwokoye, Metu and Kalu (2015) examined the impact of Nigeria's bank credit on domestic investment in Nigeria using data from 1980 to 2012. The study adopted the error correction model (ECM) and the study found that bank credit has a significant negative impact on domestic investment in the long run while it has a significant positive impact in the short run. The findings of the study implied that bank credit to private sector is a strong driver of domestic investment in Nigeria in the short run. The study recommended that the Nigeria's banking system should be strengthened with more funds and supervisions, including polices that will encourage both foreign and domestic investors through the creation of a conducive political and economic environment.

Kalu and Mgbemena (2015) examined the empirical investigation of the link between domestic private investment and economic growth in Nigeria, using the Cob-Douglas model framework. The data for the study was estimated using the error correction model (ECM) covering the period 1970 to 2012. The study shows the significance of investment on real gross domestic product (RGDP). The result of the tests reveals equilibrium relationship between real GDP and its determinants in the long and short-run. An important finding of the study is that, like in most other studies, foreign direct investment (FDI) should at best complement domestic private investment. The study recommended that macroeconomic policies and overall macroeconomic stability is quite essential for the promotion of domestic private investment.

Onodugo, Anowor, Ukweni, and Ibiam, (2014) investigated the impact of bank credit on private sector investment in Nigeria using data from 1980-2009 adopting the ordinary least square (OLS) technique. The study also used the Johansen-Juselius co-integration technique in

examining the co-integrating properties of the variables, especially in a multivariate context. The result of the test showed that for the period, there was co-integrating relationships among variables suggesting long run relationship. The study therefore recommended that credits to private investors should be encouraged and interest rate policies should encourage private investment. Okorie, (2013) examined the impact of private sector credit on private domestic investment in Nigeria using the error correction model technique. The study found out that increase in private sector credit (PSC) has a positive insignificant impact on private domestic investment (PDI) in Nigeria. However, the non-statistical significance of private sector credit showed that there is need for increase in private sector credit in the Nigerian economy.

Section Three

Research Methodology

This study adopted the ARDL (bound testing approach). The choice of the approach is because it incorporates variables that are of the mixed order of integration 1(0) and 1(1). Also the ARDL modelling incorporates sufficient number of lags to capture the data generating process and is highly suitable when the sample size is relatively small. Also, the stochastic properties of the variables were examined using the ADF and PP testing procedures. Thus, the ARDL model specification is:

$$\Delta INVT_t = \beta_{0+} \beta_1 \sum_{i=1}^{n} \Delta(INVT)_{t-1} + \beta_2 \sum_{i=1}^{n} \Delta(PSC)_{t-1} + \beta_3 \sum_{i=1}^{n} \Delta(MS)_{t-1} + \beta_4 \sum_{i=1}^{n} \Delta(INTR)_{t-1} + \beta_5$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \Delta(EXCHR)_{t-1} + \psi_1 INVT_{t-1} + \psi_2(PSC)_{t-1} + \psi_3(MS)_{t-1} + \psi_4(INTR)_{t-1} + \psi_5(EXCHR)_{t-1} +$$

$$\delta_1 ECM_{t-1} \dots \dots \dots 1.1$$

Section Four

Data Presentation and Analysis of Results

Introduction

This section presents the descriptive statistics, unit root test result, bound test result, the regression result and the analysis and discussion of the Autoregressive Distributed Lag-Error Correction Model (ECM) result. The data used for the analysis were presented in the appendix.

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 Descriptive Characteristics of the Variables

	PSC	INVT	INTR	MS	EXCHR
Mean	7280.536	8327.386	18.08703	9003.106	120.0841
Median	1096.540	8167.450	17.59000	1952.920	120.9700
Maximum	32868.49	11445.86	29.80000	40318.29	408.9600
Minimum	13.07000	5668.870	9.250000	22.30000	0.890000
Std. Dev	9841.571	1482.271	4.150907	12190.39	110.1979
Skewness	1.148860	0.168865	0.521585	1.216086	0.899176
Kurtosis	3.011720	2.219373	4.125919	3.163847	3.109456
Jarque-Bera	8.139460	1.115305	3.632007	9.161062	5.004326
Probability	0.017082	0.572552	0.162675	0.010249	0.081908

Source: Computed by the Researcher

The descriptive statistics of INVT variable help to identify the place of Public Sector Credit, Interest rate , Money Supply and Exchange rate on Investment. It is seen from the table that Investment (INVT) was ₦8,327.386 billion on the average over the period of the study.

The Minimum and Maximum values of investment indicate movement in investment over the period within the range of ₦5,668.870 billion and ₦11,445.86 billion respectively.

The mean and median of all the variables are positive and all above 100% except INTR. Investments do not show evidence of fat tails, since the Kurtosis did not exceed 3, which is the normal value, but all other variables show evidence of fat tail implying a bit of left and right fat

The ARDL Model

Table 2: The ARDL Equation (4, 2, 4, 0, 3)

	Dependent Variable: INVT			
Variables	Coefficient	Std. Error	T-statistics	Probability
CONSTANT	2644.636	3279.894	0.806318	0.4327
INVT(-1)	0.423663	0.236746	1.789528	0.0937
INVT(-2)	-0.199499	0.183351	-1.088072	0.2937
INVT(-3)	0.809728	0.203765	3.973827	0.0012
INVT(-4)	-0.335724	0.234987	-1.428690	0.1736
PSC	-0.577478	0.262433	-2.200478	0.0439
PSC(-1)	-0.284176	0.246598	-1.152382	0.2672
PSC(-2)	0.243204	0.199937	1.216402	0.2426
MS	0.481776	0.235157	2.048741	0.0544
MS(-1)	0.163429	0.227707	0.717719	0.4840
MS(-2)	0.521802	0.214459	2.433111	0.0280
MS(-3)	-0.410064	0.265100	-1.546824	0.1427
MS(-4)	-0.301647	0.228049	-1.322728	0.2057
INTR	-2.315089	46.88820	-0.049375	0.9613
EXCHR	1.066525	10.34536	0.103092	0.9193
EXCHR(-1)	7.408984	13.23883	0.559640	0.5840
EXCHR(-2)	-38.11529	12.98874	-2.934486	0.0103
EXCHR(-3)	26.68157	9.871229	2.702964	0.0164
Diagnostic Tests				
Adjusted R-Squared	0.892440			
F-statistics	7.320982			
Prob (F-stat)	0.000172			
Serial Correlation LM test	0.1876			
Heteroskedasticity Test (BPG)	0.7169			
Normality Test	0.158043			

Source: Authors Computation Using E-views 10.0

The main objective is to estimate the impact of private sector credit on investment in Nigeria. From the estimated result in table 2, private sector credit is negatively related to investment variable and statistically significant which implies that a unit increase in private sector credit in Nigeria will decrease investment by 0.57 units. However, the negative impact is not expected, but could be due to some other factors due to governance or the dominance of government in the credit environment. Also, the estimated result shows that only money supply has a positive impact on investment in Nigeria. Interest rate and exchange rate have no significant impact on investment in Nigeria. However, interest rate is negatively related with

investment as expected while exchange rate has a positive relationship. The post-estimation diagnostics indicate that about 89% variation (adjusted R^2) in investment is accounted for by changes in independent variables. The F-statistic indicates that all the regressors employed in the study are jointly statistically significant (at 1% and 5%) in explaining changes in investment results.

SECTION FIVE

Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

Summary of Findings

This study examined the private sector credit and investment in Nigeria. The study used annual time series data from 1985 to 2021 and adopted the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Philips-Perron unit root test and the ARDL bound test procedure to examine the degree of integration among the variables. Thus, based on the adopted model, the empirical analysis made the following findings: There is a structural difference in the levels of investment in Nigeria between the periods 1985-2004 and 2005-2021 due to financial sector reforms in Nigeria, which may have augmented the private sector credit and caused a structural change in the level of investment in the country. Private sector credit has a significant negative impact on investment in Nigeria. Money supply has a significant impact on investment in Nigeria.

Conclusions

This study primarily examined the impact of private sector credit on investment in Nigeria. The variables used are gross fixed capital formation (proxy for investment) as the dependent variable, private sector credit, money supply, interest rate and exchange rate all as independent variables. The study equally examined the structural differences in the impact of private sector credit on investment between two periods: 1985-2004 and 2005-2021. The study adopted the

interactive dummy approach (ANOVA) for testing for structural change and the Autoregressive Distributed Lag model (ARDL) for examining the impact of private sector credit on investment. The major finding from this study is that private sector credit has a significant negative impact on investment in Nigeria. The policy implication derivable from the findings is that though credit to the private sector has been on a continuous increase, it has rather decreased investment. This implies that it has not been matched with desired investment returns, especially in the area of private investment returns.

 Recommendations

The following recommendations are made, based on the conclusions:

(i) As a result of the fact that there is a structural difference in the levels of investment in Nigeria between the periods 1985-2004 and 2005-2021, with investment level in post financial reform higher than pre reform period, it is advisable for policy makers to formulate more policies that will attract more credits to the private sector.

(ii) The result of the study shows that credit to the private sector has a negative significant impact on investment in Nigeria. This implies that there are other factors needed to interact with private sector credit for a positive impact on investment perhaps it could be that credit allocated to the private sector is not properly channelled to the sector. Thus, policy makers and the government should try to remove bottlenecks and secure the credit to the private sector environment that will positively boost investment in Nigeria by entering into Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with some financial institutions to grant low interest rate, no collateral , non –counterparty fund loans up to certain amount to investors in the productive sector of the economy to acquire modern equipment that will enhance their production capacity, like in the case of Benue State Government MOU with the Bank of Industry(BOI) few years ago, where several Farmers' cooperative in the State benefited from 10% interest N5 million loan without collateral and counter-party funding to acquire cassava processing equipment.

iii. The study also recommends that Government should look inward other factors, such as channelling of funds to address the poor state of Physical infrastructures particularly road networks , electricity and water supply and so on in the macro-economy that will be a determining factor in boosting investment in Nigeria.

References

Adelegan, A. E. (2018). Private domestic investment, domestic credit to the private sector and economic performance: Nigeria in perspective. *IOSR Journal of Economics and Finance, 9(3): 22-31.*

Afangideh, U. J. (2010). Financial Development and Agricultural Investment in Nigeria: Historical Simulation Approach. *Journal of Economic and Monetary Integration* Vol. 9(1):74-97.

Amoo, G. B. A., Eboreime, M. I., Adamu, Y. & Belonwu, M. C. (2017).The impact of private sector credit on economic growth in Nigeria. *Central Bank of Nigeria Journal of Applied Statistics, 8(2): 1-22.*

Aremu, J.A. (1997). Foreign private investment: issue, determinants, performance and promotion. *Central Bank of Nigeria Research Seminar Papers, 4, 55-65.*

Atoyebi, K .O, Adekunjo, F .O, Kadiri, K.I, & Falana, A .A. (2012). The Determinants of Domestic Private Investment in Nigeria. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (JHSS) 2(6): 46-54.*

Ayeni, R. K. (2014). Macroeconomic determinants of private sector investment – An ARDL approach: Evidence from Nigeria. *Global advanced research journal of management and business studies, 3(2):082-089.*

Bakare, A. S., (2011), Financial Sector Reforms and Domestic Savings in Nigeria: An Econometric Assessment. *Business Administration and Management (BAM), 1(6): 198- 204. Available online, www.primejournal.org/bam.*

Central Bank of Nigeria (2020). Reviews of performance of the Nigerian economy, *Central Bank of Nigeria Publications.*

Central Bank of Nigeria (2021) Annual Report and Financial Review, *Central Bank of Nigeria Bulletin.*

Gbenga, O., James, S. O. & Adeyinka, A. J. (2019). Determinant of private sector credit and its implication on economic growth in Nigeria: 2000-2017. *American Economic & Social Review, 5(1): 10-20.*

Ibukun C. O. & Aremo, A. G. (2017) Determinants of Inclusive Growth in Nigeria: An ARDL Approach. *American Journal of Economics, 7(3): 97-109.*

Iheonu, C. O., Asongu, S. A., Odo, K. O. & Ojiem, P. K. (2020). Financial sector development and investment in selected countries of the Economic Community of West African States: Empirical evidence using heterogeneous panel data method, *Springer, Heidelberg, 6(1): 1-15*, Available at https://doi.org/10.1186/s40854-020-00195-0.

Jhingan M. L. (1997). Macro-Economic Theory, 10ᵗʰ revised enlarged edition. Vrinda Publications (P) Ltd India.

Kalu, C. U & Mgbemena, O. O (2015), Domestic Private Investment and Economic Growth in Nigeria: Issues and Further Consideration. *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 5(2), 3012-313.*

Kwoba, M. N & Kibati, P (2016). Impact of Selected Macro Economic Variables on Foreign Direct Investment in Kenya. *International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences.* 4(3):107-116.

McKinnon, R.I. (1973). Money and capital in economic development, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

Nnanna, O. J., Englama, A. and Odoko, F. O. (2004). Finance, investment and growth in Nigeria. *Central Bank of Nigeria, Abuja.*

Nwaeze, C., Michael, O. & Nwabekee, C. E. (2014). Financial intermediation and economic growth in Nigeria (1992 – 2011). *The Macrotheme review a multidisciplinary journal of global macro trends, 3(6).*

Nwokoye, E., Metu,. A. & Kalu, C. U. (2015). Does bank credit have any impact on Nigeria's domestic investment? *Journal of Economics and Finance, 6(4): 32-43.*

Oduntan, K. O. (2020). Analysis of Foreign Direct Portfolio Investment in Nigeria. *Kampala International University Journal of Social Humanities. 5(3): 119-124.*

Ojima, D & Fabian, E. M (2015) Impact of Interest Rate on Investment in Nigeria. *Journal of Developing Country Studies, 5(3): 103-109.*

Okorie, G. C. (2013), An Error Correction Model of the Impact of Private Sector Credit on Private Domestic Investment in Nigeria. *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development. 4(11).*

Okorie, G. C. & Chikwendu, N. F. (2019). Does private sector credit impact on private sector investment in Nigeria? *International Journal of Research and Scientific Innovation, 6(12): 23-28.*

Onodugo, V. A., Anowor, O. F., Ukweni, N. O. & Ibiam, F. O. (2014). Bank credit and private sector investment: Evidence from Nigeria. *International Journal of Management Sciences, 3(2): 82-92.*

Shaw, E. (1973). *Financial deepening in economic development*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Uchendu, O.A. (1993). Interest Rate Policy, Savings and Investment in Nigeria. *Central Bank of Nigeria, economic and financial review*, 31(3): 34-52.

XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE IMPLICATIONSFOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA

By

Obidinma G. U. Obidinma, PhD
&
Subair A.B. Alexander, PhD
Department of International Relations & Strategic Studies
Igbinedion University Okada
Alexander.subair@iuokada.edu.ng

Abstract

The alarming and disturbing spate of xenophobia in African countries, particularly its violent manifestations in South Africa in recent times calls for a drastic measure to tame its metastasis. This research work examined the historical background of xenophobia in Africa, its conceptualization, causes and nature of xenophobic attacks. The roles of the African Union (AU) in dealing with the issues of xenophobic manifestations in Africa were clearly examined and the work channelled a way forward. Frustration-aggression and relative deprivation theories were adopted for the study. While using extant literature, however, the study concludes that the enabling factors and the continental mechanisms put in place be adequately checked vis-à-vis the extant continental treaties and protocols on regional economy, trade and security. Effective control of borders, strict migration policies on free trans-border movements to curtail potential criminal activities and illicit flow of unlawful substances, and illegal movement were recommended as welcome solutions to the problem. Socio-economic improvement, creation of enabling environment for youths to be productively engaged were also recommended as the panacea for the problem of Xenophobia.

Keywords: Africa, integration, regional, South Africa, xenophobia

Introduction

The issue of xenophobia has become a paradoxical impact of globalization's ideal of free trade and global human rights commitments. Most often, governments pledge openly to uphold ideals of common humanity and commit to fostering free movements of goods and services, but national immigration laws speak differently in response to the local communities' insecurities about foreign population influx and the consequences of such influx on access to social security and welfare (Njamnjoh, 2006). In Europe for instance, the treatment of migrants

crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, as well as the constant writhing by Western European States over the Strasbourg court's immigration policy decisions, evince this paradox and demonstrate the distant reality between international commitment and national implementation.

It is worth mentioning that racism is a global phenomenon, and oftentimes has been reported in France against several targets since the 19th century. Again, racism against the Jews has a long history, and these despicable acts have been reported against members of resident groups, including Algerians, Berbers and Arabs. According to the French National Commission of Human Rights (2016), 8% of French think that some races are superior to others and shockingly to buttress this, the 2015 terrorist attacks in France led to a greater presence of Islamophobia and also raised the number of racist acts. Similarly, in the Americas, the United States for example is a multicultural society, but racism and xenophobia are entrenched in the system. Although the United States has come a long way since the days of slavery, and huge steps were made towards granting equal rights based on race in the 1960s, regrettably, racism remains systemic in the US today (InterNations,2017). Sometimes it is blatant and open, but often it can be more subtle or even built into the system, as seen in racial profiling by law enforcement officers and other government officials, especially against African Americans. Xenophobia, according to Smelser and Baltes (2001), comes from the Greek words *xenos*, which means 'the stranger' and 'the guest', and *phobos* meaning 'fear'. It stands for 'fear of the stranger', but usually the term is taken to mean 'hatred of strangers'. Xenophobia can be understood as "an attitudinal orientation of hostility against non-natives in a given population" (Boehnke and Klaude, 2001). Studies on Xenophobia have attributed such hatred of foreigners to several causes: the fear of loss of social status and identity, a threat, perceived or real, to citizens' economic success, a way of reassuring the national self and its boundaries in times of national crisis (Harris, 2001). Mogekwu (2005) states that xenophobes presumably do not have adequate information about the people they hate and, since they do not know how to deal with such people, they see them as a threat. Regrettably, foreigners are the ones affected most, refugees, asylum seekers, and undocumented migrants are often the central targets of xenophobic attacks. According to Adeola (2015), in Africa, some of the evident manifestations of xenophobia have been the expulsion of foreign nationals, threats of expulsion, and in other instances, violent attacks. These manifestations date back as far back as the 1960s.

For instance, in November 1969, forty-nine days after becoming Prime Minister of Ghana, Kofi Busia introduced the Aliens Compliance Order which sought to expel undocumented aliens. "The Aliens Order required aliens who lacked work permits to get them within a period of two weeks or leave the country" (Gocking, 2005). Before this time, the perception that foreigners were supposedly responsible for a 'large-scale unemployment that had befallen Ghana' emerged in the country (Aremu & Ajayi, 2014). Most of the foreign populations were from other West African countries such as Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Togo, and Cote d'Ivoire. Nigerians constituted the majority of foreigners in Ghana. Their success in running businesses in Ghana led to an influx of other Nigerians to the country. In response to increased pressure from Ghanaian citizens, certain measures were initiated, including the Aliens Order and the Ghanaian Business Promotion (GBP). The GBP sought to reserve certain businesses for Ghanaians. To facilitate Ghanaian business promotion, aliens would be allowed to engage in certain economic activities only if they put in capital of determined amounts (Asamoah, 2014). The Aliens Order led to the mass exodus of between 900,000 to 1,200,000 individuals from Ghana (Oppong, 2002).

In 1972, the expulsion of Indian and Pakistani citizens by the Ugandan Military despot, General Idi Amin, brought about severe economic hardships and international disrepute (Kasozi, 1994). Despite the expropriated businesses owned by these foreigners, however, the economic downturn of the country was not salvaged (Stokes, 2009). In the early 1980s, due to the declining economic conditions after a period of economic boom in the 1970s, Nigeria, a West African country expelled over 2 million foreigners from the country in 1983, and over a million of these foreigners were from Ghana. In addition to the decline in economic conditions, another key reason given for the expulsion of foreigners from the country was the involvement of foreigners in crime in the country (Aremu, 2013, p. 341). In 1985, another wave of expulsion in which 300,000 Ghanaians were expelled from the country was similarly carried out and the reason given was not different from the first: simply economic conditions (Oteghile & Obakhedo, 2011).

The Southern African region is not exempted from this. In Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe's hostile policy against white men who invested hugely in agricultural sectors was in many instances condemned. This adversely affected the economic growth and development of Zimbabwe and led to Zimbabwe's economic backwardness on many fronts (Oyelana, 2016). In 2009 in Central Africa, the government of Congo Kinshasa expelled about 50,000 Angolans in retaliatory response to the mass expulsion of Congolese from Angola. This was done 'amid

a rising wave of unpopular anger over the humiliating treatment of those expelled by Angola' (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

Thus, the objective of this paper is to examine the manifestations of xenophobic attacks in Africa with particular reference to South Africa and the implications on regional integration. The research work is divided into five sub-sections and they are: introduction and definition of concepts with a review of literature, and theoretical framework. Xenophobia under international instruments is highlighted in the second section. The third section examines the role of the African Union (AU) as possessing the capacity to be a significant actor in addressing Xenophobia within the continent. The fourth section addresses the implications of Xenophobia for regional integration, while the fifth section is on the conclusion and recommendations.

Definition of Concepts

Xenophobia

Xenophobia is the fear or hatred of that which is perceived to be foreign or strange. A scholarly definition of xenophobia, according to Wimmer, is an element of a political contest about who has the right to be cared for by the state and society: a fight for a welfarist modern state. In other words, xenophobia arises when people feel that their rights to benefit from the government are being threatened by other people's rights (Wimmer, 1997).

Regional Integration

It is a process in which neighbouring states enter into an agreement in order to upgrade cooperation through common institutions and rules. The objectives of the agreement could range from economic to political and environmental cooperation. However, it has typically taken the form of a political economy initiative where commercial interests are the focus for achieving broader socio-political and security objectives, as defined by national governments. Instructively, regional integration has been organized either via supranational institutional structures, through intergovernmental decision-making, or a combination of both.

Literature Review

African countries have violent histories, but African immigrants in South Africa have been surprised by the extent of the heightening xenophobic attacks. In recent times, South African society has seen violent responses throughout its history, and xenophobia has become a new form of violence in the democratic era (Harris, 2001). Before 1994, immigrants from elsewhere faced discrimination and even violence in South Africa. Post-majority rule in 1994, contrary to

expectations, the incidence of xenophobia increased (Neocosmos, 2010). For instance, between 2000 and March 2008, at least 67 people died in what were identified as xenophobic attacks. Worthy of note, in May 2008, 62 people were killed in a wave of xenophobic attacks across townships. Foreign nationals, mostly migrants from Somalia and Ethiopia, were dragged through the streets of Alexandra, barely a few kilometres from Johannesburg's plush Sandton Suburb, and "necklaced": a rubber tyre, filled with petrol, is forced around a victims' chest and arms, and then they were set ablaze (Patel & Essa, 2015).

There is an abiding notion that Xenophobia is derived from the sense that non-citizens pose some threat to citizens' identity or their rights, and is closely connected with the concept of nationalism, the sense that each individual's membership in the political nation is an essential ingredient in his or her sense of identity (Kaysen, 1996). To this end, a notion of citizenship of a state can lead to Xenophobia when it becomes apparent that the government does not guarantee the protection of individual rights. This is all the more apparent where poverty and unemployment are rampant. Appallingly, many immigrants came to South Africa to get away from fighting and violence in their home countries, and this is not sufficient in itself to blame the violence on history (Serino, 2014).

Although violence has been embraced by some sections of the South African society to the point that to qualify as newsworthy, a certain level of violence must be met. Unfortunately, according to Harris (2002), Xenophobia has been presented as a pathology, because it is not a healthy feature of the new and democratic South Africa, and it is regarded as something negative and abnormal that cannot and should not be part of a healthy society. It is instructive to note that a history of violence is not only exclusive to South Africa, but the question now is why are most black African foreigners the primary targets of xenophobia? An easy explanation would be proximity, which is important in relative deprivation theory and Horowitz's ethnic violence theory. In addition, the group threat theory explains that the subordinate group of foreigners must be relatively large, and that leads to competition: for example, jobs. Invariably, this scenario mostly occurs in the townships where black African foreigners are situated as they are believed to be competing with citizens when it comes to housing, jobs, etc (Hagensen, 2014). Consequently, the nature of South African society may be part of the explanation for the levels of xenophobia. Society accepts violence as a means to an end and also accepts that foreigners are a problem. However, this may help to explain the violent nature of xenophobia.

Perhaps this is where the work should start. There is the need to offer the South African people a different way of channelling their grievances which appear to have taken a racial form, as most of the attacks are directed at migrants, especially black migrants from elsewhere on the continent, as opposed to, for example, Europeans or Americans, who are, to a certain extent, practically welcome with open arms. This racially selective xenophobia is exemplified by the fact that many of those in leadership positions are of 'foreign' origin, suggesting that exclusion is not simply directed against 'foreigners' but against those who seem to correspond to stereotypes of the stranger, especially those from Africa (Neocosmos, 2006).

From the findings of the South African Migration Project (SAMP,2001), not only are Africans discriminated against but Southern African Development Community (SADC) citizens, including Nigerians who are believed to take jobs from locals, commit crimes, and send their earnings out of the country. They also use the country's welfare services which in some cases provide treatment for infections (Crush and Pendleton, 2004). The overreaction and several attacks unleashed on black foreigners make the situation more problematic because of the historical universality of the struggle against apartheid and the unprecedented international, but mostly African, support it received in the 1980s. Ironically, the Africans that currently face such exclusionary rhetoric hail from the same nations that supported and nurtured the liberation activists by providing sanctuary, education, and sustenance to the fleeing comrades and cadres of the ANC who are today's gatekeepers (Nyamnjoh, 2006).

Similarly, another lens is rooted in and conditioned by the structure of its apartheid economy. The apartheid economy was a totalizing one, in that it mobilized all the social forces at its disposal to further the interest of the apartheid South African state. Since the primary productive sector in the apartheid South African economy was gold mining and the concomitant social relations of the mining process were mostly by the black labour force, the industry attracted heavy migrant labour from Southern African regions, notably Zimbabweans, Malawians, and Mozambicans to the fast thriving industry (Ikechukwu & Olotuche, 2021). The immediate result of this was that, as the foreign labour force began to gain social mobility in the gold industry and the black South Africans were continually subjected to the repressive policies of apartheid, social tensions rose in the political economy of the state and has since remained a dominant part of the social relations of the post-apartheid South Africa state (Konanani & Odeku, 2013; Chidozie, 2014).

No doubt, democratization in South Africa has translated to the poor having the same formal political power as the rich. The country remains one of the most unequal societies on earth. This gross inequality was engendered by the fact that when the country left apartheid behind, it did not leave behind the structures and processes which generated inequality. This problem continues to dominate the contemporary discourse on the nature of the post-apartheid economy in South Africa (Lester et al., 2000). Thus, this contradiction in the social relations of apartheid, resulting in limited opportunities for blacks in South Africa, fuels fear and suspicions among the majority of them, especially for foreigners. The mounting poverty and unemployment rate among the majority of the South African blacks have intensified in post-apartheid South Africa, prompting the various governments to initiate economic reforms to reverse the trend (Alozieuwa, 2009; Edigheji, 2012).

In any case, the deep economic cleavage in post-apartheid South Africa becomes pronounced when the rising influx of "other foreigners", especially Nigerians, and their active role in the economy of South Africa comes under scrutiny. The Institute for Securities Studies (ISS), South Africa, estimated that 13 million Nigerians are living in South Africa, while about 1 million South Africans are living in Nigeria. These figures imply that rather than portend an advantage for the South African economy, as many believe, there is instead a huge tension in the South African economy which has resulted in xenophobia in recent times (Salifu, 2013). According to Alli (2008), recent waves of xenophobic attacks on Nigerians living in South Africa bring into stark reality the preponderance of the Nigerian business community in the post-apartheid South African economy. The attacks in which more than 60 persons were killed and thousands displaced attracted diplomatic intervention by the Nigerian state. Even though no Nigerian was killed in the wake of the violent xenophobic attack, many lost their property, and their shops were looted, an indication of an orchestrated attack on the businesses of Nigerians in South Africa (Jonathan, 2020).

Theoretical Framework

This research is premised on frustration-aggression and relative deprivation theories that explore the economic frustration and deprivation in most African countries with particular reference to South Africa. The theory as proposed by John Dollard and others contends that

aggression is the result of blocking, or frustrating a person's efforts to attain a goal (Friedman et al., 2014). It attempts to explain why people scapegoat (Whitley et al, 2009) and gives an explanation as to the cause of violence. According to Dollard and colleagues, frustration is the state which exists when a goal-response suffers interference, while aggression is defined as "an act whose goal-response is an injury to an organism (or an organism surrogate). The theory says that frustration causes aggression, but when the source of the frustration cannot be challenged, the aggression gets displaced onto an innocent target. For instance, frustration and aggression theory can be used to explain riots and revolutions, which both are believed to be caused by poorer and more deprived sections of society who may express their bottled-up frustration and anger through violence. However, this theory explains that another group is held responsible for the frustrations experienced or imagined by one group. (Soyombo, 2008). This usually happens when one group experiences problems attaining a goal, and then takes out their frustrations on another vulnerable group (usually a minority). This is usually when the agent of the frustration is too powerful to confront as seen in the case of South Africa. The inability of the South African government to address the economic hardships of its black citizens and develop in them the necessary skills to compete with foreigners in their midst is at the root of xenophobic violence in the country.

Relative Deprivation Theory

In explaining social unrest, relative deprivation theory suggests that the psychological factor of relative deprivation is a key factor. It derives from the subjective feeling of dissatisfaction, based on the perception that one is getting less than one is entitled to. This gap between reality and aspiration means that it is likely that social unrest will develop (Harris, 2002). In a refinement of the 'poverty begets conflict' argument, scholars have argued that frustration and thus aggression are functions of expected welfare as much as actual deprivation. Relative deprivation theory is now well-established, with both personal (Gurr, 1970) and intergroup (Runciman, 1966) variations having been advanced. Relative deprivation theory also utilizes the mechanism of frustration-aggression to link perceptions of conditions and conflict. However, several studies of South African Xenophobia have used arguments based on relative deprivation. In the case of South Africa, perceived earning differentials draw in migrants from most of Africa and beyond. At the lower end of the market, the inflow does not address shortages, but increases labour supply and reduces wages. This worsens an already skewed income distribution in the eyes of South Africa's low-income earners and causes resentment

towards a category of migrants, commonly expressed as "they have taken our jobs" (Kellet, 2002). This perception continues to spur severe attacks on migrant foreigners as drawn in literature.

Xenophobia under International Instruments

The International Bill of Rights, which consists of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), is the basis for all international legal documents on human rights. Thus, it is the background for any discussion on racism and xenophobia. Articles 2 and 7 of the UDHR stand out as guarantors of equality in any matter (UNGA, 1948) in addition to Articles 2(1), 20(2) and 28 of the ICCPR, (UNGA, 1966a). While the latter focuses on individual rights, the ICESCR, as its name says, covers important economic and social rights, but it also leaves important exceptions to economic rights for non-nationals in developing countries (UNGA, 1966b, Article 2, para. 3). Since the foundation of the United Nations, important treaties and covenants have been signed by the international community on the specific matter of discrimination. The Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) rules on the most violent act of discrimination: the destruction of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group (UN, Art.2). The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons both include non-discrimination provisions (UN, Art. 3). The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), nonetheless, is the main document regarding discrimination of all kinds. It binds all parties of the convention to eliminate racial discrimination by public and private institutions and individuals (UNGA, Art. 2). In November 1973, the General Assembly adopted the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (ICSPA), an advance in the global fight against racial discrimination (UN 2008).

However, the "World Conference on Racism" consists of international events organized by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), aimed at discussing and proposing policies against racial discrimination. Since its first edition in 1978, three more conferences were held in1983, 2001 and 2009. The latest, named Durban Review Conference, was intended to evaluate the progress made worldwide based on the 2001 Durban

Declaration and Programme of Action (UNGA 2007). The 2009 edition had expressive cases of no-show by Western countries due to divergences on the focus of discussion. The 2001 Declaration was considered by many of the boycotters as anti-Semitic and strictly turned against the West (CNN, 2001). Yet, the document produced in the 2001 meetings has shed light over considerable effects of colonization in producing social, economic, cultural, legal structures based or favoured by racism and xenophobia. Having been held in Africa, the Declaration repeatedly mentions the continent (UN 2001, Art. 34 and 35). Many articles (e.g. Art. 22, 25 and 27) approach the institutionalization of racism, xenophobia and other forms of discrimination through legal structures provisions (UN 2001).

Moreover, regional organizations also play a fundamental role in fighting racism and xenophobia worldwide. The Organization of American States (OAS), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have human rights regimes; and, except for the ASEAN, they all have specialized courts on the matter. The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights has a special agenda for "Racism & Related intolerances" (ERA 2013), while the OAS, through the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs of the Permanent Council, established a "Working Group to Prepare Draft Legally Binding Inter-American Instruments against Racism and Racial Discrimination and against All forms of Discrimination and Intolerance" (OAS, 2011 [d]). The OAS also maintains a "Rapporteurship on the Rights of Persons of African Descent and against Racial Discrimination" (OAS 2011 [c]). These are important initiatives, which allow the creation of regional bodies for combating racism and xenophobia in accordance with specific regional understandings of human rights.

Instructively, apart from the general protection afforded by international humanitarian law to civilians, refugees also receive special protection under the fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol 1. This additional protection recognizes the vulnerability of refugees as aliens in the hands of a party to the conflict and the absence of protection by their state of nationality (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2015). The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990) guarantees fundamental rights to workers and their families, as well as equality before the courts and tribunals and to treat migrant workers not less favourably than nationals in respect of remuneration for employment and conditions of work in terms of employment. Emergency

medical care and basic education are also guaranteed and regular migrant workers are to have the right to vote (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2015).

The Role of the African Union

The African Union Charter on Human and People's Rights has non-discrimination and the universality of human rights among its pillars. To Makinda et al (2016), AU, the regional institution mandated to advance cooperation among African states and between Africa and the international community, has the capacity and the wherewithal to act as a significant actor in addressing xenophobia. Under the AU Constitutive Act, the AU is mandated to promote human rights, sanctity of life, and peaceful co-existence and cooperation between African states, as well as position the continent at an advantage within the international community. In the solemn Declaration, AU members states are committed to 'continue the global struggle against all forms of racism and discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerances' (African Union 2013: art H(i)). To consolidate on this, the AU commitment was further emphasized in the 2015 policy document created by the AU to foster this Solemn Declaration (African Union Commission, 2015). However, while the Solemn Declaration and the Policy Document iterate the need for states to combat xenophobia by ensuring that Africa takes in global governance, regrettably, the roles of relevant institutions within the African Union in fostering this goal are not specifically mentioned.

By and large, there are roles which relevant institutions within the AU can perform in addressing the issue of xenophobia on the continent. For instance, Adeola (2015) opined that the AU has adopted numerous treaties within the African human rights system. While still named the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1981, it adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Charter), which is still the main regional human rights instrument. Worthy of mentioning is the fact that, in commemoration of the 50th year of African integration, the Assembly adopted the Solemn Declaration to serve as a springboard for the development of the Agenda 2063 policy document, which highlights the aspirations of the African Union over the next 50 years from 2013. One of the aspirations emphasized in the policy document is the need to combat the issue of xenophobia. In any case, even if the Assembly has taken steps in developing a strategy for the prevention of xenophobia, it is the stand of this paper that more should be done by cooperating with key organs on the continent with exclusive mandates on human rights protection, peace and security such as the African Union Commission (AUC), African Commission on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR),

the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by compelling member states to adhere to their decisions. Additionally, it can also do this by adopting a common position on the continent which should emphasize non-cooperation with states that fail to address xenophobic related attacks. In view of the fact that the African Union Commission is the secretariat of the AU, the AUC is the nerve centre of the AU. One of the departments of the AUC is the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). Within it is the Humanitarian Affairs, Refugees and Displaced Persons Division (HARDPA) with a mandate over issues of migration. One important role which the AUC can play is in facilitating regional discussions on the issue of xenophobia. The AUC should also develop advocacy pamphlets to foster regional sensitization on African shared values of humanity and on the rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. In collaboration with the ACHPR, the HARDPA should develop a model for states to utilize in developing national policies on the issue of xenophobia.

It is very crucial to note that the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, constituted in 1987, is the primary regional organ with the mandate to promote and protect human rights in Africa. Following the xenophobic violence in South Africa, the ACHPR adopted a resolution against this violence (Resolution Condemning the Xenophobic Attacks in the Republic of South Africa 2015). In the May Resolution, the ACHPR requested that the South African government ensures that mechanisms are put in place to prevent xenophobia from reoccurring. The ACHPR further stressed the need for investigation and urged the state to respect its obligations under the African Charter. As a pivotal institution in the promotion of human rights in Africa, the ACHPR has an essential role to play in addressing the issues of xenophobia in Africa. The ACHPR should assess national laws and provide recommendations on how these laws could be aligned with international human rights standards. The ACHPR should also develop a General Comment on the issue of xenophobia.

The Pan-African Parliament is another organ of AU that can play major role on the issue of xenophobia in Africa. Although initially created to foster economic integration on the continent, the PAP has assumed a broader function over time (PAP Protocol 2001; Dinokopila, 2013). Some of the functions of the PAP are to foster economic integration, promote human rights, democracy and good governance and serve as a focal point for engagement with regional economic communities (RECs) and their parliaments (constitutive Act of the AU 2000: art 3). In line with its mandate, one of the roles which PAP can undertake in addressing the issue of

xenophobia is to engage with RECs on legislative, administrative and other measures that can be adopted in combating xenophobia in states within the sub-regions. As these Regional Economic Communities (RECs), such as ECOWAS, EAC and SADC, have a strong presence in the AU, the PAP should engage them in actualizing regional strategies for tackling the issue (Adeola, 2015). The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a Peer Pressure platform that allows African leaders to assess their commitment to governance, democracy and development. The APRM has a relevant role to perform in addressing xenophobia in Africa.

The APRM is a voluntary self-assessment mechanism that is conducted under the aegis of the AU (Killander, 2008, p. 41). Member states of the AU voluntarily accede to the process. One of the institutions created the same time with APRM is the Country Review Mission Team (CRMT) (African Peer Review Mechanisms: Base Document, 2003). While the CRMT conducts country visits and produces reports on the progress made by states in line with its commitments on governance, democracy and development, the PEP oversees the review process, considers recommendations of the CRMT and makes recommendations to the APRF. While the CRMT and PEP are essential in addressing the xenophobia, this paper argues that the APRF is particularly significant as it serves as a platform for constructive dialogues between heads of states and governments (Turianskyi, 2013).

Implications for Regional Integration

According to Okem, Asuelime and Adekoye (2015), the integration of the disparate countries on the African Continent is a principal aim of the African Union. This is more compelling in the twenty-first century with all the myriads of socio-economic and political challenges the continent is besieged with. While the legacies of the continent's colonial past, neo-colonialism and the idiosyncrasies of Africa leaders have been identified as impediments to the realization of the continent's integration, the role of xenophobia as a hindrance to Africa's integration, regrettably, has not been recognized and acknowledged. Although xenophobia is not a new phenomenon on the continent, the size and scope of South African xenophobic attacks in recent years indicate a great challenge for African integration and the Pan Africanist agenda (Wellington, 2021).

The advanced economic development of South Africa when compared to most African countries has made it a country of destination for immigrants from across the continent. South Africa has a long history of attracting migrants, particularly those attracted to the mining

industry (Salvatore, 1990). The demise of apartheid in 1994 opened up the country to foreigners who came in as refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and students. South Africa is characterized by migrants from many countries around the world. These migrants are involved in both low-skilled jobs and high-skilled jobs. In South Africa, African immigrants are seen as competitors for scarce jobs, and at the same time, they are viewed as people who bring diseases into the country and place unnecessary pressure on limited government services (Nyamnjoh, 2006).

Against this backdrop, xenophobia in South Africa can be described as Afro-Phobia, given that attacks are almost always directed at black Africans. Those who are targeted are identified by 'criteria such as having dark skin or walking in a "strange way" (HSRC, 2008). This form of strategic essentialism undermines the continent's strive towards integration. The essentialisation of the other is also manifested in the manner in which the public and government officials associate certain crimes with specific nationalities. For instance, Nigerians are associated with drug trade; 'Congolese are identified with passport racketeering and diamond smuggling; Lesotho nationals, smuggling of gold dust and copper wire; and Mozambican and Zimbabwean women are profiled as indulging in prostitution (Nyamnjoh, 2010).

To buttress this, Tuffuor (2015) asked, what is the Economic implications of these incidences of xenophobia on the economics of South Africa and the entire continent? It is not far fetched to answer the effect on the economic integration of Africa. For instance, the dream for a united economy or regional economic integration in Africa started in the early years of post-colonial rule. African leaders' quest for unity after independence clearly demonstrates their commitment to this, giving impetus to the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, now African Union (AU). It is instructive to note that the current incidence in South Africa is an affront to this dream of a United Africa. This dream is a partnership for transformation. Through the strategies, policies, programmes and activities of regional integration, the fifty-four fragmented economies on the continent could become one robust, diversified and resilient economy, supported by a first class trans-boundary infrastructure, highly educated, flexible and mobile workforce, highly mobile financial capital, sound quality health facilities, peace and security.

In addition, the Southern sub-regional blocs' position to attract foreign direct investments (FDIs) could be non-achievable if something is not done to effectively manage the situation. Normally, every investor would want to invest in a politically stable economy, especially where maximum security is guaranteed for his/her investments. The incidence of xenophobia is a direct opposite of actions that attract investments into an economy, especially looking at the spread of South African conglomerates across countries in Africa. How well do some of these actions affect the operational safety of these companies? These actions put South African multinationals at risk of losing grips of their continental investments, the end of which will show that actions such as what we are witnessing in South Africa today negatively affect Africa economically and in all fronts, Pan Africanist's agenda.

To draw a needed attention to how development can be achieved, to Ilorah (2004), countries integrate through the formation of an economic union or a regional trade bloc. A regional bloc can implement, as part of its policies, a common market with unified monetary and fiscal policies. Such policies remove both tariff and non-tariff barriers for member countries. Non-member countries trade with the bloc and have to conform to the common trade policies and tax regimes that operate in the union (Johns, 2001). In the opinion of Salvatore (1990) cooperation among members of a bloc allows for the free exchange of labour and capital among member countries. Invariably, this produces benefits in terms of access to a larger market, which stimulates investment. Another important aspect of regional integration is that it encourages coordinated industrial planning, resulting in specialization with corollary benefits of large scale production (Todaro, 1994).

It is worth mentioning that in furtherance of the foregoing values of integration, various arguments have been advanced in academic and diplomatic circles for integration in Africa. Such arguments have been premised on the conviction that integration is a prerequisite step for Africa's economic growth and political stability (Okem, et al, 2015). Though as laudable as the benefits outlined may be, it is no gainsaying that the continued xenophobic manifestations in any part of the continent have the negative effect of pushing the fragile African economy to the back burner of today's globalizing world order.

Conclusion
Xenophobia is a heinous crime against humanity that involves aspects such as dislike, fear, distrust or intolerance of foreigners, often expressed in terms of hostilities towards immigrants.

Historically, the incidence of xenophobia is not a new phenomenon with the continent as most countries in Africa have one time or the other instituted policies that gave impetus to the practice of xenophobia. But all pale into insignificance when compared with the violence nature it wears in South Africa that has drawn the attention of the rest of the international community, and the enabling factors vary from the fear of loss of social status and identity, threat whether perceived or real, to citizens' economic success, and the way of reassuring the national self and its boundaries in times of national crisis. However, these factors do not appear to take cognizance of the extent international laws against any form of discrimination and protection from harm on immigrants and refugees. The implications of xenophobia for regional integration, if not abolished may have far reaching consequences on economic, trade and security issues for the integration of the disparate countries on the African continent which is the principal aim of the African Union. This is more compelling in the twenty-first century with all the myriads of socio-economic and political challenges that confront the continent. While the legacies of the continent's colonial past, neo-colonialism and the idiosyncrasies of Africa leaders have been identified as impediments to the realization of the continent's integration, the role of xenophobia as a hindrance to Africa's integration is yet to be recognized and acknowledged as cancerous.

Recommendations

Effective control of borders and drawing up of strict migration policies that would check free trans-border movements should be put in place to curtail potential criminal activities and illicit flow of unlawful substances and illegal movement. Various governments in Africa should improve the employment rate in their countries. Joblessness is at the root of xenophobia problems. The absence of clear-cut economic development strategy in countries of Africa with its concomitant impact on youth unemployment could mar the continent's efforts for economic integration. The continental body, the Africa Union (AU) should ensure compliance by member countries with all international treaties, protocols and covenants entered into by member states that are against any form of discrimination on foreigners and immigrants. In the event of any breach, collective actions should be taken against erring member.

References

Adeola, R. (2015). Preventing Xenophobia in Africa: What Must African Union Do? Pretoria. *African Human Mobility Review*, 1 (3):

African Union. (2013). *50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration. Addis Ababa: African Union Commission* in Adeola, R. (2015). Preventing Xenophobia in Africa: What Must the African Union Do?

Alli, Y. (2008). "*South Africa to Nigeria: We're sorry for Attacks*". The Nation, Wednesday, June 4. Pp. 1-2.

Alozieuwa, S. H. O. (2009*). "Beyond South Africa: Mbeki's Resignation and the Consolidation of Democracy in Africa",* Nigeria Journal of International Affairs Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 101 – 120 in Oluyemi, F. Chidozie, F. Ayo, C. 2015.

Aremu, O. J. (2013). 'Responses to the 1983 expulsion of aliens from Nigeria: A critique'. *African Research Review7* (3) 340.

Aremu, O. J. and Ajayi, T. A. (2014). *Expulsion of Nigerian immigrant Community from Ghana in 1969: Cases and Impact, Developing Country Studies 4*(10) 176.

Bochnke, Klaude. (2001). In NGO Working Group on Migration and Xenophobia for the World Conference in International Migration, Racism, Discrimination and Xenophobia. A Publication jointly Produced by ILO, IOM, OHCHR, in consultation with UNHCR. Pg 2.

Bonga, W.G. (2021). *Impact of Xenophobia Attacks in South Africa on Regional Integration Agenda*. International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Publications. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/353764140_Impact_of_Xenophobia_Attacks_in_South_Africa_on_Regional_Integration_Agenda

Chidozie, F. C. (2014*) "Dependency or Cooperation? Nigeria - South Africa Relations (1960-2007).* Unpublished PhD Thesis. Ota: Covenant University in Oluyemi, F. Chidozie, F. Ayo, C. (2015) Retrospective Study in the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa – Nigeria Relations, Covenant University, Ota.

CNN. (2001). *Police dogs set on migrants. 22*. November (Online) http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/africa/11/22/safrica.police/index.html Accessed: 24 May 2018.

Crush, J. and Pendleton, W. (2004). *Regionalizing Xenophobia? Citizen Attitudes to Immigration and refugee policy in Southern Africa, Canada*: South African Migration Project. Retrieved from: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1126&context=samp

Edigheji, O. (2012). *"Affirmative Action and South African State Capacity for Redress",* Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 149-167

Friedman, H. S., and Schustack, M. W. (2014). *Personality: Classic Theories and Modern*

Research (5 ed). Boston: Pearson. pp. 204 - 207.

Gocking, R. (2005). *The History of Ghana*. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group.

Gurr, T. R. (1970). *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press).

Hagensen, L. (2014*). Understanding the causes and the Nature of Xenophobia in South Africa: A case study of De Doorns* – A Master's Thesis, Stellenbosch University.

Harris, B. (2001). *A foreign Experience: Violence, Crime and Xenophobia during South Africa's transition*. Johannesburg: Centre for the study of Violence and Reconciliation.

Harris, B. (2002). '*Xenophobia: A new Pathology for a new South Africa*?' in Hook, D and Eagle, G. (eds). Psychopathology and Social Prejudice. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press. 169-184

HSRC. (2008). *Citizenship, Violence and Xenophobia in South Africa: Perceptions from South African Communities*. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, pg. 23.

Human Rights Watch (2012*)."If You Come Back We Will Kill You*." Sexual Violence and other Abuses Against Congolese Migrants during Expulsions from Angola: New York: Human Rights Watch Publications.

Ikechukwu, S.O & Olotuche, O.J (2021). *Examining the Triggers of Xenophobic Attacks in*

Republic of South Africa. Journal of Political Science and Leadership Research E-ISSN 2504-883X P-ISSN 2695 2432 Vol. 7 No. 2202. Retreived from : [*https://www.researchgate.net/publication/355119797_Examining_the_Triggers_of_Xenophobic_Attacks_in_Republic_of_South_Africa*](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/355119797_Examining_the_Triggers_of_Xenophobic_Attacks_in_Republic_of_South_Africa)

Ilorah, R. (2004). *NEPAD: The Need and Obstacles*: African Development Review, 16(2), pp. 223-251.

International Committee of the Red Cross (2015). Refugees and displaced persons

http ://www.icrc.org/web/Eng/siteengo.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_refuges_cmd_idps?

Inter Nations(2017) https://www.internations.org-guide   retrieved 22/07/2019.

Johns, D. (2001). *Health and Development in South Africa: from Principles to Practice Development, 44 (1), pp. 122-128.*

Jonathan, C. (2020). Deadly Denial: Xenophobia Governance and the Global Compact for Migration in South Africa. SAMP MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 82 Retrieved from : https://media.africaportal.org/documents/SAMP82.pdf

Kasozi, A. (1994). *Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 1964-1985.* London. McGill-

Queen's University Press.

Kaysen, C. (1996). '*Are Nations Natural Economic Units?'* in Bekker and Carlton (eds.) Racism, Xenophobia and Ethnic Conflict, Durban: Indicator Press.

Kellet, F. (2002). "*African immigrants not welcome*?" New Africa, April, issue 406 p.14

Killander, M. (2008). "*The African Peer Review Mechanism and Human Rights: The First Reviews and the Way Forward"*.Human Rights Quarterly 30 (1) 41.

Konanani, R. H. and Odeku, K. O. (2013). "*Vicious Attacks on Foreign Nationals in South Africa: An Enthreached Culture of Impunity*". Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences (MLSER Publishing), Rome, Italy.Vol. 4, No. 13.Pp. 801-807 in Oluyemi, F. Chidozie, F. Ayo, C. (2015).Retrospective Study of the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa – Nigeria Relations, Covenant University Ota, Nigeria.

Lester, A., Nel, E., and Binns, T. (2000).*South Africa: Past, Present and Future: Gold at the End of the Rainbow?* Essex: Pearson Education.

Mogekwu, M. (2005). '*African Union: Xenophobia as Poor Intercultural Information'*, EcquidNovl 26(1): 5-20.

Neocosmos, M. (2006*).From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners'*, Dakar: CODESRIA.

Neocosmos, M. (2010).*From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners'. Explaining Xenophobia in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, CODESRIA, Dakar.

Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2006*). Insiders and Outsiders. Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary Southern Africa,* London: Zed Books Ltd.

Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2010). Racism, Ethnicity and the Media in Africa: Reflections Inspired by Studies of Xenophobia in Cameroon and South Africa. Afrika *Spectrum*, 45(1), pp. 57-93.Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cmw.htm

Okem, A., Asuelime, L. and Adekoye, R. (2015). Re-visiting Xenophovia in South Africa and Its Impact on Africa Integration. Africa Institute of South Africa. *Africa Insight* VOL. 45 (2).

Otoghile, A. and Obakhedo, O. (2011).'*Nigeria – Ghana Relations from 1960 to 2010: Roots of Convergence and Points of Departure*. African Research Review 131.

Oyelana, A. A. (2016*). Effects of Xenophobic Attacks on the Economic Development of South Africa.* Eastern Cape, J SocSci, 46(3): 282 – 289

Patel, K. and Essa, A. (2015).*Xenophobia in South Africa/Causes, Attacks and History*. ALJAZEERA. Retrieved from https:www//interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2015/xeophobiasouthafrica/phone/index.html

Runciman, W. G. (1966). *RelativeDeprivation and Social Justice: A Study of attitudes to social inequality in twentieth century England.* (Berkeley, CA, University of California Press).

Salvatore, D. (1990*). International Economics (3rded.)* New York: Macmillan Publishers.

Smelser, N. J. and Baltes, P. B. (eds) (2001). *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behaviourial Sciences.*Elsevier. Oxford Science Ltd.

Solomon, H. and Kosaka, H. (2013).*Xenophobia in South Africa: Reflections, Narratives and Recommendations,* South African Peace and Security Studies, Vol. 2 Number 2.

Soyombo, O. (2008). *Xenophobia in contemporary society*: *A sociological Analysis.* IFE Psychologia 16, (2) in Singh R. J. (2013). *Examining Xenophobic practices amongst University Students – A case study from Limpopo Province,* Alternation Special Edition 7

Stokes, J. (2009).*Encyclopedia of the People of Africa and the Middle East.* New York: Infobase Publishing.

Todaro, M. P. (1994). *Economic Development (3rded),* New York: Longman.

Tuffuor, D. O. (2015).*Economic Implications of the Xenophobic Attacks on the African Continent* Retrieved from modernghana.com

Turianskyi, Y. (2013*). "The African Peer Review Mechanism Ten Years Old: How can it be strengthened?"* South African Institute of International Affairs Policy Note 2.

UNGA, United Nations General Assembly. *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*, 1966b.

Whitley, Bernard E., Kite, Mary E. (2009). *The psychology of prejudice and discrimination* (2nd ed.). Belmont, CA, USA: Wadsworth.

Wimmer, A. (1997). *"Explaining Xenophobia and racism: A critical review of current research approaches*." Ethnic and Racial Studies. 20(1):17

ELECTION OBSERVATION: DISCURSIVE DOMINATION AND RESISTANCE IN EURO-AMERICA – NIGERIA RELATIONS DURING THE 2019 ELECTIONEERING

By
Qasim Adeyemi Aliu
Assistant Lecturer
Nigeria Maritime University, Okerenkoko, Delta State
&
Ogungbenro Adewale Mathew

Abstract

This study explores ideological strategies used to exact, legitimate and resist power in the Euro-America – Nigeria relations discourse during the 2019 electioneering and evaluates their implications on peaceful electoral process in the country. The data comprise excerpts from four strategic statements by the UK, the US and the EU and three major rejoinders authored by Garba Sheu, Nasir El-Rufai and Festus Keyamo. Following the socio-cognitive model of CDA, the study juxtaposes opposing ideologies of the texts' producers. The analysis reveals that they present alternative realities about election observation to legitimate their various acts. We conclude that the different strategies tend to instigate the public against the government and election stakeholders as well as against the observers. To promote peaceful electoral process, we therefore recommend observers' improved impartiality and effective separation of power in Nigeria's democracy, especially on total independence of the judiciary and appointment of election umpire.

Keywords: election observation, power abuse, resistance, international relations discourse, CDA

1. Introduction

Rather than promote peace and stability, election observation, which involves making informed statements about a country's electoral process by a supposedly neutral body, has become a contentious issue, especially in many African countries where elections are still

fraught with violence or being stage-managed by incumbents in order to retain power. Although election observation remains an important measure for reducing electoral tension, violence and other malpractices, it has never succeeded in creating electoral credibility because of observers' perceived partisanship and largely the control exerted by the dominant elite over election management bodies and security agents (Kohnert, 2004; Mou, 2018). For example, many African leaders, especially the incumbents, usually criticise the exercise as an instrument of domination and infringement on their states' sovereignties by some super states and several international organisations. In some cases, many citizens and local election observers have condemned the legitimation of flawed elections by certain international observers as a subterfuge to promote foreign policy (Tapoko, 2017).

National elections are part of a state's sovereignty and they are traditionally conducted by a neutral national body. In contrast, election observation is a systematic gathering of information about a country's entire electoral process (before, during and after the election) by a (local or international) neutral body (Tapoko, 2017). In this study, however, we focus only on pre-election observation. Tostensen (2004) submits that the three-fold objectives of election observation are to legitimise (or if necessary delegitimise) elections, recommend ways of improving electoral processes, and to nurture democracy. However, conflict occurs when, because of many vested interests, election observers tend to influence the conduct of elections by passing comments capable of instigating acrimony and violence in the host country thereby jeopardising the whole process.

Thus, in hegemonic relations between super state(s) and less powerful ones, this tends to constitute threats and uncertainties to the aspirations of incumbents and it usually elicits resistance (Haugaard, 2013). Nevertheless, because of many African nations' dependence on foreign aids and technical assistance from Western nations, donor countries have continued to dominate international relations discourse under the guise of establishing democracy and good

governance and enforcing human rights (Laasko, 2002; Kohnert, 2004). In fact, Akyesilmen and Ishmeal (2019) argue that the beneficiary countries are negatively labelled 'third world', 'underdeveloped' or 'developing world' in order to naturalise social inequality and the super powers' dominance. Although the EU-Nigeria relations improved following the return to democracy in 1999, the relationship has always been asymmetrical and influenced by EU's strategic interests in the country (Bakare, 2019). Similarly, the US-Nigeria relations favour the unipolar world of globalisation, where Nigeria, as a subordinate ally, constantly preserves the aid providers' political conditions (Ogbodo, 2012).

As a former colony of Britain and the most populous black nation, which also proclaims Afrocentric foreign policy, Nigeria has assumed a strategic position in international affairs that many nations globally have been interested in and dependent on its political stability (Dauda, Ahmad & Keling, 2019). Its electioneering and elections proper have been bedevilled with different sociocultural issues, such as regionalism and ethno-religious conflicts, and that of 2019 was not an exception. The climax of the 2019 electoral tension was the January 25th 2019 suspension of the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN), Justice Walter Onnoghen, by President Muhammadu Buhari, few weeks before the presidential election upon charges of misconduct. As this could affect a part of the institutional and legal framework prepared for the elections, the United Kingdom (UK), United States of America (USA), the European Union (EU) and other election observers expressed serious concerns about electoral credibility, while notable Nigerian public figures condemned their statements as foreign interference.

Several studies (such as Laasko, 2002; Matlosa, 2002; Kohnert, 2004; Tostensen, 2004; Odukoya, 2007; Tapoko, 2017) have focused on election observation and diplomatic conflicts surrounding elections in many African countries. However, language, with its inherent ideological properties, has not received much attention. Although many linguistic scholars (see Aremu, 2015; Opeibi, 2006; Ademilokun, 2015; Taiwo, 2013; Kamalu & Iniworikabo, 2016)

have studied features of Nigerian political discourse, such as invectives, negative advertisements and metaphors, which can stoke electoral tension and violence, they do not focus on election observation and international relations discourse. Investigating Euro-America-Nigeria relations discourse during the 2019 electioneering reveals discursive strategies used by these nations to negotiate their relations. This is the gap that this study intends to fill.

Thus, this study seeks to identify domination and resistance strategies in selected Euro-America – Nigeria relations texts, discuss ideological and power relation features in the texts, evaluate their implications, and recommend strategies to promote peaceful electoral process in Nigeria. It specifically explores negotiations of meaning in the pre-2019 election observation statements by the UK, the US and the EU, as well as the rejoinders produced by Nigeria's Presidency, Governor Nasir El-Rufai of Kaduna State and the then spokesperson of the President Buhari Campaign Organisation, Mr Festus Keyamo. The present study does not only examine how dominant groups enact, perpetuate, and naturalise social inequality and power abuse, it also explores how dominated groups form resistance against power abuse. Therefore, it intends to answer the following research questions: (a) what are the domination and resistance strategies used in selected texts? (b) What are the interpretations of the utterances in connection with identity construction, ideology, and power relation? (c) What are the implications of the strategies? (d) What are the strategies to promote peaceful electoral process in Nigeria?

2. Domination and Resistance in International Relations Discourse

Domination is an act of exerting influence and control over an individual or a group, while resistance is an attempt by the oppressed to repel domination. It is the "illegitimate exercise of control over others" in order to promote personal or group interests (van Dijk, 1995,

p. 84). Domination is ubiquitous in that it involves many social group relations such as age, gender, class, ethnicity/race, religion, region, and even sovereign states. The intersection between domination and resistance is power relation. Both are interconnected because they reproduce each other and their dimension is dynamic in the sense that their actors' relationships are unstable (Johansson & Vinthagen, 2014). In other words, one dominant individual or group in a social context can be a dominated individual or group but an agent of resistance in another context.

However, domination is not only exerted through force, but also through discourse. Discourse, as an important instrument of domination, is usually used to control people's opinions and influence their practices. Because of its capacity to mask ideologies, language is easily used to incite people into action or even to naturalise dominance, social inequality and resistance. Discourse simply means language in use; that is, a stretch of language used to achieve a goal in a social context. It constitutes subjective meanings created and sustained in order to construct ideologically-induced alternative or adversarial social representations (Neumann, 2008; Holzsheiter, 2013). van Dijk (1995) establishes that through special access to public discourse, dominant groups influence the dominated groups socially, politically and culturally. For example, he suggests that the persuasiveness and manipulations in the discourse of super states in issuing threats and economic sanctions against weaker states in order to influence their political and governance process appear to be subtle forms of domination.

International relations discourse consists in any speech, text, report or document that is produced by a sovereign state, an international organisation or specific politicians and has regional or global politics as its goal. As expected of any political discourse, international relations discourse exhibits asymmetric power relations (between sovereign states) and overt and covert ideological structures and strategies that result in (re)construction of social reality. Since coercive power and invasion are no longer fashionable globally, actors in international

politics have embraced deliberation and argumentation in a way to use the power of discourse to legitimise dominance and/or resistance (Holzscheiter, 2013). Yongtao (2010) submits that with the social features and power effects of language, super states create or intentionally amplify artificial security threats and create enemies in order to promote their foreign policies and dominate global politics. For example, former President George Bush's rhetoric of "axis of evil" appears to have ignited global security concerns and thereby exposes the so-called enemies from that region to condemnation and elicit further sympathy and support for the United States. So international relations discourse, especially in an electioneering period, is expected to exhibit critical social issues, such as identity construction, ideologies, power abuse and resistance. These and other discourse features are what this study intends to investigate.

3. Methodology

Two separate statements by the UK and the US were sourced from the *The Cable* edition of 24th January, 2019. Another UK's statement of 26th January, 2019 on the CJN's suspension was retrieved from the UK Government's website. While both rejoinders of Mr Garba Sheu and Governor El-Rufai were drawn from *The Cable* of 26th January and 6th February, 2019 respectively, those of the EU and Mr Festus Keyamo were retrieved from the *Premium Times* of 26th January and 11th February, 2019 respectively. Statements of the UK, the EU and the US represent the anchor texts, which elicited many rejoinders; but we chose Sheu's, El-Rufai's and Keyamo's because the trio were among the most vocal defenders of the Nigerian Government during the 2019 electioneering. Using van Dijk's socio-cognitive model of critical discourse analysis, the texts were descriptively analysed. Subsequently, they were compared to determine the patterns of strategies used by the text producers in disseminating their different ideologies.

4. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA): van Dijk's Socio-cognitive Model

Critical discourse analysis essentially is an interdisciplinary approach that explores discursive (re)production of social problems, such as domination, inequality and resistance in order to proffer solutions to them. It tries to explain how discourse and society relate and affect each other. However, van Dijk's socio-cognitive model of CDA, as a synthesis of sociological, psychological and linguistic theories, stipulates that the relationship between discourse and society is mediated by cognition. van Dijk (2015) asserts that discourse production and interpretation are influenced by mental models and social cognition. That is, through personal experiences about the world, and by extension, socially shared knowledge, group attitudes and ideologies, powerful people or groups attempt to influence and manipulate the minds of individuals and groups and subsequently control their actions. Indeed, socio-economic and symbolic power resources, such as privileged access to knowledge, region and nationality, can be used to manipulate public discourse to present "polarized ideological discourse structures" through judgmental beliefs, such as attitudes and ideologies (van Dijk, 2015, p. 69).

Therefore, this model of CDA studies a set of "cognitive structures" and "specific discourse strategies", which create text producers' desired "mental models of social events", such as cooperation or violence in unsuspecting victims of such persuasive discourse (van Dijk, 1995, p. 85). Some of the structures and strategies include ideological polarisation between opposing groups, which is usually characterised by the use of pronouns expressing typical US vs THEM dichotomy and different forms of implicit and explicit positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (van Dijk, 1992; 2015). Others are self-presentation, group descriptions or identification, which reveals personal and collective identities of text producers, define and emphasise their beliefs, activities, common goal, norms and values. Thus, based on historical events and differences in beliefs, attitudes and ideologies, election observation is differently perceived as entrenchment of democracy by the UK, the US and the EU on the one hand, and as external influence by the Nigerian Government on the other hand.

5. Analysis

Two mental models that facilitate discourse processing (that is, meaning making) are (semantic) situation model, which refers to the situation of discourse, and the (pragmatic) context model, which refers to the communicative situation that defines "the appropriateness of discourse" (van Dijk, 2015, p. 67). The situation of discourse in this study is the 2019 electioneering, while the pragmatic context model is ethnic tension and the suspension of the CJN. Thus, this section is sub-divided into three analytical categories: threats as domination and resistance strategies, other-derogation as domination strategy and delegitimation as resistance strategy.

5.1 Strengthening Democracy: Threats as Domination and Resistance Strategies

A threat is an utterance that indicates harm if a desired action is not done. Threats are a feature of asymmetrical power relation as they are usually directed to less powerful people or groups in order to enforce cooperation or, more specifically, domination. Thus, as Nigeria and many other developing countries are less powerful, socially, economically and politically, super states, such as the United Kingdom and the United States of America, try to institutionalise election observation as a legitimacy stamp on their various elections as part of global efforts to promote democracy and good governance. However, against the observers' expected neutrality and respect for the host country's laws and sovereignty, election observation tends to be a source of foreign interference and domination due to violation of observation principles and standards (Kohnert, 2004; Tostensen, 2004; Tapoko, 2017). Indeed, van Dijk (1995) opines that, through threats of socio-economic sanctions against developing states, imperialist states exert subtle dominance in discourse just as revealed in Texts 1 and 2 below. Also, a counter-threat could be issued to resist domination as the host country tends to claim absolute power and tries to protect its sovereignty.

Text 1

We and our international partners remain committed supporters of Nigeria's democracy. We do not support any party or individual and believe that the Nigerian people should be able to choose their leaders in an environment free from hate speech and insecurity. …We will be deploying an extensive observation mission for the forthcoming elections, including coordinating with the EU's Election Observation Mission. Our monitors will in particular be looking out for any attempts to encourage or use violence to influence the elections, including on social media. We would like to remind all Nigerians that where the UK is aware of such attempts, this may have consequences for individuals. These could include their eligibility to travel to the UK, their ability to access UK based funds or lead to prosecution under international law. (UK, *The Cable*, 24th January, 2019.)

Through the expression "We and our international partners", the UK employs self-identification to emphasise its social identity. It outlines its activities, defines its goal in the Nigeria's elections and uses a disclaimer "We do not support any party or individual" to express its neutrality. The UK's description of itself as a supporter of free choice in Nigeria constitutes positive self-presentation. All these are done to enhance its credibility and legitimate its role as election observer. The positive self-presentation is contrasted with those who may "attempt to encourage or use violence to influence the elections", which represents negative other-presentation. This ideological polarisation is intensified by the use of typical pronouns of US vs THEM such as *we*, *our* in "Our monitors" and *their* in "their eligibility to travel to the UK". Also, while the UK's activities are described as strengthening democracy, 'others' are negatively described as trying to subvert it.

Based on previous experiences of electoral violence and the palpable tension that preceded Nigeria's 2019 general elections, the UK warned Nigerians against violence and threatened them with consequences, whose limit could not be determined. This reveals unequal power relation and Western dominance in international politics. Also, the word choice *monitor* in "Our monitors" suggests possible control of the election process. A monitor warns and instructs. Although election monitoring and observation are intertwined, the former appears holistic and broader than the latter in that it involves intervention whenever there is violation of basic electoral laws and principles (Matlosa, 2002, p. 134). The UK is aware of the struggle

of many Nigerians, including political actors, to gain opportunities in the UK and other Western countries. Therefore, threatening Nigerians with visa ban, access to foreign aids and international trials appears as power abuse. This suggests UK's influence on international courts' proceedings and that many states' sovereignties are being traded for political and scarce socio-economic resources. Similar threat is replicated in Text 2 below.

Text 2

The United States government does not support any specific candidate or party in Nigeria's upcoming elections. The United States supports the Nigerian democratic process itself. We support a genuinely free, fair, transparent, and peaceful electoral process. We, and other democratic nations will be paying close attention to actions of individuals who interfere in the democratic process or instigate violence against the civilian population before, during, or after the elections. We will not hesitate to consider consequences - including visa restrictions - for those found to be responsible for election-related violence or undermining the democratic process. (US, *The Cable*, 24th January, 2019.)

Like in text 1 above, the US deploys ideological polarisation, denies domination, and declares support for free choice in the elections in order to achieve legitimacy and promote its credibility. It also combines self-presentation with group description as in "We and other democratic nations" to emphasise its social identity, goal and norms and values. This constitutes positive self-presentation as the US is portrayed as a mature democracy which intends to spread it to other nations. This is contrasted with negative other-presentation found in "individuals who interfere in the democratic process or instigate violence against the civilian population" and "those … undermining the democratic process". Also, through victimisation, the potential negative act of violence against the powerless victims – "the civilian population" is intensified to justify the consequences – domination. This is complemented by the use of indexical that reveals implied negative opinion and distance about the outgroup (van Dijk, 2015, p. 73). Like in Text 1, the threat of consequences including visa ban exhibits unequal power relation between the two countries and power abuse by the super state because it seeks to enforce cooperation or, more specifically, domination. In addition, the vague and

indeterminate word "consequences" suggests unlimited harm expected from the US. Interestingly, these threats of sanctions usually generate counter-threats as forms of resistance as exemplified in Text 3 below.

Text 3

We are waiting for the person that will come and intervene. They will go back in body bags, because nobody will come to Nigeria and tell us how to run our country. We got that independence and we are trying to run our country as decently as possible and we know the history of those countries that are trying to teach us these things. (Governor El-Rufai; *The Cable*, 6th February, 2019.)

Governor El-Rufai of Kaduna State, who was then also seeking re-election, is an ally of President Buhari. His statement is a counter-threat to western observers' comments. He deploys speech acts of warning and threat and ideological polarisation between the western observers and the Nigerian Government. He supports this with pronouns exhibiting the typical US vs THEM dichotomy – "*we* are waiting …", "*they* will …", "*our* country", "*those* countries … trying to teach *us*". El-Rufai tacitly warns the opposition to expect no foreign support; and through the utterance "They will go back in body bags …", he threatens the observers with death if they try to influence the elections. A body bag is a bag used to convey a dead body.

To justify his threat, he employs negative other-descriptions embellished with 'teaching' metaphor "nobody … will … tell us how to run our country" and "those countries … trying to teach us". As teacher-student relationship is unequal and dominated by the teacher, this suggests western domination in the Nigerian politics. This is complemented by the use of distant indexicals in "*that* independence" and "*those* countries", which imply "[d]istance or a negative opinion about outgroups" (van Dijk, 2015, p. 73). As a form of positive self-descriptions, El-Rufai further contrasts these indexicals with the proximal one in "*these* things" to claim informed knowledge about democratic processes. The choice of "got" in "We got that independence" suggests the Nigerian people's courage and determination in the fight against colonialism. Also, the expression "we are trying to run our country as decently as possible …"

is an implicit concession that Nigeria's democracy is not perfect, but denies the government's partiality in the electoral processes. For claiming to "… know the history of those countries", El-Rufai seems to argue that democracy is a gradual process. This represents "nationalist self-glorification" (van Dijk, 1992, p. 109). However, El-Rufai's counter-threat appears to instigate violence against the opposition and foreign observers, which can lead to a war.

5.2 Afro-pessimism: Outgroup Derogation as Domination Strategy

Afro-pessimism is the wrong assumption that the African people, especially black nations, cannot peacefully rule themselves and deliver good governance without western countries' intervention. It constitutes neo-colonialism and racist practices, over-generalisation of African problem, preconceived negative ranking, selective news reporting and prediction of doom for Africa (Nothias, 2012). This mirrors discursive outgroup derogation, which exaggerates the dominated groups' negative aspects, in order to reproduce, mitigate, conceal or deny and legitimate dominance, such as super powers' intervention (van Dijk, 1992). For example, Odukoya (2007, p. 153) avers that the persistent "perception of Africa as the graveyard of democracies" makes election observation and monitoring in Africa inevitable. Also, Matlosa (2002) opines that the aggressive fault-finding tendencies of western election observers in the 2000 Zimbabwe's parliamentary elections were influenced by Afro-pessimism and imperialist hegemony. Thus, the consistent implicit and explicit expression of doubts on African democracies, as exhibited below, appears as a strategy to denigrate African democracies and facilitate external influence. As they emphasise negative aspects of the 2019 elections, Texts 4 and 5 below exemplify outgroup derogation.

Text 4

The EU Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) is very concerned about the process and timing of the suspension of the Chief Justice of Nigeria. … With 20 days until the presidential and National Assembly elections, political parties, candidates and voters must be able to have confidence in the impartiality and independence of the judicial system. The EU EOM will continue observing all aspects of the election, including the independence of the election

administration, the neutrality of security agencies, and the extent to which the judiciary can and does fulfil its election-related responsibilities. (The EU, *Premium Times*, 26th January, 2019.)

Through presuppositions and implicature, the EU Observation Mission tries to prejudge the Nigeria's elections in a way that can instigate the opposition against the incumbent government. Using strategic number game (van Dijk, 2015) "20 days until … elections", it decries "the process and timing of the suspension of the Chef Justice of Nigeria", who is expected to play a decisive role in electoral petitions. The use of the modality of certainty "must" suggests unequal power relation between the EU EOM and the Nigerian Government because it appears as a command. Also, specific mention of the beneficiaries of free choice ("political parties, candidates and voters") and emphasis on the impartiality of stakeholders in the conduct of elections (electoral body, security agencies and judiciary) undermine the credibility of the election processes. This tacitly draws a battle line between the two groups. However, the EU EOM tries to legitimate its observer role, conceal its domination tendency and save its face through the initial self-identification, repetition and positive presentation of itself as a strong supporter of Nigeria's democracy. The electoral prejudice is repeated in Text 5 below.

Text 5

We respect Nigeria's sovereign authority and its right to adjudicate on constitutional provisions but as friends of the Nigerian people, we are compelled to observe that the timing of this action, so close to national elections, gives cause for concern. It risks affecting both domestic and international perceptions on the credibility of the forthcoming elections. We, along with other members of the international community, are following developments closely. (The UK, UK Government website (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-statement-on-suspension-of-nigerian-chief-justice), 26th January, 2019.)

Through the apparent disclaimer "We respect Nigeria's sovereign authority … but …" and the hedging "It risks affecting …", the UK Government implicitly criticises the CJN's suspension and indirectly undermines the Nigerian Government's impartiality and electoral integrity. Both mitigation strategies are used to promote the UK's positive impression and deny

dominance. van Dijk (1992, pp. 105 – 106) claims that hedges express subtle denials, doubt, accusations, distance or non-acceptance of others' statements or actions. Also, a euphemism "friends of the Nigerian people", embedded in the disclaimer, and the self- and group identification "We, along with other members of the international community" emphasise UK's positive impression. However, the UK Government's specific intention in the vague expression "We … following developments closely" could not be determined. It produces the speech act of warning, which signals unequal power relation. Thus, expression of doubts in government's impartiality and electoral integrity tends to stoke electoral tension, and possibly violence, in the country.

5.3 Protecting State Sovereignty: Delegitimation as Resistance Strategy

Sovereignty is the supreme power and the inalienable right of a country to control all sociopolitical affairs, including elections, within its territory. Whereas, election observation is a systematic gathering of information about electoral processes and making informed statements about the whole process in order to promote free choice and prevent violence (Tapoko, 2017). Although election observation enhances sovereignty by its promotion of popular participation, respect for the rule of law and electoral credibility (Tapoko, 2017), strong comments of some imperialist observers seem to constitute threats to the host country's sovereignty and especially incumbents' re-election bid, like Nigeria's case. Therefore, these usually provoke resistance as the host country will try several means, including discursive strategies that tend to delegitimise external influence, to safeguard its sovereignty. Texts 6 and 7 below showcase different resistance strategies employed by the Nigerian Government to delegitimise western domination.

Text 6

Although the question of foreign interference, whether state sponsored,
promoted or otherwise has dominated recent elections and outcomes globally,

the federal government assures citizens and the global community that it will fiercely and assiduously promote the will and the right of Nigerians to choose and elect their leaders without pressure or assistance from persons or entities that are not constitutionally empowered to participate in the process. (Garba Sheu, *The Cable*, 26th January, 2019).

Malam Garba Sheu is the Senior Special Assistant on media to President Buhari. He employs positive self- and negative other-presentations influenced by ideological polarisation between foreign observers and the Nigerian Government. His allusion to previous successful practices of external influence in some nations' elections, purposely to create fear in the minds of Nigerians, presents election observers as a common enemy that must be combated. He contrasts this with positive presentation of the Nigerian Government as the protector of masses' rights. Also, he employs an explicit performative / speech act "assure" to state categorically that the Nigerian Government will protect its sovereignty in the elections. This is intensified by the adverbs "fiercely and assiduously". Emphasis on the negative activities of the observers – "without pressure or assistance from persons and entities … not constitutionally empowered …" – represents outgroup derogation. This is to expose the observers to condemnation, and delegitimise their perceived dominance and legitimate Nigeria's activities in the electoral process. These strategies, however, indirectly incite the public against the observers.

Text 7

Unfounded allegations and threats to penalize people for constitutionally-protected free speech is improper interference in our internal affairs. Sadly, what Ambassador Symington and some other western diplomats are doing border on the improper. … We take the view that the **constant** statements by Ambassador Symington and the other diplomats are implicit attacks against the government of Nigeria. These statements imply the Nigerian government is inclined to rig the election in favour of President Muhammadu Buhari. This is unfair and unacceptable to us. … He seems to be saying that only a PDP victory will be evidence of a fair election. … The days of unquestioned condescension to Western powers are long gone … (Festus Keyamo, *Premium Times*, 11th February, 2019.)

Mr Festus Keyamo was the spokesperson of President Buhari Campaign Organisation, at the time of this statement. He tries to deny the alleged Nigerian Government's instigation of violence and partiality in electoral processes. He expresses this through emphasis on negative other-descriptions – "Unfounded allegations and threats to penalize people", "improper interference in our internal affairs", "implicit attacks against the government of Nigeria". Keyamo specifically accuses the US Ambassador, Mr Symington, and other diplomats of supporting the opposition PDP against the Nigerian Government. He however attempts to delegitimise (and resist) "Western powers" in Nigeria's electoral process, through the speech act of declaration generated by the utterance "This is unfair and unacceptable to us". With this, Keyamo reverses the allegations and implicitly describes Western observers as the real instigators of violence. van Dijk (1992, p. 94) describes this strategy as the "strongest form of denial".

Also, Keyamo downplays the purported inciting statements and the speakers' identity through the euphemisms "constitutionally-protected free speech" and "people" in order to intensify the negative acts of the outgroup members – Western observers. This tacitly appeals to populism and Freedom of Speech – the norms and values of democracy. By this, as the word choice "penalize" suggests unequal power relation, he portrays the act of Western observers as oppression – an attempt to hinder free speech; and by extension, free choice in the poll.

6. Conclusion

This study has tried to explore ideological strategies used to exact, naturalise and resist power abuse in the texts produced by the UK, the US, the EU, Sheu, El-Rufai and Keyamo on pre-election observation during Nigeria's 2019 electioneering. Following van Dijk's socio-cognitive model of CDA, this study has analysed and explained some opposing ideologies found in the texts. In order to manipulate public opinion and legitimate their various acts, we

discover that the opposing groups prevalently use ideological polarisation, pronouns, positive self-presentation, negative other-presentation, identification, speech acts and mitigation strategies (such as disclaimers, euphemisms, hedging, vagueness). Using pronouns, speech acts of warning and threats and outgroup derogation, the dominant groups (the UK, US and EU) mainly create ideological division between themselves and Nigerian political actors to perpetuate and naturalise power abuse.

Whereas, the dominated groups (Nigerian political actors) deploy mainly outgroup derogation, speech acts of warning and counter-threat, metaphor, euphemisms, allusion and denial to demonise the western observers and construct scare tactics in order to expose them to public condemnation and/or attacks. However, we conclude that the various pre-election observation statements examined above tend towards prejudgment of the 2019 elections and can instigate opposition political parties against the government and electoral stakeholders, while the counter-threat and delegitimation strategies employed by the Nigerian Government also appear as incitements against the observer missions. We, therefore, recommend election observer missions' improved impartiality in order to achieve their goal of free choice and violence prevention. Also, to promote peaceful electoral process, we encourage Nigeria to overhaul its democracy to effect separation of power, especially on total independence of the judiciary and appointment of election umpire.

References

Ademilokun, M. A. (2015). Discursive strategies in selected political rally campaigns of 2011 elections in Southwestern Nigeria. *International Journal of Society, Culture and Language, 3*(1), 120 – 132.

Akyesilmen, N. & Ishmeal, M. (2019). The discourse on language in International Relations. *Przeglad Politologiczny, doi: 14746/pp.2019.24.3.7*, 79 – 92.

Aremu, M.A. (2015). Being politically impolite: A community of practice (CofP) analysis

ofinvective songs of Western Nigerian politicians. *International Journal of Society, Cultureand Language, 4*(1), www.ijscl.net ISSN 2329 – 2210.

Bakare, O. (2019). Investigating Nigerian-European Union Relations: A focus on the EU's strategic interest in Nigeria since 1999. *Open Journal of Political Sciences, 7*(6), 233

242.

Dauda, M., Ahmad, M.Z. & Keling, M.F. (2019). Foreign policy and afrocentricism: An appraisal of Nigeria's role. *Journal of Business and Social Review in Emerging Economies, 5*(1), 107 – 124.

Haugaard, M. (2013). Domination and resistance. *Journal of Political Power, 6*(2), 173 – 177.

Holzscheiter, A. (2013). Between communicative interaction and the structures of

signification: Discourse theory and analysis in International Relations. *International Studies perspectives, doi: 10.1111/insp.12005*, 1 – 21.

Johansson, A. & Vinthagen, S. (2014). Dimensions of everyday resistance: An analytical framework. *Critical Sociology, 5*(12), 1 – 19.

Kamalu, I. & Iniworikabo, P. B. (2016). Metaphors in selected political speeches of Nigerian democratic presidents. *California Linguistic Notes, 40*(2), 71 – 84.

Kohnert, D. (2004). Election observation in Nigeria and Madagascar: Diplomatic and technocratic bias. *Review of African Political Economy, 31*(99), 83 – 101.

Laasko, L. (2002). The politics of international election observation: The case of Zimbabwe 2000. *Journal of Modern African Studies, 40*(3), 437 – 464.

Matlosa, K. (2002). Election monitoring and observation in Zimbabwe: Hegemony versus sovereignty. *African Journal of Political Science, 7*(1), 129 – 154.

Mou, D. (2018). National security and electoral integrity: A focus on the Nigerian general election of 2019. *International Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies (IJPCS). 5*(2),

71-   109.

Neumann, I. B. (2008). Discourse analysis. In A. Klotz & D. Prakash (Eds.). *Qualitative*

Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide (pp. 61 – 77). New York: Palgrave   Macmillan.

Nothias, T. (2012). Definition and scope of Afro-pessimism: Mapping the concept and its usefulness for analysing news media coverage of Africa. In J. Plastow (Ed.). *The Leeds African Studies Bulletin, N0. 74 (pp. 54 – 62)*. Leeds: The Leeds University Centre for African Studies.

Odukoya, A. (2007). Democracy, elections, election monitoring and peace-building in West Africa. *African Journal of International Affairs, 10*(1&2), 147 – 160.

Ogbodo, S. (2012). An analysis of Nigeria- Us relations, 1999-2009. *(Master's Thesis)*. University of Nigeria Nsukka.

Opeibi B.O. (2006). Political marketing or political 'macheting'? A study of negative campaigning in Nigerian political discourse. *Reproduktionen and Innovationen in*

Sprache und Kommunikation Verschiedener Sprachkulturen Nr 16. Available at: http://www.inst.at/ trans/16Nr/01_4/opeibi16.htm.

Taiwo, R. (2013). Metaphors in Nigerian political discourse. In N. Johannesson & D. C. Minugh (Eds.). *Selected Papers from 2008 Stockholm Metaphor Festival, (193 – 205).* Stockholm: Stockholm University Press.

Tapoko, G. C. (2017). Election observation and the question of state sovereignty in Africa. *Journal of African Elections, 16*(1), 46 – 71.

Tostensen, A. (2004). Election observation as an informal means of enforcing political rights. *Nordisk Tidsskrift for Menneskerettigheter, 22*(3), 330 – 344.

van Dijk, T. (1992). Discourse and the Denial of Racism. *Discourse and Society*, 87 – 118.

van Dijk, T. A. (1995). Discourse, power and access. In C. R. Caldas-Coulthard & M. Coulthard (Eds.). *Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis (84 - 104).* London: Routledge.

van Dijk, T. A. (2015). Critical discourse analysis: A socio-cognitive approach. In R. Wodak & Meyer (Eds.). *Methods of critical discourse studies: Introducing qualitative methods (3rd ed.) (pp. 63 – 85).* London: Sage.

Yongtao, L. (2010). Discourse, meanings and international relations studies: Taking the rhetoric of "Axis of Evil" as a case. *CONfines: de relaciones internacionales y ciencia politica, 6*(11), 85 – 107.

HEALTH CHALLENGES AND COPING STRATEGIES AMONG PEOPLE LIVING WITH DISABILITIES DURING COVID-19 ERA IN LAGOS STATE, NIGERIA

RAJI Sakiru O., PhD
sakiru.raji@lasu.edu.ng
Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences
Lagos State University, Lagos Nigeria

Abstract

The World Health Organisation estimated that 15% of the world's population live with different types of disabilities, and 2 - 4% of this population are experiencing significant disabilities. The possibility is high that during the Covid-19 pandemic, the situation of people living with disabilities will be worsened. This study focuses on the health challenges and coping strategies adopted by this category of people to ameliorate their health situation. Conflict theory was adopted as the theoretical orientation. This study adopted the sequential explanatory mixed methods design of the triangulation of both quantitative and qualitative approaches. This study was conducted in the five divisions of Lagos State: Badagry, Epe, Ikeja, Ikorodu, and Lagos (Eko). For the qualitative techniques, three in-depth interviews were conducted among PWD in each of the five divisions of Lagos State, totalling 15 in-depth interviews. For the quantitative method, a stratified sampling technique based on Israel's Model (1992) of determination of sampling size was adopted, which amounted to 500. The data generated through in-depth interviews were content analysed. Cross-tabulation of variables was also done to show the effect of COVID-19 on some variables peculiar to PWD. The results demonstrate that a large and significant proportion of PWD are aware and believe in the existence of the Covid-19 pandemic. This level of awareness among PWD can be attributed to the combined and intense efforts of international organizations, national and state governments, non-governmental organizations, and individuals in ensuring that no one is left behind in the fight against the spread of coronavirus. PWD and other vulnerable groups should be empowered financially to make them economically independent, enabling them to be able to cater for their needs in perilous times as these.

Keywords: People living with disabilities, disability, Covid-19, lockdown, coping strategies

Introduction

Disability is increasingly on the development agenda and is one of the significant challenges facing the overall development of society. Disability is not a new phenomenon in the world, and there have been different studies with different statistics of people living with disabilities. For example, the World Health Organisation (WHO, 2018), estimated that 15% of the world's population lived with different types of disabilities, and 2 - 4% of this population are experiencing significant disabilities. In the same vein, the Human Right Watch (2018) estimated that about one billion individuals all over the world live with one form of disability or the other. In Nigeria, Eleweke and Ebenso, (2016) posited that about 22 million persons are living with disabilities, while *The Tide* (2017) estimated the population of people with disabilities (PWD) in Nigeria at over 25 million people. The fact is that the population of PWD is not a figure that can be ignored. Many of these individuals are also often deprived of their rights to live independently; they are usually locked up, shackled or cycled through the criminal justice system, leading to human rights abuses, social stigma, stereotypes, and discrimination (Human Right Watch, 2018).

With the declaration of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic by the WHO in February 2020, the gains of the international community in areas of technology and communication, through globalization have been lost to the debilitating effects of the Coronavirus pandemic (Loopstra, 2020; WHO, 2020). Societies have been closed against one another, restricting individual and group mobility across the globe, creating problems for human co-habitation as individuals rely on the use of face masks and other personal preventive equipment (PPE) to be able to communicate with one another and making social life very difficult from one country to another (Sarker, Wu, Alam, & Shouse, 2020). If individuals without disabilities could be subjected to and faced numerous challenges during COVID-19, how much more would be the situation of people living with one form of disabilities or the other?

Moreover, coping with disabilities varies across different cultural setups (Agarwal, & Steele, 2016). In the view of the social model, disability encompasses all factors that restrict people with disability, ranging from negative social attitudes, institutional discrimination, inaccessible public buildings (including Banks, hospitals etc.), unusable transport systems, segregated education, exclusion in work arrangement, and so on (Siordia, 2016). Parents, including the relatives of children with disabilities, are faced with unique challenges associated with their child's condition which may affect the entire family as an interactive unit; that is, if something affects or influences one member in the family, all members of the family are affected as a

whole. Parents of children with different forms of disabilities have an additional set of responsibilities compared to the parents of children without disabilities and thus, may endure an extra level of stress related to their child's disability. They undergo unique problems associated with raising disabled children (Wahab et al., 2018). Several studies (Oakley, 2016; Siordia, 2016; *The Tide*, 2017; Krishnamurthi, & Ojha, 2019) have focused on the causes and likely problems faced by disabled persons. However, adequate research attention has not been directed towards the plight of the livelihood of the PWDs during global pandemics such as COVID-19.

In trying to reduce and limit the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Lagos State government, health professionals in the state, alongside the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (NCDC) and the Federal Government rolled out guidelines which include total lockdown of Lagos State and Abuja for four weeks. After complete lockdown, Lagos State started experiencing partial reopening characterised by fundamental regulations such as social distancing, wearing of masks, and restrictions on the social gathering of people more than twenty. Based on the peculiarity of the situations of the PWDs, what are the coping strategies adopted by people living with disabilities?

Livelihood challenges are generally embedded among PWDs. For instance, livelihood challenges among PWD are exacerbated by commuting difficulties, poor access to information and public facilities, and exclusion from the decision-making process on issues related to their livelihood (Bombom and Abdullahi, 2016; Haruna, 2017). Similarly, in a study conducted by Wahab et al., (2018) profiling PWD in Lagos State, revealed that only 7.3% of people living with disabilities were reported to be employed. Consequently, the majority of PWD resort to begging as a means of livelihood (Khan et al., 2018). Furthermore, *The Tide* (2017) stressed that PWD face challenges such as denial of employment, and economic marginalization, among others. Is it sufficient to say that they are regarded as people who cannot contribute anything, are dependent, and always wait to be helped? According to WHO (2018) report on disability lack of equitability access to resources such as education, employment, health care, and social and legal support system results in PWD having a disproportionately high rate of poverty (WHO, Disability Report, 2018).

Early reports suggested that the Covid-19 pandemic worsened the socio-economic condition of PWD, limited their access to needed health and social services, putting them at the risk of impoverishment, abuse, poverty, morbidity, and mortality (Armitage and Nellums, 2020;

United Nations, U.N. 2020). However, adequate research focus has not been given to the awareness, perceptions, and coping strategies adopted by PWD in a society that is full of discrimination and biases toward PWDs. Hence, this study is very pivotal to ensuring that PWD are adequately catered for during and after any form of pandemic and as such, improving the welfare of PWD.

Disability and Access to Health

People with disabilities need adequate health care and public health programmes for the same reasons anyone else does, to stay well, active, and contribute to the community. This is often denied to an estimated 650 million people living with disabilities in the world today and 2 billion family members directly affected by disability (Yahaya & Halima, 2020).

According to the Equity Act 2010, a person is disabled if they have a physical or mental impairment that has broad and long-term adverse effects on their daily life. This definition moves beyond biomedical definitions that associate impairments with a disability, thereby addressing the social dimension of disability. Access to health care has several aspects: service availability, use of service, and relevance of services (Gulliford, Fugueroa-Munoz, 2012). This article focuses on the use of healthcare systems and barriers to it with precise emphasis on unmet healthcare needs.

In the U.K., there are facts of long-standing inequalities both in terms of access to healthcare, unmet need, and health outcomes. (Barr, Bamba &Whitehead, 2021). However, access to healthcare by people living with disabilities is either limited or inadequate. Available information shows that people living with disabilities do not have adequate access, including physical access to buildings, access to services and worse satisfaction with provided services, that their needs are not recognized, and that they generally face several barriers, both structural such as lack of transportation, financial and cultural misconceptions about disability (Emerson, Maddem, Robertson, Rechel, Abel, 2019 & 2020). Studies in the past have shown that disability is an added impairment in a bid to access healthcare services. (Sheer, Kroll, 2013). A systematic review on access to healthcare for disabled people (Gibson, O'Connor; 2020) established that people living with disabilities are restricted in accessing healthcare and report less satisfaction with their medical care.

Gibson and O'Connor (2020) posit that the barriers to health care access include lack of transport and inaccessible buildings. People living with disabilities often report that their needs

are not understood, and they are treated as patients with low priority. They further explain that there is also a gender dimension, with women with disabilities often facing additional barriers in accessing healthcare services (Smith, 2018). Findings have shown that people with disabilities do not have access to healthcare due to cost, transportation, and long waiting lists as the main barriers. Also, women have reported worse cases than men across all categories. This is particularly worrying because the people who may have higher healthcare needs faced increased barriers to accessing much-needed services (Smith, 2018). This agrees with previous research (Popplewell, Rechel & Abel, 2014), which indicates that people living with severe disabilities are the most likely to have unmet healthcare needs due to cost. On the other hand, people with mild disabilities are more likely to have an unmet needs as a result of the cost of prescribed medicine than people with no disability. Another research, (Allerton & Emerson2012) found similar inequalities in a U.K. national study with people with chronic conditions or impairments. Other research studies from the U.K. have shown that people with disabilities report worse experiences of access to health care systems.

The available data from many countries suggests that people with disabilities are generally less likely to have proper access to healthcare compared with people without disabilities. People living with disabilities face structural, financial, and cultural attitudinal barriers when they seek to access healthcare, and they have higher healthcare needs. Still, the existence of obstacles the access to healthcare may further compromise their health. To develop an effective policy to move towards more equitable healthcare access, mainly, to explore in detail the reasons for inadequate access to healthcare services for people with disabilities, acknowledging the significance of gender in any exploitation of access to healthcare services is necessary. It is worth mentioning that health inequalities are based mainly on disparities in wider health determinants. Therefore, policies aimed at achieving a more quality and affordable health need to address the socio-economic differences, hence this study.

Coping Strategies for Physically Challenged Persons

Any form of disability can be referred to as a measurable impairment or limitation that interferes with a person's ability (Crisp, 2012). Attempts have been made to distinguish between the term 'physically challenged' and the word 'handicapped'. According to Crisp (2012), 'physically challenged' is not a synonym for disability; instead, it could be referred to as a handicap which is a form of disadvantage that occurs due to disability. It could also be referred to the external circumstances, which place people with disabilities at a disadvantage

about their peers and the norms of society. Department of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation (2020), argued that handicaps include physical barriers such as inaccessible entrances to buildings, barriers to education, employment opportunities and negative public attitudes.

Some people have a severe physical disability and need to rely on coping devices that take advantage of their specific abilities and on their ability to use coping mechanisms with standard products. Commonly used coping mechanisms include mobility aids such as crutches, wheelchairs, and manipulation aids such as prosthetics, orthotics, communication aids such as single switch based artificial voice, computer or device interface such as eye gaze operated keyboards. Also, the ability to cope with a disability varies from one individual to another and even on the area in which the individual encounters the difficulty. In other words, the use of these coping aids such as glasses, hearing aids, wheelchair, prevents the disabled person from being disabled in certain places.

Generally, in situations where a person with a disability is not able to cope, negative perception that people have about disabled persons may manifest. It can result in stereotyping, derogatory labelling, and depersonalization. Inability to deal with a disability may also lead to the portrayal of people with disability as helpless, mindless, suffering and deserving sympathy and alms. Interestingly, the emerging areas of study in recent years is the process by which people cope with various forms of disability or illness (Anderson & Hagnebo, 2013; Jemta, 2017). Some of these studies focused on various techniques and strategies that have been adopted by multiple classes of individuals in coping with all manner of physical challenges (Babar, 2014, Elzubeir, 2010). In the same vein, some research studies seem to suggest that the coping strategies that will be adopted by an individual are based on several factors such as age, sex, type of disability, and so forth. Findings have shown that girls are more likely to use social support but report more daily stress and depression (Amponsah, 2020).

Theoretical Orientation

This study employed the conflict theory as the theoretical framework. Conflict theory, as developed by Karl Marx, purported that due to constant societal competition for resources, there will always be a state of conflict in the society. This theory implies that those in possession of wealth and resources will protect and store those resources, while those without will struggle to get the support. It means that there is a constant struggle between the rich and the poor (Collyer & Scambler, 2015).

Conflict theory examines any social phenomenon on the assumption that there is a natural human instinct towards conflict. Marx does not say whether a conflict is good or bad, but instead, he argued that it is an unavoidable aspect of human nature. For example, conflict theory is used to look at different forms of injustice and discrimination by explaining that there is a natural disparity in a society, leading these problems. Uneven distribution of resources within societies was predicted to be maintained through ideological coercion where the bourgeoisie would force acceptance of the current conditions on the proletariat. The thinking goes that the elite would set up systems of laws, traditions and other societal structures to support their dominance further while preventing others from joining their ranks/class. Marx also believed that as the working class and poor are subjected to worsening conditions, a collective consciousness would bring inequality to light and potentially result in revolt. If conditions were subsequently adjusted to address the concerns of the proletariat, the conflict circle would eventually repeat itself. One of the most influential theorists that understood the evolution of society based on its materialistic premises is Marx (Worsley, 2012; Collyer, 2015). For instance, Marxist theory has influenced sociology as a theory that focuses on the interests of competing groups and health as studied about the capitalistic system and conditions of the working class (Collyer & Scambler, 2015).

In application, conflict theory sees the problems of disabled people mainly as the product of inequality within society and ties the solution to social action and change. Conflict theory sees PWD as being socially oppressed, discriminated against and restricted in the community (Tide, 2017). Such an issue could be resolved by spending money which is only accessible to the wealthy and influential people in the society (Ajuyah, 2016). As long as disability is seen to be an individual matter of personal misfortune, disabled people would not be involved in decision making and other societal activities, e.g., education, employment, buildings, public transportation, and other things which most people take for granted but remain inaccessible and difficult to access by PWD.

The impact of this critical theorizing on health care and research tends to be indirect and has raised political awareness, helped with the collective empowerment of disabled persons (Cole, 2016) and publicized disabled people's critical perspectives on health care. It has drawn attention to the medical control exerted over many disabled people's lives, such as repeated and unnecessary visits to clinics for disabilities that do not change and are not illnesses in need of treatment. By and large, coping and living with disabilities might be a challenge because

facilities and materials designed to make life comfortable for them are not either available or affordable to the majority of PWD in the underdeveloped world.

Data and Methods

Lagos State is a state in the southwestern geopolitical zone of Nigeria. It is the smallest in area among Nigeria's 36 states. However, it is the most economically significant state of the country. It has the highest population density of Nigeria's states (including a substantial number of people living with disabilities). Lagos State is bounded on the north and east by Ogun State. In the west, it shares boundaries with the Republic of Benin. Behind its southern borders lies the Atlantic Ocean. 22% of its 3,577 km^2 are lagoons and creeks.

This study adopted the sequential explanatory mixed methods design of the triangulation of both quantitative and qualitative approaches. This study was conducted in the five divisions of Lagos State; Badagry, Epe, Ikeja, Ikorodu, and Lagos (Eko). For the qualitative techniques, three in-depth interviews were conducted among PWD in each of the five divisions of Lagos State, totalling 15 in-depth interviews. For the quantitative method, a questionnaire from the available literature reviewed and in line with the objectives of the study was developed for the quantitative data collection. Stratified sampling technique based on Israel's Model (1992) of determination of sampling size was adopted, which amounted to 500. In each of the five divisions of Lagos State, 102 questionnaires were administered, and 504 were recovered. Respondents for both qualitative (in-depth interviews) and quantitative (questionnaire) were PWD between the ages of 18-65 years.

The principles governing human research were observed. Respondents were briefed about the study and its expected outcomes /or benefits. They were assured of the confidentiality of their responses, and their consent to be a part of the sample population was obtained. The researcher also observed all standards set by the National Health Research Ethics Code (NHREC).

The data generated through in-depth interviews were content analysed. First, the recorded interviews were transcribed, and after comparing the transcription with notes taken during the interview, a mini-report was prepared on the data. The data were checked correctly to generate categories consistent with the study objectives. Noting memorable quotes used in demonstrating the findings as evidence to support the quantitative data, this study employed the use of descriptive statistics using frequency distribution and percentages to bring out the

variables in the study. Cross-tabulation of variables was also done to show the effect of COVID-19 on some variable peculiar to PWD.

Results

The analysis indicated that the majority of the respondents were males (94.4%) and were aware of Covid-19 and the symptoms associated with it in Lagos State. Although a slight a majority (59.5%) believe in the existence of Covid-19 in Lagos State and Nigeria as a whole, a vast majority (90.1%) believe there is no cure for this pandemic. These are presented in Table 1 and Table 2.

In Table 3, percentage distribution showed how PWD coped with their health and sustenance during the lockdown resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic. The result showed that a large majority (94%) received a form of support or the other from people while a significant proportion also received palliatives materials from most government agencies.

Table 1: Percentage Distribution of Social Characteristics of PWD in Lagos State

Characteristics	Number	Percentage
Sex:		
Male	294	58.3
Female	210	41.7
Total	**504**	**100**
Religion Affiliation:		
Christianity	250	49.6
Islam	232	46.0
Traditionalist	22	4.4
Total	**504**	**100**
Age:		
Under20	96	19.0
21-30	152	30.2
31-40	116	23.0
41-50	70	13.9
51-60	50	9.9
Above 60	20	4.0

Total	**504**	**100**
Type of Disability:		
Sight	114	22.6
Hearing	166	32.9
Physical	224	44.4
Total	**504**	**100**
Occupation:		
Trader	214	42.5
Nothing	164	32.5
Begging	110	21.8
Teacher	16	3.2
Total	**504**	**100**

Table 2: Percentage Distribution of PWD Awareness and Belief in the Existence of Covid-19 in Lagos State

Characteristics	**Number**	**Percentage**
Awareness of Covid-19:		
Yes	476	94.4
No	28	5.6
Total	**504**	**100**
Belief in the Existence of Covid-19:		
Yes	300	59.5
No	204	40.5
Total	**504**	**100**

Table 3: Percentage Distribution of PWD Coping Strategies During Covid-19 Lockdown in Lagos

Characteristics	**Number**	**Percentage**
How did you cope during the Covid-19 Lockdown? Support from people Engaging in domestic labour	474	94.0

Savings	28	5.6
Total	2	0.4
	504	**100**
Received any palliatives:		
Yes	330	65.5
No	174	34.5
Total	**504**	**100**
Whom did you receive from?		
Government	165	50
Relatives	109	33.03
Religious Organization	46	13.94
Friends	10	3.03
Total	**330**	**100**
What did you receive?		
Food Items	257	77.9
Money	67	20.3
Sanitizer	6	1.8
Total	**330**	**100**

In Table 2, bivariate association between effects of Covid-19 lockdown on PWD and some socio-economic characteristics was examined. The socio-economic effects measured include: loss of job, reduced income, maltreatment from family members, inadequate access to needed drugs and healthcare and shortage of food and these were associated with social characteristics such as sex, marital status, type of disability and occupation. The analysis revealed that there exists a significant relationship between marital status and all the socio-economic effects measured. The most significant of the association *(p<0.001)* was found between PWD and reduction in income during the Covid-19 lockdown period in Lagos State, Nigeria. The analysis indicates that a majority of the respondents (n264) were affected by the Covid-19 lockdown as they lost their source of income (52.4%). This is not strange as majority of the respondents were not gainfully employed, trading (42.5%), doing nothing (32.5%), or begging (21.8%). Reduction in income was followed in magnitude by food shortage (n110, 21.8%), maltreatment

from relatives (n34, 6.8%), job loss (n30, 5.9%), and finally lack of access to needed drugs and healthcare services (n26, 5.2%).

Table 4: Percentage Distribution of Socio-economic Effects of Lockdown on PWD

Characteristics	Job loss	Reduction in income	Maltreatment from relatives	No access to need drugs and healthcare	Food shortage
Sex Male	8.8(26)	56.5(166)	82.4(28)	46.2(12)	25.2(74)
Female	1.9(4)	46.7(98)	17.6(6)	53.8(14)	17.1(36)
Chi-square	10.536***	4.713*	8.654**	8.654	4.626*
Marital Status Single	33.3(10)	46.2(122)	29.4(10)	30.8(8)	60.0(66)
Ever Married	66.7(20)	53.8(142)	70.6(24)	69.2(18)	40.0(44)
Chi-square	3.715*	3.884*	6.423*	4.225*	5.191*
Type of Disability Sight	40.0(12)	12.9(34)	23.5(8)	46.2(12)	18.2(20)
Hearing	6.7(2)	31.1(82)	41.2(14)	30.8(8)	25.5(28)
Physical	53.3(16)	56.1(148)	35.3(12)	23.1(6)	56.4(62)
Chi-square	11.511**	40.679***	1.452	9.568**	8.114**
Occupation Trader	40.0(12)	56.0(148)	52.9(18)	46.2(12)	45.5(50)
Nothing	20.0(6)	14.4(38)	11.8(4)	7.7(2)	38.2(42)
Begging	40.0(12)	25.0(66)	35.3(12)	46.2(12)	16.4(18)
Teacher	0.0(0)	4.5(12)	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0.0(0)
Chi-square	9.537*	90.655***	14.191**	13.692	8.198

*significant at $p<0.05$, **significant at $p<0.01$, ***significant at $p<0.001$

From the qualitative data, the result revealed that the main effect of the covid-19 lockdown also led to loss of income and shortage of food as reported in the quantitative results presented above. Some of excerpts of qualitative data are presented below.

> *The lockdown affected so many things, especially our level of income.*
> *Many people come from various places to this place (Ikeja) and Island to*

work, but since the lockdown started, many people were not able to go to their place of business. Also, even savings has been affected because if you have money at hand and you are not adding to it, the money will soon finish, especially when everyone was just at home doing nothing. Thank God I have an understanding wife; we had to begin to ration the way we eat in order to survive the lockdown. This partial lockdown is better (A married male with disability in Ikeja, Lagos).

From the excerpt above, the income of the respondents were severely affected due to the Covid-19 lockdown. For those of them that were working, the lockdown could not allow them go to work. By implication, it means they could not make any additional income while spending their little savings. The nature of job/business they are talking about here has to do with those of them who are traders or beggars. It is a common thing among people living with disability to refer to begging as a form of job.

Another respondent stressed how the Covid-19 lockdown affected his life and that of his family. He stated that:

The lockdown really affected us, especially people like me that do not have a specific job. Before the Covid-19 lockdown, when I go out, I see people that give me change (small amount of money) that I use to survive, but when the lockdown began it has been difficult. This is because even the people that ought to help those of us that are physically challenged are also trying to manage during the lockdown, since all of us could not go out from our various homes. Thus, the lockdown has affected everybody's movement and feeding. I was eating once a day in order to manage resources. Because of this kind of disease, total lockdown would have been better as done in other countries as it will help reduce the spread of the virus, but those other countries assisted their citizens with food and things needed for survival. Here in Nigeria, the government only shares things to those that belong to their political parties. I was able to receive some food stuff once from the government but the stress was too much as there were too many people there. (A married male with disability in Ojude Oba)

The above excerpt explained how the Covid-19 lockdown affected the people living with one form of disability or the other and how palliatives from the government were not really going round the populace. If those who are able are struggling for food intervention, how will those with disabilities survive in such a situation? The situation of people with disabilities is terrible to the extent that, during the lockdown, they had to survive and also provide food for their family.

A married man who resides in another division of Lagos, Agege, explained how the covid-19 lockdown destroyed the little business he had before the lockdown and how he was returned to zero level.

The lockdown destroy and completely stop my business. This seriously affected my source of income. I do manage to sell thing inside traffic but

immediately the lockdown started, the business completely stopped. I now beg for a living and with the lockdown it became very difficult to feed, as the food available was not enough. So, it affected me in every aspect of life, including the area of food. ***(A married male with disability in Agege)***

The above findings from the qualitative data are consistent with the quantitative result presented above; the main socio-economic effect of the lockdown on PWD was loss of source of income and shortage of food.

Discussion and Conclusion

Covid-19 pandemic has affected every member of the globe either directly or indirectly. The results demonstrate that a large and significant proportion of PWD are aware and believe in the existence of the Covid-19 pandemic. This level of awareness among PWD can be attributed to the combined and intense efforts of international organizations, national and state government, non-governmental organizations and individuals in ensuring that no one is left behind in the fight against the spread of coronavirus. Furthermore, during the period of total lockdown in Lagos State, PWD relied heavily on the support of others as a means to cope and survive as many were neither financially independent nor engaging in sustainable economic activities. This raises the questions of what would have been the fate of PWD if there were no forms of support and their helpers were not economically buoyant. This finding is consistent with previous studies about the social and economic conditions of PWD (Siordia, 2016; The Tide, 2017; Khan et al., 2018; Human Right Watch, 2018; Wahab et al., 2018).

COVID-19 has extended beyond a health pandemic but also a socio-economic pandemic affecting the entire globe. The pandemic has affected every member of the globe either directly or indirectly. However, not everyone is affected in the same manner (Hussein, 2020). The latent consequences of social measures introduced to help curb the spread of the virus will remain with us for a long time. COVID-19 has created challenges and adverse socio-economic consequences for vulnerable groups such as women, girls, PWD, migrants, daily earners, etc (Buhejil et al., 2020; Velavan & Meyer, 2020). PWD are part of the vulnerable groups, whose socio-economic condition is expected to worsen due to the social measures of COVID-19 (United Nations UN, 2020).

In a bid to cushion the adverse effect of the total lockdown on people across the country, individual philanthropists, federal and state governments embarked on the task of providing palliatives to the citizens. It is clear from the results above that these palliatives measures went a long way in cushioning the effects of the total lockdown on PWD.

The study revealed that a very small proportion of PWD were gainfully employed and a large proportion resorted to begging and dependent on other people for survival and sustenance. This is consistent with the results of a surveys conducted among PWD in developing countries (Khan et al., 2018; Wahab et al., 2018). As the study revealed, reduction in income was the most significant effect the Covid-19 lockdown had on PWD. This is in line with the expectation that it is the vulnerable groups in the society who experience and bear the devastating socio-economic effects of COVID-19 and the lockdown associated with the pandemic (Armitage and Nellums, 2020; Loopstra, 2020). Reduction in income will result in increasing level of poverty as predicted by the UN (2020). PWD poverty situation would increase the costs incurred by them and family members for healthcare and negatively impact earnings of family members (Oakley, 2016). Invariably, the loss of source of income by PWD during the covid-19 lockdown will indirectly affect the already depleted income of their family members as they cater for their basic and medical needs.

COVID-19 is contributing to global food insecurity, and will likely result in increased food insecurity in Africa so it is expected that PWD would experience some form of food insecurity and shortage (Kihato & Landau, 2020). However, shortage of food although not very high was one of the effects measured in this study, and it was the second socio-economic effect after the reduction of income experienced by PWD. This finding is similar to the report of Loopstra (2020) that PWD are more susceptible to food shortage and insecurity. The low incidence of inadequate access to drugs and necessary healthcare contradicts the prediction that the lockdown is likely to disrupt access and provision of medical service by PWD (Armitage & Nellums, 2020). The result revealed that male respondents were more affected by the lockdown than their female counterparts. This is not surprising as most of these men are likely the bread winner of their family.

In conclusion, one way in which this Covid-19 pandemic can be beneficial is by expanding infrastructure and the provision of quality social service, focusing policy attention on vulnerable groups and empowering them (UN, 2020). COVID-19 pandemic is an opportunity and avenue for developing countries of Africa to invest in their countries' resilience by developing strategies to boost their human capital and wellbeing (educational sector, health sector, water and sanitation) via digital technology.

The study also concluded that PWD and other vulnerable groups should be empowered financially to make them economically independent, enabling them to be able to cater for their needs in perilous times as these.

References

Agarwal, A. & Steele, A. (2016). Disability Consideration for infrastructure programme. Retrieved on 24 May 2020: http://dx.doi.org/10.12774/eod_hd.march2016.agarwaletal Ajuyah, E. (2016). Challenges of living with disabilities in Nigeria. Retrieved on 24 May 2020
 https://www.worldpulse.com/en/community/users/ese-ajuyah/posts/69215

Armitage, R. & Nellums, L.B. (2020). The Covid-19 response must be disability-inclusive. The *LANCET Public Health,* 5(5), E257. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/s2468-2667 (20)30076-1

Bombom, L. S. & Abdullahi, I. (2016). Travel patterns and challenges of physically disabled persons in Nigeria. *GeoJournal,* 81, 519-533. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-015-9629-3.

Cole, A. (2016). Disabled People Face Difficulties in Accessing Primary Care. Available Online at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1569976/

Eleweke, C. J. and Ebenso, J. (2016). Barriers to Accessing Services by People with Disabilities in Nigeria: Insights from a Qualitative Study. *Journal of Educational and Social Research,* 6 (2). DOI: 10.5901/jesr.2016.v6n2p113

Wahab, E. O., Ajiboye, O. E., Yusuff, S. O., Samuel, O. S., Oyenuga, A. S., Jawando, J.O., Odunaike, B. A., & Olarinmoye, A. W. (2018). Profiling disability rate in Lagos State. Final Report Presented to the Office of the Special Adviser, Social Development, Lagos State Government.

Haruna, M. A. (2017). The problems of living with disability in Nigeria. *Journal of Law, Policy and Globalisation,* 65: 103-133.

Human Right Watch, (2018). I would like to go to school: barriers to education for children with disabilities in Lebanon. Retrieved on 23 May 2020: https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/03/22/i-would-go-school/barriers-education-children-disabilities-lebanon#_ftn2

Israel, G. D. (1992). *Sampling the Evidence of Extension Program Impact*. Program Evaluation and Organizational Development, IFAS, University of Florida. PEOD-5.

Khan, F., Owolabi, M. O., Amatya, B., Hamzat, T. K., Ogunniyi, A., Oshinowo, H. Elmalik, A. & Galea, M. P. (2018). Challenges and barriers for implementation of the World Health Organisation global disability action-plan in low- and middle-income countries. *Journal of Rehabilitation Medicine*, 50 (4): 367-376. http://doi.org/10.2340/16501977-2276.

Krishnamurthi, G. & Ojha J.K. (2019). Pulling the Marginalized Out of Margins: Role of Mobilization, Collectivization and Livelihood Interventions. In Jammulamadaka N. (eds) *Workers and Margins*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7876-8_11. ISBN: 978-981-13-7876-8.

Loopstra, R. (2020). *Vulnerability to food insecurity since the Covid-19 lockdown*. Preliminary Report, 14 April, 2020. King's College London. Retrieved on 20 May 2020: https://foodfoundation.org.uk/

Oakley, M. (2016). *Closing the gap: creating a framework for tackling the disability employment gap in the U.K*. London: Social Market Foundation.

Sarker, M. I., Wu, M., Alam, G. M. M., & Shouse, R. C. (2020). Livelihood resilience of riverine island dwellers in the face of natural disasters: empirical evidence from Bangladesh. *Land Use Policy*, 95, 104599. Retrieved on 26 May 2020: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2020.104599Siordia, 2016

Tide, (2017). Addressing the Plight of Persons with Disabilities. Available online at http://www.theThe Tidenewsonline.com/2017/05/17/addressing-plight-of-persons-with-disabilities/

United Nations (2020). *Responses to the Covid-19 Catastrophe Could turn The Tide on Inequality.* Department of Economic and Social Affairs; Policy Brief [No]65, May 2020

World Health Organisation (2018) *Risk Communication and Community Engagement (RCCE) Considerations: Ebola response in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. WHO

World Health Organisation (2020) Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) advice for the public. Retrieved 6th May 2020 from https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/advice-for-public

HORACE'S ART OF POETRY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS ON THE CREATIVE WRITERS' MANUAL

BY

Okhaifo Phillandar Eseigbe, Phd.
Department Of Theatre Arts,
Igbinedion University, Okada.
Edo State. Nigeria.
Email:**phillandar36@gmail.com, Okhaifo.eseigbe@iuokada.edu.ng**
Telephone: 08032178116, 07062984565.

Abstract

In this study, the researcher maintains that there are trifocal lenses from whence Horace's 'The Art of Poetry' can be read: poetry as an Art, 'the Art of writing poetry' or poetry as Drama and the Art of poetry itself. While the three premises convey diverse ways of seeing or knowing, this study focuses on Horace's preoccupation on the rules and regulations by which good poetry or drama should judged. This paper seeks therefore to reflect on the basic rules for any poetic work of art as implied, to create a recipe for the acknowledgement of poetic manifestations. The work is an urbane, unsystematic amplification of Aristotle's discussion of the decorum or propriety of each literary genre, which at Horace's time included lyric, pastoral, satire, elegy, and epigram, as well as Aristotle's epic, tragedy, and comedy. The work was prized by Neoclassicists of the 17th and 18th centuries not only for its rules but also for its humour, common sense, and appeal to educated taste. As a work of art, poetry presents the human mind in its finest form. A work of art speaks a truth we cannot speak outright: the truth of the human experiences. Love, joy, grief, guilt, beauty – no words can communicate these. We can only represent them in stories and pictures and songs. Thus, art is the way we speak the meaning of our lives. So, the objective of this paper is to create guidelines for writers of dramatic pieces on the model for the development of their works. As it were, all professions have its related ethics and modes of manifestations. This paper recommends that all poetic dispositions should maintain certain standards.

Introduction

As in liberal art, poetry is connected with self-expression. It is here that the aesthetic urge of man comes alive. As an art, it is directly concerned with the spiritual life of man and belongs

primarily to his spiritual culture. The Art of Poetry by Horace is one of the series of epistles written by critics, regarding to Dramatic Theory and Criticism over the ages. Aristotle is often acknowledged for the classification of drama. Horace on the other hand can be said to have invented rules for drama. However, these rules have undergone changes and restructuring over the years.

Quintus Horatius Flaccus, more commonly known as Horace, was a Roman poet, best known for his satires and his lyric odes. His letters in verse, particularly his Ars Poetica, outline his beliefs about the art and craft of poetry. His main contribution to the traditions of literary theory lies in his articulation of the purpose of poetry, or literature in general: sweet and useful. Horace insists that literature serves the didactic purpose which had been Plato's main concern and that it provides pleasure. The two goals are not incompatible as Plato had feared. Poetry is a useful teaching tool; it is pleasurable. The pleasure of poetry makes it popular and accessible and its lessons can be widely learned. Like Plato, Horace sees nature as the primary source for poetry but argues that poets should imitate other authors as well as imitating nature. Horace therefore establishes the importance of a poet knowing a literary tradition and respecting inherited forms and conventions, as well as creating new works of art.

The writings of Plato, Aristotle and Horace defined the parameters of thought about literature, from the ancient world until the Renaissance. The explosion of art, literature and science which is thought of as the hallmark of the European Renaissance in the 14th to 16th centuries prompted not only a deluge of literary texts, including the works of such luminaries as Shakespeare, but also torrent of writings about the purpose, form and importance of literature. The Renaissance discourse on literary theory was stimulated at least in part by the rediscovery of Aristotle's Poetics, a text which had been lost to Western culture during the Dark Ages.

Conceptual Explanations

Whereas, Kenneth M. Cameron and Patti P. Gillespie observe that:

> Artists and scholars have struggled for centuries to define art satisfactorily. We need not detailed these attempts, except to note that most have agreed that art is distinguishable from real life by an artist's intention to create or craft something that will evoke a certain kind of response – an aesthetic response – from its audience. Again, the exact nature of an aesthetic response … but for our purposes it is enough to say that an aesthetic response includes an appreciation of beauty and some understanding that goes beyond the merely intellectual or the merely entertaining (8).

Oscar Wilde lends credence to this position by noting that:

> The tears that we shed at a play are a type of exquisite sterile emotions that it is the function of Art to awaken. We grieve, but our grief is not bitter. We weep, but we are not wounded. Just as nature is matter struggling into mind so art is mind expressing itself under the conditions of matter, and thus, even in the lowliest of her manifestations, she speaks to both sense and soul alike (36).

Oscar Wilde under reference did not reticence when he further opined that:

> The aim of art is simply to create a mood and where self-culture has ceased to be the ideal, the intellectual standard is instantly lowered, and often, ultimately lost. … Art is a passion, and in matters of art, thought is inevitably coloured by emotion, and so is fluid, rather than fixed and depending upon fine moods and exquisite moments cannot

be narrowed into the rigidity of a scientific formula or a theological dogma (37).

So, emotion is eclectic. From the foregoing, it is clear that Oscar Wilde advocated for the use of 'poetic license' as can be verified from this words;

> For what is mind but motion in the intellectual sphere? The first condition of criticism is that the critic should be able to recognize that the sphere of Art and the sphere of Ethics are absolutely distinct and separate. When they are confused, chaos has come again. For the real artist is he who proceeds, not from feelings to form, but from form to thought and passion. He gains inspiration from form and from form purely, as an artist should (p. 38).

Therefore, the highest criticism is that which reveals in the work of Art what the artist had not put there. *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English* (2007) defined poem as "a piece of writing that expresses emotions, experiences, and ideas…", whereas poetry is the art of writing poems. Poem or poetry in this context of our discussion can be drama or play. Nicholas (cited in Dukore, 256) noted that "whatever you write of pleasant or sublime (strong emotions), always let senses accompany your rime… rime must be made with reason's law to close". Nevertheless, Art as the layer that lies between the skins of truth and falsity – that which is false but not false, true but not true – that is, what gives us joy.

The Art of Poetry;

Edwin Wilson and Alvin Goldfarb explained that:

> Horace (65 – 8 B.C.), who is sometimes called the Roman Aristotle, outlined his Theory of Correct Dramatic Techniques in his Ars Poetica (The Art of Poetry). In The Art of Poetry, Horace argues that comedy must be distinct

genres, or types, of drama, and that there should be no mixture of the two. Tragedy should deal with royalty, while comedy should depict common persons. The playwright's task, according to Horace, is to create easily recognizable stock characters. One of Horace's most important notions, not found in Aristotle, is that drama should not just entertain audiences but should also instruct them or teach them a lesson. Horace lists a series of additional dramatic axioms: plays are to be written in five acts, no violence should be presented on stage, and the use of dues ex machina should be avoided (210).

Although Wilson and Alvin above agreed that many of Horace's principles have their roots in Aristotle's Poetics. However,

There are important differences between the two: Horace was far more dogmatic and prescriptive. The Romans were experts at formulating rules and laws (such as the latter, the Neo-Classical Ideals), and Horace was no exception. He was codifying rules, whereas Aristotle had simply described the dramatic technique of the classical Greeks, without providing rigid guidelines (50).

According to Horace himself, as recorded by Dukore, "a book will appear uncommonly if impossible figures are wrought into it – like a sick man's dreams – with the result that neither head nor foot is ascribed to a single shape nor unity is lost. In short, be your subject what you will, only let it be simple and consistent" (67).

Horace advised writers to choose a subject that is within their powers and ponder long what their shoulders can and cannot bear. He who makes every effort to select his theme aright

will be at no loss for choice words or lucid arrangement; you must write in a way that is clear and easy to understand.

In works of genius are clearly marked differences of subject and style. Horace held that it is not enough for poems to be fine; they must charm, and draw the mind of the listener (or audience) at will. Horace argued that

> If you would have me weep, you must first of all feel grief yourself, then and not till then will your misfortunes, touch me". If a speaker's words are out of gear with his fortunes, horses and foot will guffaw. Either sticks to tradition or see that your inventions be consistent; such that, "beginning, middle, and end all strike the same note… (14).

Thus, the issue of unity as in verisimilitude of the Renaissance was emphatic. Horace maintained that if you want an appreciative audience that will sit quiet till the curtain drops and call for 'cheers' begins, you must observe the characteristics of such age and assign a fitting grace to natures that shift with the years. We should do wisely to dwell on the attributes proper to each period of life. In the very words of Horace, he advised that: the chorus should discharge the part and duty of an actor with vigour, and chant – nothing between the acts that does not forward the action and fit into the plot naturally.

It is said that Thespis discovered Tragedy – and carried his plays about in tumbrils, to be chanted and performed by actors with faces smeared with lees. After him Aeschylus, inventor of the mask and comely robe, laid his stage on short planks, teaching his company how to talk grandiloquently. Oscar Brockett affirmed Thespis claim as he recorded that "Horace, writing some 500 years later, declares that Thespis travelled about on a cart with plays. If this is true, Thespis probably performed in several Greek towns other than Athens" (14).

Now, the poet's aim is either to profit or to please, or to blend in one the delightful and the useful. Whatever the lesson you would convey, be brief, that your hearers may catch quickly what is said and faithfully retain it. Fictions made to please should keep close to the truth of things. The elder folk, Horace emphasized, trail at what contains no serviceable lesson; the man who mingles the useful with the sweet carries the day by charming his reader and at the same time instructing him. That is the book to enrich the publisher, to be posted overseas, and to prolong its author's fame.

In the very words of Horace, he noted clearly that "Poetry is like painting; one piece takes your fancy if you stand close to it, another if you keep at some distance: but mediocrity in poets has never been tolerated by gods, men, or – booksellers. So a poem, created to give delight, if it fails but a little of the highest, sinks to the lowest" (13). Horace argued further that if "however, you should one day produce something, (pray) – submit it first to the critic, and then, put back the manuscript in your desk and let it stand over for a decade"(15) This is because the unpublished may be cancelled, but a word once uttered can never be recalled.

Poetry and the Arts

The Poetics for instance is much more like a cookbook than it is like a textbook in elementary engineering. Poets like painters, musicians and dancers, all 'imitate action' in their various ways. By 'action', it means not physical activity, but a movement of spirit, and by 'imitation', it means not superficial copying, but the representation of the countless forms which the life of the human spirit may take in the media of the arts; either in musical sound, painting, words or gestures.

The Arts may be distinguished in three ways: Object of imitation, the Medium and Manner. Object is action; Medium is the poet's words, colour or sound. By Manner, it refers to the

convention… novel, play, dance, etc. According to Aristotle, poetry originated from two instincts in human nature itself, that of imitation and that of harmony and rhythm. Therefore, the pleasure that we get from direct experience seems to come from recognizing what the artists is representing; some vague intuition which suddenly seems familiar. Hence, imitation has to do with the intellectual and moral content of art and therefore related to philosophy. Harmony and rhythm on the other hand refer to the pleasures of form, which we usually consider as pure aesthetics.

The Manifestations of Poetry

i.   **Tragedy:** according to Aristotle, tragedy is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete and of a certain magnitude, in language embellished with all kinds of artistic ornaments; in the form of action that is serious, not of narrative – with incidents arousing pity and fear – effecting the proper purgation of the emotions, thus catharsis. The purgation of pity and fear is a kind of description of that special kind of pleasure that we get from tragedy or any kind of poetry for that matter.

ii.   **Action and Passion in Poetry**

Action in poetry refers to the motivation from which deeds spring. It may also be described metaphorically as the focus or moment of the psyche towards what seems good to it at the moment – a movement of spirit. There is surely an action represented in every work of art and the arts reflect not only rational purpose but movements – of – spirit of every kind. Every action has its own form or mode of being. Moreover, both action and character are formed out of emotions, which can be called pathos.

iii.   **How Poetry Imitates Action**

Poetry imitates action through the plot making. The plot is therefore the basic form of poetry. It is the arrangement of the incidents in a piece of art. The purpose of

plotting is to represent one ''complete action''. Plot, then is the first principle and the soul of any poetic genre. By soul, it means the formative principle in any living thing, whether human or plant. In order words, plot is the first form of the play, but it is by character and language that the poet gives it the final form of which we read, see or hear.

iv. **Character Imitation in Poetry**

Knowing that tragedy or poetry is an imitation, not of men, but of an action and of life. So, character comes as a subsidiary to the actions. The contrasting characters in a play reveal the main action in different ways and their disagreements make the tense disputes of all the episodes. This diversity of characterization, conflict of thought, is with a view to the realization of action of the play as a whole.

v. **Thought and Diction in Poetry**

Diction refers to "the art of delivery''. It also means speech. Thought deals with a very wide range of the mind's activities, from abstract reasoning to the perception and formulation of emotion, for it is thought that defines all the objects of human motivation, whether they are dimly seen or clear and definite, illusory as a dream or objectively real. Regarding to language embellishment, it means language into which rhythm, harmony and song enters. In dramatics, the chorus too is regarded as one of the actors; it should be an integral part of the whole and share in the action. But it is better to have a good command of metaphor; this is a mark of genius, to make good metaphor implies an eye for resemblance.

vi. **Songs and Spectacles: Action and Acting in Poetry**

In constructing the plot and working it out with the proper diction, the poet should endeavour to place the scene as much as possible, before his own eyes. Again, the poet should work out his play, to the best of his power with appropriate gestures:

for those who feel emotion are most convincing through natural sympathy with the characters they represent; and one who is agitated storms; one who is angry rages – with the most lifelike reality. Consequently, the purpose of any good technique of acting is to help the actor to perceive the action of the character he is portraying and then, re-create it in his own thought and feelings. This is what the playwright must do.

vii.   **The End of Poetry: Pity, Fear and Pathos**

A play or any poetry cannot be used for anything but 'Pleasure'. The poetic Arts give pleasure because they satisfy the instincts or needs of imitation and of harmony and rhythm. The creatures of the poet's imagination do not literally represent anything in our own experiences. It must therefore be that through words, characters and situations, we can glimpse something common to men in all times and places. In poetry, the pleasure of imitation, harmony and rhythm are the universal quality of art, and the release and cleansing of the passions are things to observe and mention in different forms and contexts. So, poetry becomes the purgation of passion and the embodiment of a universal truth, analogous to the purposes of religious rituals. The rituals of the festival of Dionysus ought to include imitation ceremonies intended to purify the neophytes by the enactment of symbolic ordeals and sacrifices; also rites of spring ''season – spirit''.

Whatever language is used in poetry, the purpose is to acquaint the hearer or audience with a fact or with the thought of the speaker or author. Poetry of all sorts; tragedy, comedy, prose, are for one purpose. It imitates so that it may teach. All forms of poetry have one and the same end, which is 'persuasion'. Persuasion means that the hearer accepts the words of the speaker or writer and that the soul of persuasion is truth. Truth is the agreement between that which is said about a thing and the thing itself. While tragedy should deal with royalty

whose affairs are those of the city, comedy should deal with common people. Tragedy must be resolved calamitously, while comedy must be resolved happily. The language of tragedy is grave, polished; removed from the colloquial. The events should have such sequences and arrangements as to approach as near as possible to the truth. This is because a play is not acted solely to strike the spectator with admiration or consternation – but should also teach, move and please.

Nevertheless, poetry remains as imitation and its general mode is imitation. Qualified poets' duty is to imitate through speculation – the reality of people caught in accidents of fortune. Since drama was invented to delight and provide recreation for the common people, it must have subject matter, which the common people can understand and which when they understand, may make them happy. This subject matter should include such things as everyday occurrences and such things which people discuss like history, power, politics, culture… hence, 'theatre, as a slice of life'.

Tragedy and comedy as types of representational poetry cannot last longer than that time which the comfort of the spectators tolerates. So, the comfort of the public should be considered; for after some hours, people have to leave the theatre because of human needs such as eating, drinking, sleeping, bathing, etc. Just as the boundary of place is the stage, so is the boundary of time; that period in which spectators can comfortably remain sitting in the theatre. For this reason, Aristotle's ''the revolution of the sun'' becomes questionable as that would take over twelve hours to elapse.

However, the characters of tragedy are not the same as those of comedy. Those of tragedy are royalty in nature and are more dynamic and proud. They intensely want what they want. If offended, or if they think they have been offended, they do not appeal to the courts to take legal action concerning the injury. Instead, they take justice in their own hands,

following their instincts. In revenge, they kill both strangers and relatives, sometimes even themselves. So, when we see others being unjustly oppressed and realize that the same could happen to us or people like us, we thus learn quietly and unconsciously that we are subject to many misfortunes and that it is not wise to place trust in the tranquil course of events. And we learn more in the little we learn from ourselves than in the much we learn from others. We are not able to learn from others unless we admit ignorance of that which we learn and an obligation to our teachers for what we learn from them.

Summary

The main subject of Horace' Art of Poetry can be enumerated as follows:

i.   A poem demands unity, to be secured by harmony and proportion as well as wise choice of subject and good diction. Meter and style must be appropriate to theme and character.

ii.   Dramatic poetry calls for special care with regard to character drawing, propriety of representation, length of play, number of actors, use of chorus and its music; special features for the satiric type and verse forms.

iii.   A poet's qualifications include common sense, knowledge of character, adherence to high ideals, intellectual superiority, appreciation of the noble history and lofty mission of poetry, and above all, willingness to listen to and profit by impartial criticism.

The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism notes:

> It would be impossible to overestimate the importance of Horace's Art of Poetry for the subsequent history of literary criticism. Since its composition in the first century BCE, this epigrammatic and sometimes enigmatic critical poem has exerted an almost continual

influence over poets and literary critics alike; perhaps because its dicta, phrased in verse form, are so eminently quotable. Horace's injunction that poetry should both ''instruct and delight'' has been repeated so often that it has come to be known as the Horatian platitude (121).

Whereas, the Horatian platitude is usually given as ''instruct and delight'', but sometimes as ''instruct, or delight''. The first reading implies that literature must be instructive. A related ambiguity is that ''instruct'' might be better translated as ''help'', ''advise'', or ''warn''; hence, the tripod dimension. Horace repeats this maxim in different wordings: ''Aut prodesse uolunt aut delectare poetae aut simul et iucunda et idonea dicere uitae'' (The poet wishes to benefit of please, or to be pleasant and helpful at the same time), ''miscuit utile dulci'' (a mix of useful and sweet), and ''delectando pariterque monendo'' (delighting and advising).

The Horace's Arts of Poetry was first translated into English in 1566 by Thomas Drant. A translation by Ben Johnson was published posthumously in 1640.

Conclusion

Horace approaches poetry from a practical standpoint – as a craft – rather than the theoretical approach of his predecessors, Aristotle and the philosopher Plato. He also holds the poet in high regard as opposed to Plato, who distrusts mimesis and who has philosopher Socrates say in Book 10 of the Republic that he would banish poets from the ideal state. For Horace, a writer must choose a subject within his power and appropriate to his gifts; he must say at any given moment what needs to be said and no more. He must choose vocabulary, meter and form that are right for his subject, whether noble, exciting, erotic or joyous. He warns against extravagant implausibility and incongruities. Indeed, the

prevailing emphasis throughout is on the need for consistency, coherence and seemliness. It is the writer's business to refine and polish his text that the highest standards of propriety and artistry are maintained.

However, Horace demands a craft man's skill in an artist: he does not utterly neglect the role of natural talent in art. In fact, he is insisting on complementary relationship between learned artistry and genius. Horace's Art of Poetry can also be read as a useful advice to the prospective writers. He equates poetry with painting. In poetry, words are like various colours that are put beautifully. He focuses on decorum in poetry, that is, the rightness of each part to the whole. There should be the harmony of each part to the whole. These ideas become laws for neo-classical writers and a benchmark for the pragmatic effect of poetry and how it can be achieved.

Whatever the techniques there is, the end of poetry should teach and delight. Actions should be physical than verbal because whatever people see, they may believe. So, it is better to perform everything, but scenes of murder, violence, etc should not be shown on stage. Deux ex machine (performing of God on stage) is to be used. Nevertheless, Horace remains as the classicist who established the classical sets of belief, rules and orders, restraints and correct expression. He wished that the writer should choose correct and right words; that he should use meters in maintaining their appropriateness; that he should be able to choose a proper subject; that he should make use of proper poetic diction; and that he should follow the rules of ancient arts. Moreover, he says that an artist is always a craft man who, using his architectural genius, maintains decorum and 'urbanity' in his work of art.

Once again, the writer can take one of the following techniques to present the content:

a. Prolepsis (flash back): that is, what happened before the action takes place.
b. Analeptics (foreshadowing): that is, what happens next to on-going action.

c. Anachronistic (random): that is, mixture of all techniques.

So, from the discussions so far, it would be pleasing to align with the thoughts of Oscar Brockett (44 – 45) when he recorded that:

> The Roman poet Horace… states that Latin (Roman) Drama originated in the Fescennine Verses (a town on the Etruscan border), compositions consisting of improvised, abusive, and often obscene dialogue exchanged between masked clowns at harvest and wedding ceremonies.

Where Aristotle had invented dramatic criticism with his 'Poetics', the Roman writer Horace would be content to provide a manual for the writing of good plays in his 'The Art of Poetry'.

With the above in mind, it is worthy to note that Oscar Brockett also observed that:

> One Roman critic, Horace, was to exert influence on later theory and practice second only to Aristotle. His 'The Art of Poetry' contains advice on subject matter, characterization, language, and style. He insists that plays must be written in five acts and that they should teach and please. He especially encouraged writers to revise and polish their works to insure unity, grace, and decorum. Hence, he was to be especially influential during the Renaissance (52).

On the other hand, prior to 1550, interest in literary theory developed slowly and was concerned above all with two classical treatises: that is, Horace's 'Art of Poetry' and 'Aristotle's Poetics'. Although Horace's work had never been lost sight of since it was written in the first Century B.C., "Aristotle's was little known prior to 1498, when it was published in Italy in a Latin translation, but during the sixteenth century, it came to be

accepted or considered the supreme authority on literary matters", Oscar Brockett (2003, p. 161).

In neoclassical doctrine, the fundamental demand was for verisimilitude, or the appearance of truth. Verisimilitude may be divided into three subsidiary goals: reality, morality and universality. After the 1570s, most Italian critics demanded that a play have a single plot, take place in twenty four hours or less, and be confined to one place, although the latter rule was often extended to include additional places if they could easily be reached without violating the twenty-four-hour rule. Oscar Brockett (2003) confirmed the fact that: "The division into five acts was also considered essential to regular drama. Horace had first stated this rule in Roman times and it was adopted in the Renaissance as a norm for regular drama." (163). Therefore, till today the Renaissance remains as the sign post to modern drama, which is an off- shoot of Horace and his 'Art of Poetry'.

So, for any creative work to maintain relevance and stand the test of time in theatre Arts and its related discipline, such poetic dispositions and endeavour must conform to the expectations postulated by Horace.

Works Cited

Brockett, Oscar Gross & Frankline, Hildy J. *The History of Theatre (9ᵗʰ Ed.)*, USA: Allyn and Bacon; Pearson Education Group, Inc., 2003.

Dukore, Bernard F. *Dramatic Theory and Criticism: Greeks to Grotowski*, USA: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974.

Edward, Wright A. *Understanding Today's Theatre (2ⁿᵈ Ed)*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972.

Edwin Wilson and Alvin Goldfarb *Theatre: The Lively Art*, USA: Edwin Wilson and Alvin Goldfarb Publications, 1991.

Kenneth M. Cameron, Patti P. Gillespie. *The Enjoyment of Theatre*, USA: Allyn & Bacon Inc., 2000.

Pearson Education. *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English*, USA: Pearson Education Limited, 2007.

Thomas Drant and Fred Schurink in The Encyclopedia of English Rennaissance Literature, Vol.1. Blackwell Publishing, 2012.

Wilde, Oscar. The Critic As Artist, USA: Green Integer Books, 1997.

THE PROBLEMS OR CHALLENGES OF AFRICA'S SUPRANATIONAL COURTS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES

By

Uwasomba Manday Cyricus, Ph.D.
Faculty of Law, Madonna University, Okija, Anambra State.

Abstract

In the resolution of international disputes among countries, continents of the world have set up supranational or international courts to resolve them. The international community through the instrumentality or medium of the United Nations kick started this by first establishing the International Court of Justice and later the International Criminal Court to handle international disputes arising from nations of the world. The United Nations, after establishing the International Court of Justice by its Charter, Article 33(1), recognized other regional organs for the resolution of International disputes. Seizing the opportunity offered by the United Nations Charter, many regional organizations in the world established their own judicial organ or supranational courts for dispute resolution. For example, Europe through the European Union established the European Court of Justice on the 21st January, 1959 and America has the Inter American Commission on Human Rights and the American Court of Justice. Africa's own from historical perspective compared to that of Europe and in America was established some years after. Currently, Africa has the following Supranational Courts namely: the African Court on Human and People's Rights, the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (ECOWAS CCJ), the South African Development Community (SADC Tribunal), the East African Court of Justice, the OHADA Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA). Naturally, being late in time than the other continents own mentioned herein, and as a developing continent, the supranational courts in Africa are bound to have challenges or problems to contend with worth examining or analyzing. This article examined these challenges or problems comprehensively. Apart from an examination or analysis of these problems/challenges, the article made some recommendations among which is the need to provide a Legal Aid Scheme to assist the indigent citizens of the continent have access to the Courts as well as the need for public awareness. The article concluded by agreeing with the view of some scholars that if certain steps are taken Africa's Supranational Courts would be on the same pedestal with the European and inter American Courts. This article was purely doctrinal based.

Keywords: supranational courts, challenges, access to court, human right, judgement and international disputes.

Introduction

According to a renowned Jurist, "where people live together, there is the need for a system of justice. The great majority of people are motivated mainly by self-interest, and unless their activities are to some extent restrained, they would oppress the poor"[1] Even though this statement applies to National Laws to be applied by National Courts, where individuals are mostly affected in disputes, it also mutatis, mutandis applies to international law where states are the principal actors or parties. This is because just as disputes arise among individuals existing in a country or nation, the same also occur amongst nations or countries of the world. In other words, states are bound to have disputes, which may arise from boundary problems or even in political interactions or other relationships. Since the issue of disputes amongst states is a worldwide issue, a recourse will be made or had to be made to international law.

In this regard disputes involving states will thus be referred to as international disputes. Referring generally to international disputes, Henry C. Alisigwe has this to say:

> International disputes can be defined within the contextual framework of article 33 of the United Nations as altercation whether founded on law or fact involving states inter se or between states and non-states parties, the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.[2]

These international disputes noted herein, whether arising from political, economic, traditional or human rights, when they occur, states are enjoined in this regard to take cognizance of Article 33(1) of the United Nations Charter which provides as follows:

> The parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security shall first of all seek solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangement or other peaceful means of their own choice

Thus, the United Nations Charter by the above provisions recognized adjudicatory method of resolving international disputes at the international sphere. The supranational courts are the recognized organs by both the United Nations and other regional bodies for the resolution or determination of international disputes. The supranational courts set up by the United Nations as its principal judicial organ is the International Court of Justice which has decided dozens of cases since its inception in 1946, and which is a successor to the Permanent Court of the

---

[1] Njemanze, B.A. Former Chief Judge of Imo State in a Keynote Lecture delivered at the Seminar/Workshop for Judiciary, titled "*An exposition of the Imo State of Nigeria Administration of Criminal Justice Law 2020*"

[2] Alisigwe H.C.; An Overview of the Non Adjudicatory Methods of Peaceful Resolution of International Disputes (2016), *IMSU Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence* (Vol. 1, Maiden Edition, 46).

International Justice PCIJ.[3] However, the United Nations recognizes other organizational methods of dispute resolution apart from its own organs involved in judicial settlement of international disputes.

As rightly pointed out by a Legal Scholar,

> Thus many regional organizations have created machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes. In Africa, we have the African Union (AU) Court of Justice and Human People Rights which is one of the organs that serves as the Judicial Organ of the Union and interprets the AU Act as well as settle disputes brought before it. It is created in the similitude of the ICJ. It also has a criminal jurisprudence. Note too that other regional organizations like the organization of the American States, the Arab League and the European Union all made similar provisions in their respective treaties for the peaceful settlement of disputes among members. Where a matter is simultaneously before the UN and a regional Organization and such is not endangering international peace and security, the UN may defer to the appropriate regional mechanism to be exhausted first pursuant to article 52 (2) and (3).[4]

Examples of these supranational courts have been said to include the ICC, The Committee on Human Rights, under the ICCPR, the EU Court of Human Rights, the Inter American Court and Commission on Human Rights, the AU Court of Justice, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Law of the Sea Tribunal, the WTO dispute settlement systems[5]. It has been noted for Africa that at least for now the following supranational Courts are Operational ACHPR (Court), ACHPR (Commission), ECOWAS CCJ, SADC Tribunal, EAC, CJ and OHADA CCJA. The planned merger of AUCJ and ACHPR is waiting for the required number of signatories to come into force".[6] However, unlike the other Continents of the World whose Supranational Courts can be said to be old, for example the Inter American Court of Justice and the European Court of Justice, Africa's own Supranational Courts can be said to be relatively young.

Several reasons have been given for this youthfulness or late coming of Africa's Supranational Courts. Some writers attribute it to the traditions, customs and habits of the African people and

---

[3] Yemi, O. The Law of International Institutions (Simplified Edition), Lagos, Princeton and Associated Publishing Co, 2018, 573

[4] Alisigwe, A.C. *Op cit,* 53.

[5] Alisigwe, H.C.; Globalisation and the multiplication of International Courts/Tribunals – Whither the International Court of Justice, In Chukwumaeze, U.U. et al (eds), *Law, Social Justice and Development, A Festschrift for Professor Uba Nnabue*, Owerri, Imo State University Press, 2013, 125

[6] Ngwakwe, E.C. *Lawness of African Law, A Trajectory of Advances in the Dialectics of African Law for African Development*, Uturu, Abia State University, 2017, 106.

their lack of interest for litigation,[7] whilst in another breath it has also been blamed on the type or nature of leaders existing at that time, who have been described as dictators involved a lot in massive human rights violations.[8] Implicit in the above is that Africa's supranational courts, compared to that of Europe and the Americas, are relatively young. Consequently, compared to the supranational courts of the other continents, Africa's own supranantional courts are expected to face a lot of challenges and problems. It is therefore important, imperative, and germane that these challenges or problems are examined for future improvement, progress and development. This article or topic examines these challenges or problems. These problems or challenges include the following;

Logistics and Procedural Problems

There are a lot of logistics and procedural problems facing the supranational courts in Africa. However, the following are worthy of note:

(i) **Languages**

Inside the countries that make up the continent there are different types of languages. Since many countries in the continent use the various supranational courts, the language problem will definitely arise. Take for example the ECOWAS court of justice, the treaty provides that the official and working languages of the court shall be English, French and Portuguese.[9]

> The language of a case shall be chosen by the applicant, except where the defendant is a member state, the language of a case shall be official language of that case. In this regard the language chosen by the applicant shall be used in written and oral, pleading of the parties, the supporting documents and minutes as well as the decisions of the court.[10] Pleadings and other processes filed in the court are required to be translated to the working languages of the court.[11]

In relation to the above requirements, Femi Falana has identified procedural and logistics challenge to the ECOWAS court of Justice, thus:

> As the rules of the court require all applications and pleadings to be translated into the languages of the court, the limited number of translators in the service of the court has caused undue delay in the trial of cases in the court. In his report

---

[7] Yerima, T.F.; "*Trends and Prospects of African Continental Human Rights System*" (2010) Obafemi Awolowo, Ife Juris Review (Vol.1 and 2), 4
[8] Yerima, T.F. "*In the African Court of Human and People's, Some Emerging Issues*" (2010), Ebonyi State University Journal of International Law and Journal Review (Vol.1), 60
[9] *Article 87* of the Revised Treaty.
[10] *Article 25* of the Rules of Procedure.
[11] *Article 32 (2)* of the Rules of Procedure

on the status of the applications lodged in the court the chief Registrar explained that the hearing of some cases have been delayed due to the limited number of translators in the court.[12]

The issue of language has also been identified as a serious issue or problem in relation to OHADA states and the OHADA Community Court of Justice. In this regard it has been identified as follows:

> According to Article 42 of the treaty French is the working language of OHADA. Therefore all the uniform Acts are drafted and enacted in French. Apart from Equatorial Guinea (that is Spanish Speaking) Guinea Bissua (that is Portuguese speaking) and the English speaking provinces of Cameroon all the other OHADA member states are French speaking countries. It shall be said that up to now very little has been done to address such important issue, no Portuguese and Spanish versions of the uniform Act have been officially published and the English version of the Same Acts are not of the best quality and do not have any official value.
> ….. The consideration of all the above issues, has brought some Cameroonian authors to regard the OHADA treaty as unconstitutional in Cameroon… Being aware that the problem of the language represents a serious issue, the possibility to "Save" the application of the OHADA legal framework in Cameroon as well as in Equatorial Guinea and Guinea Bissau should anyway be explored.[13]

These issues can cause the language to be used in the cases presented before the common court of justice and Arbitration (CCJA) to be a problem.[14]

ii. Access to the Courts

This is another problem, particularly as regards the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights where individual access to the court is another area of concern. The protocol envisaged two types of access: automatic and optional. Once a state ratifies or accedes to the protocol, its access to the court is automatic. The optional access is subject to the discretion of the court and most importantly on the acceptance of the particular state by a separate declaration of the competence of the court to receive cases from individuals' and NGOs' petitions involving a state party.[15] On the challenge posed on this to the court and member states it has aptly been captured thus:

---

[12] Falana Femi, 'ECOWAS Court Law and Practice, Lagos, Legal Text Publishing Company Limited, 2010, 95
[13] Salvatore Mancuso 'The Renunciation to the State Sovereignty'. Is it an issue for the OHADA Treaty for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, Nweze Chima, Contemporary Issues on Public International and Contemporary Essays in Honour of Professor Dr. Christian Nwachukwu Okeke, Lake Mary, U.S.A. V and Oplas Publishing, 2009, 487 – 488.
[14] *Ibid,* 488
[15] Timothy F. Yerima. 'The African Court of Human and People Rights: Some Emerging Issues' *In EBSU Journal of International Law and Judicial Review Abakiliki*, Faculty of Law Ebonyi State Journal Vol .1, 2010 56

> This procedure for optional access is a far cry from an effective rights enforcement system. It does not give individuals and NGO's who are the primary beneficiaries and users of the court direct access to it. This is considered the less disappointing and terrible blow to the standing of the court in the eyes of most Africans. The crucial question whether African states most of which have track records of massive human rights violations will consent to individual and NGO's petitions against them is hardly answered in the affirmative. No doubt, without states making declarations to accept individual and NGO's access to the court the integrity of the court would be severely undermined.[16]

Another eminent legal writer has also identified it in these words.

The effect of denying individuals and NGOs direct access to the African court is that the discretion to allow direct access to the court lies with the African commission and the target state.

> Denial of direct access to individuals and NGO's depicts that accessing the court will be difficult for most victims of human rights abuses in Africa. It is in fact giving justice with one hand and taking it with the other hand… The denial reveals lack of effective legal protection of human rights in Africa. It also shows that the problems of effective access, fair trial, power to give binding decision, absence of legal representation which affected and still affect the performance of African Commission will continue to rear their ugly heads indirectly under the court system. It was rightly pointed out that if states did over the years, decide that they wanted to make the protocol establishing the court more binding, they could of course accept locus standing for individuals and NGO's … it is predicted on the point that the role of the court might be relegated to the role of a puppet and objectives of establishing the court right to be detected. It has been rightly pointed out that denial might be of direct access to individuals is a major obstacle to assessing the court.[17]

The issue of access to individuals and NGOs from the above perhaps may be the greatest challenge facing the court procedurally.

iii. None Publication of Law Reports and Textbooks Materials: This is one of the logistics problems facing Africa's regional or supranational courts. Publication of law reports is necessary for both the judges of the court, the legal practitioners and indeed for scholars or students. This is necessary because of the doctrine of judicial precedent or stare decision as courts are bound to follow their previous decisions in determining cases at hand. Whilst the legal practitioners need to know which case to cite that it is relevant to the one they are handling, its importance to students cannot be overemphasized. A writer who was writing on

---

[16] *Ibid,* 66
[17] Timothy F. Yerima *'Problems of personal Jurisdiction and Accessibility by Individuals and NGOs to the African Human Right Courts: Lessons from the ECOWAS Court System'.* Ekiti State University, Ado Ekiti Law Journal Ekiti, Faculty of Law, Ekiti State University, Vol. 5, 2013, 26-27.

the need for publication of law reports as it concerns the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice stressed a point that is relevant to all regional courts in Africa when he stated thus:

> The growing visibility of the community court has led to a demand for the publication of its decisions. Apart from publishing the judgments in a law report, they should be made available on the internet. The website of the community court should be regularly updated to enable stakeholders to familiarize themselves with activities of the court.[18]

It has also been stated that the publication of law reports or annual reports of the work of the regional courts will enable the public to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the court. That the publication of law reports, text and other publications is a challenge to the Regional courts was brought out by Femi Falana in relation to ECOWAS court thus:

> Nevertheless, community citizens are still largely ignorant of the existence of the court. Even Judges and Lawyers in the member states of ECOWAS are not familiar with the legal instruments which established the court and the rules of procedure applicable in the court. Against this background the West African Bar Association jointly organized two day training workshop in Freetown Sierra Leone in March 2006, and Bamako, Mali in December 2006, on the law and practice of the ECOWAS court. Both workshops were attended by leaders and representatives of the National Bar Associations in the member states of the ECOWAS, since then I have been under pressure from a number of colleagues to make available to a larger audience of lawyers and community citizens, my presentation at the sensitization workshops. In taking up the challenge I decided to publish this book which is divided into seven chapters.[19]

The issue of publication of law reports, textbooks and other legal materials is common to all the regional courts in Africa. Even the ECOWAS community of court of Justice that has started publishing law reports of its cases or decisions stopped at 2011;[20] that is about eight years ago. This prompted a writer to call a spade a spade when he stated thus:

> Very little is known about the ECOWAS community court, which indicates the need for the court and their personnel to develop and conduct outreach programs. There is the need for ECOWAS nations to keep working on public awareness campaigns and partner with civil society organizations in taking steps to adequately sensitize community citizens on their rights and duties under ECOWAS laws.[21]

---

[18] Falana Femi, 'The Community Court of Justice, ECOWAS and Experience of Other Regional Courts'. *Compendium of the International Conference on the Law in the Process of Integration in West Africa, Abuja, L'espoir Int'l, 2007,* 149.

[19] Cheryl Thompson Barrow, 'Observations from the common wealth secretariat'. *Compendium of the International Conference on the Law in the Process of Integration in West Africa, Abuja, L'espoir Int'l, 2007,* 140.

[20] See 2011 Community Court of Justice ECOWAS Law Report, cited as (2011) *CCJELR*.

[21] Ajoni, K.F. 'Enhancing Access to the ECOWAS Court" *Compendium of the International Conference on the Law in the Process of Integration in West Africa, op cit*, 251.

iv. High rate of Illiteracy and Lack of Legal Aid

There is no doubt that there is high rate of illiteracy and poverty in Africa. This issue of poverty invariably affects justice delivery to Africans as far as these supranational courts are concerned. Writing on impediments to access to Justice, Dr C.K. Nwankwo clearly brought this point thus:

> The financial barrier has been recognized in all jurisdictions as the central impediment to access to justice. In Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa and beyond poverty is a reality and the commonest hindrance to obtaining justice. The cost to individuals to bringing themselves into the formal legal system is frequently prohibitive.[22]

There is no doubt that these factors that highly affect the operational activities of the regional courts in terms of filing cases and retaining legal practitioners to ventilate their legal rights and to keep the courts busy. The challenge posed by poverty and illiteracy on Africa's supranational courts was clearly brought out thus:

> High rate of illiteracy and poverty are twin problems in Africa. Unlike Europe and America, the rate of poverty and illiteracy is very high in Africa, therefore the problem is not only establishing Human Rights Commission and Human Rights Court but also for African people to know of the existence of the Commission and Human Rights Courts, and be able to utilize them fully. What will in fact be the significance of the African Commission and the African court in the continent where millions of people do not even know their rights or where many of those who know their rights are not in a financial position to pursue their rights in judicial or quasi-judicial institutions.

> A learned writer has pointed out that a grave impediment to the attainment of civil and political right is constituted by illiteracy, ignorance and poverty in Africa. He observed that many rural dwellers in most African states and indeed the urban poor cannot assert their rights because of lack of awareness or means to do so.[23]

As a result of this problem, some writers have advocated the establishment of legal aid services as poor people are particularly vulnerable to human rights violations and abuses by governmental authorities and private individuals.[24] It is a well-known fact that as far as legal aid is concerned none exists for any of the supranational courts in Africa, despite the fact that the protocol to the African charter makes provision for free legal representation under Article

---

[22] Nwankwo, C.K. *'Impediment to Access to Justice in Law Social Justice and Development, A Festschrift for Professor Nnabue Chukwumaeze, U.U. Olaolwa, and Nnabue, A (eds) op cit* 334

[23] Yerima, Timothy, F., 'The African Court of Human and People's Rights, Some Emerging Issues', *EBSU Journal of International Law and Judicial Review op cit*, 68.

[24] Ajoni, K.F., 'Enhancing Access to the ECOWAS Court' in *Compendium of the International Conference on the Law in the Process Integration in West Africa, op cit*, 249-250.

10(2).[25] However, even with the provision on legal aid by the said protocol, the challenge or problem which such a yet to be established legal aid will face has been adequately highlighted by a writer thus:

> Although this provision is an improvement on the provision of Article 7(c) of the African charter, dealing with the right to counsel, it has left one or two questions unanswered. First who provides the free legal representation? Is it the African court through its secretariat or the state against which the matter is instituted? Whichever side the pendulum, swings, it is submitted that there is likely to be a problem if it is the state that provides for legal representation, unless most Africans states which are known for their poor legal aid programmes turn over a new leaf, the provision on free legal representation in the protocol would be unrealistic because many African Governments are not able to provide legal aid for those who cannot hire a lawyer. On the other hand, if it is the African court secretariat that would provide free legal representation, it means that the secretary must employ experts on human rights to handle such cases. The success of this depends on adequate funding and the availability of human rights practitioners especially at the seat of the court. From the foregoing issues emerging from the establishment of African Human Rights court, it is crucial to ask the question whether the establishment of African court would add value to the African Commission or that the decision to establish the court was taken impetuously.[26]

These problems and challenges referred to by Yerima Timothy, on poverty and legal aid as it pertains to the African court on Human and people's court, it is submitted, applies mutatis mundas to other supranational or regional courts in Africa as borne out or evidenced in a statement made by another prominent practitioner in relation to the ECOWAS community of Justice thus:

"In order to ensure that access to the court is not limited to a privileged few, the ECOWAS community should establish a legal aid centre to assist community citizens who lack the financial wherewithal to secure the enforcement of their fundamental human rights in the court".[27]

v. Access to the Courts in Terms of Distance or Location

Africa is a vast continent with large landmark and boarders separating their countries. Its regional or supranational courts are located in the headquarters of one country or another. For example, African court or human and people's court is located in Arusha Tanzania whilst the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice is located in Abuja Nigeria. For the citizens to transport

---

[25] Yerima, Timothy F. 'The African Court of Human and People's Rights: Some Emerging Issues', *EBSU Journal of International Law and Juridical Review op cit*, 68.

[26] *Ibid,* 68-69.

[27] Falana, Femi, *'ECOWAS Court; Law and Practice, op cit,* IV-V.

themselves and their lawyers to either file court process or attend the sitting of the courts; huge amount will be involved. The poverty rate in the continent as well as lack of free legal aid have already been noted in this work. Consequently, travelling or accessing these courts by the citizens is no doubt a big challenge. Highlighting this problem with regards to the ECOWAS court of justice, a jurist has aptly stated thus:

> At the commencement of the present 2007/2008 new legal year for the ECOWAS court of Justice some weeks ago, Justice Aminatta Male Sanogo, of the court of justice, stated amongst other things that:
> Accessibility constitutes a serious handicap to the community citizens possessing the right to seek justice before the court due to the long distance separating them from the court as well as the extreme poverty of most of the potential applicants who cannot therefore take their cases to court". She noted that the issue of access to justice has been a major challenge facing the ECOWAS court of Justice which is situated in Abuja and that it has become increasingly difficult for citizens of other West African states, whose rights have been violated to come before the court of justice.[28]

Problems of Enforcement of Judgments of the Courts

The problem of enforcement of judgments of the court is another big challenge facing the supranational courts. The courts have varying provisions for enforcement of their judgments. For example the African court on Human and Peoples court by Article 30 of its protocol provided that the state parties for the present protocol undertake to comply with the judgment in any case to which they are parties within the time stipulated by the court and to guarantee its execution, and by Article 29(2) the council of Ministers shall also be notified of the judgment and shall monitor its execution on behalf of the Assembly.

Analysing the provisions of execution of the judgment of the African court on Human and people's court vis-à-vis the challenges such would pose a writer stated it this way:

> The court is also required to notify all the parties of its decisions and transmit copies of same to member states and the council of ministers of AU, which must monitor its proper execution. There are at least three foreseeable hurdles.
> First obviously, the court has no express power to ensure the execution of its judgment, secondly the efficacy of this enforcement mechanism is doubtful, considering the gross human rights violations that are being committed by government agents in many parts of Africa. It is also very doubtful if the council of ministers will have the political will to perform this function effectively. We

---

[28] Ajoni, K.F., 'Enhancing Access to the ECOWAS Court' *Compendium of the International Conference on the Law in the process of Integration in West Africa, op cit*, 249.

submit that considering these doubts the African Court might face the same problems as the African commission.[29]

On the weakness or challenge posed by enforcement of judgment of the African court on Human and peoples' court, it has also been rightly pointed out thus:

> One's attention is caught by the provision of Article 30 which enjoins state parties to undertake to comply with judgment of the court. This provision in my view fall short of expectation because gone were the days when international law is regarded as having only moral authority.[30]

The ECOWAS court of justice has the same problem as it has been observed that:

> The ECOWAS court has lamented the non-compliance with its judgments and has called for sanctions against such non-complaint members states. Among the leading non complaint states is Nigeria (in whose territory the court is situated).[31]

It was the problem of enforcement in the case of Mike Campbell (PVT) Ltd and others Vs Republic Zimbabwe,[32] that led to the suspension of the South African Development Tribunal. The non-enforcement of the judgments of the regional or supranational courts in Africa is a challenge that is universal and common to all of them that it has been lamented thus:

> The issue that has not been settled in the absence of enforcement, mechanism for decisions of international courts and quasi-judicial bodies in civil cases especially if the violator of the right is a state. If the state fails to comply with a decision of a court (as has been reported among West African States) there is no procedure for enforcement now. Perhaps, this is partly responsible for the continuous violations of human rights or disregard for court orders of the state parties to human rights treaties in Africa.[33]

Some writers have as a result called for sanctions such as suspension to be imposed on any member state that violates the judgment of the court.[34] Thus, the challenge or problem of

---

[29] Yerima Timothy Fwa 'The African Court of Human and People's Rights: Some Emerging Issues', *EBSU Journal of International Law and Juridical Review, op cit* 66.

[30] Wahab O. Egbewole 'African Court Protocol and Development of Human Rights in the Continent' *Ilorin Bar Journal* (2002) Vol.1 No.1, 60.

[31] Zechariah Mathias and Danda Leah P. 'Institutional, Constitutional Constraints to the Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Nigeria; Lessons to Learn from International Law, *NIALS Journal of Constitutional Law (NJCL)*, (2013), Vol. 1,310

[32] (2/2007(2008) *SADCT* 2 (28 November, 2008)

[33] Zechariah Matthias and Dauda Leah P., *'Institutional and Constitutional Constraints to the Realisation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Nigeria, lessons to Learn from International Law, op cit*, 309. Adigun, A. "Enforcing ECOWAS Judgments in Nigeria through the Common Law Rule on the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments", Journal of Private International Law, Vol 15, 2019, 130-161.

[34] Wahab O. Egbewole, 'African Court Protocol and Development of Human Rights in the Continent'. *Ilorin Bar Journal*, (Vol 1 No. 1) Nigeria Bar Journal, 2002, 60.

enforcement of the judgments of the regional or supranational courts in Africa is a big one that it questions the usefulness or benefits derivable from their establishment.

Funding

The issue of providing fund for the running and or administration of courts whether national, regional or supranational cannot be overemphasized. It is a well-known fact that African Countries, compared to the countries of Europe and America, cannot boast of enough or adequate resources or fund to manage them as the continent is well known for its lack of adequate finance or resources. The nature, amount or quantum of fund required to run a regional court was elaborated by a writer, thus:

> Regional and international litigation is resource, time and technique intensive. A pool of skilled advocates and litigators will have to be established around the workings of these courts to identify the best cases find the resources to conduct them, ensure compliance with the decisions and disseminate the outcomes of the legal work. This will take time and investment from different sources. In May 2003, a group of African and international NGOS formed a coalition on the African Court on Human and People's Rights to advance creation and functioning of an effective African Court. The promise of regional courts in Africa requires focused attention of this kind of fulfillment.[35]

Based on the above analysis, the issue of funding of Regional courts by African countries may have been rightly questioned by the same writer as follows:

> Furthermore the multiplicity of regional courts raises questions of sustainability and funding. Can Africa afford so many regional courts? In recognition of this problem, the third summit of the African union in Addis Asaba in July 2004 adopted a decision requiring the African Union to integrate the African court on Human and Peoples Rights and the court of justice of the African Union into one court. Work on merging the two courts is currently under way.[36]

It should be noted that African countries are expected to fund the African court on Human and Peoples' Court (a joint project owned and run by them) and also the regional courts like

---

[35] *Odinkalu*, C.A., 'Regional Courts in Africa, A Promise in Search of Fulfillment in Justice Initiatives,' *A Publication of the Open Society Justice Initiative*. New York: 2005, 47-48
[36] *Ibid,* 47

ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, East African Court of Justice, South African Development Tribunal etc. The difficulty which African countries are facing to fund the African court on Human and Peoples court was highlighted by a scholar as follows:

> Although the AU has provided an initial budget of $2,250,000 for the African court to commence operation, the fact that the continuing existence and effective performance of both the court and the commission require serious financial commitment by members of AU has tasked the already lean pocket of the AU. The question is, whether without adequate funding the court would not follow the practice of the African commission which relies heavily on financial support from other international and regional institution? A scholar while recommending the establishment of the African court as a result of the poor performance of the African commission, hasten to warn that regard should be had to the fact that even the African commission relies on donations to effectively perform its function.[37]

Since the funding of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights has tasked the already lean pocket of the African Union, there is no doubt then that in the funding of the other regional courts undertaken solely by the regional bodies like ECOWAS, SADC and EAC, the task on their own lean resources will be heavier. This then supports the assertion by a writer that lack of adequate resources and funding rolled into one is another crux of the issues and problems facing Africa's regional or supranational courts.[38]

Lack of Appellate Procedure

An appellate procedure in a judicial system is necessary to correct, review or affirm or amend the decisions or judgments of a court lower in the judicial hierarchy. Such a system exists in the municipal systems of countries in Africa and other parts of the world. For example, in Nigeria we have the Magistrate Courts, High Courts, Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. However, at the supranational or regional levels such a system does not exist. Giving hint of

---

[37] Yerima Timothy, Fwa 'The African Court of Human and People's Court some Emerging Issues' in *EBSU Journal of International Law and Juridical Review.* Faculty of Law, Ebonyi, State University, Vol. 1 2010, 67.
[38] *Ibid,* 66

the effect or danger such a system poses to international law, Alisigwe noted and continued thus:

> ….There now exist a plethora of well-developed judicial or quasi-judicial bodies operating under the treaty regimes of the United Nations as well as the regional organizations.
>
> The scope of these courts and the jurisprudence they espouse has evoked much commentary among writers in recent times. Especially is this so when the existence of these courts is juxtaposed with the provisions of the United Nations charter and the pride of place accorded the international court of justice. Thus today as the world grapples with the complexities of human existence, there seem to be a certain decentralization of some of the bodies with which the international court of justice can in principle deal to new highly specialized bodies whose members are experts in the subject matter. Can it now be said that acceding to these new supra judicial bodies constitute opting out of many substantive rules of international law as espoused by the international court of justice.
>
> Given the pre-eminent position of the United Nations charter over other treaty obligations, the answer can only be in the negative. However while the multiplicity of these new supranational judicial bodies reflects the vitality and complexity of contemporary international life sight should not be lost of their adverse potentials on the integrity of international law ….
>
> This warning is underlined by the fact that judicial findings that are inconsistent with the judgment of the international court of justice would present particular problems to the role of international law in international relations given the pre-eminent position of the international Court of Justice as the principal judicial organ of the united Nations and pro-tarts, the only judicial body vested with a universal and general subject matter jurisdiction.[39]

There is no doubt that Alisigwe was referring to the existence of many supranational or regional courts in the world today, and the danger their different decisions or judgment will pose to international law without the existence of an appeal procedure or mechanism. Alisigwe finally recommended the International Court of Justice as the appellate court that will serve that procedure or purpose.[40] Coming home to Africa and its regional courts, this same problem of multiplicity of decision has also been noted and cautioned in the following words:

> Also germane for consideration is the relationship between the African court and other multiplicity of regional courts and tribunals with mandates that overlap with those of the African court and African Commission. These include

---

[39] Alisigwe Henry C. 'Globalization and the Multiplication of International Courts/Tribunals Whither the International Court of Justice' in Chukwumaeze, U.U., Ola Oluwa R. and Nnabue (Eds), *A Law, Social Justice and Development: A Festschrift for Prof Nnabue,* Owerri, Imo State, University Press, 2013, 130 -131
[40] *Ibid,* 134

the court of justice of the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) and the East African Court (EAC) of justice and the South African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal. Writers wonder whether with these institutions, the competence to interpret the African Charter is still a monopoly of the African Commission and the African Court. A thorough perusal of the treaties establishing these sub regional African courts and tribunals reveals that they also make provisions either expressly or impliedly relating to the obligations of the state parties to promote and protect human rights in accordance with the African charter. The disadvantage of this overlapping system is that there is the real possibility of the various courts giving varying interpretations of the same provisions or as put by a commentator: it is also presents rich possibilities for forum shopping in the enforcement of regional human rights standards in Africa. The question of concurrent jurisdiction and conflicting judgments which might emanate from the interpretations of the charter provisions and treaties of the various regional court was not properly addressed by the drafters of the protocol establishing the African court.[41]

The above statement clearly highlights the issue of an appellate procedure or court as big challenge to the supranational or regional courts in Africa. However, unlike Alisigwe who pointed at the international court of justice directly as being in a position to fulfil that role, Yerima pointed indirectly at the African court on Human and Peoples' Rights as the likely appellate court for Africa.[42] For the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, it has expressly been pointed out that there is an inherent violation of the due process of right to an appeal in the structure of the community judicial system.[43]

The ECOWAS body realised this problem as according to Falana Femi:

> The council of Ministers has agreed on the need of establishing an appeal structure within the community court of justice to review the decision of the court at the instance of aggrieved persons.
> However in view of the fact that the volume of cases being currently handled by the court does not justify the establishment of the appeal court the council directed the commission to undertake in collaboration with the court of justice, a study for the establishment of an appellate division in the court and submit a report at one of its next sessions. The directive has not been carried out by the commission due to bureaucratic bottleneck. Hence the appellate division of the court has not been established.[44]

---

[41] Yerima Timothy, Fwa '*The African Court of Human and People's Court: Some Emerging Issues', op cit*, 67-68.
[42] *Ibid,* 68
[43] Odinkalu, Chidi Anselem 'ECOWAS Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights'. *Compendium of the International Conference on the Law in the Process of Integration in West Africa, op cit*, 202.
[44] Falana Femi, 'ECOWAS Court: Law and Practice', *op cit,* 42-43

The nonexistence of appellate procedure is thus a big challenge facing the regional or supranational courts in Africa, even ECOWAS that has realized the need has not even established one for ECOWAS Court of justice.

Infrastructural Deficiency

On the issue of infrastructure, there exists little or no text, data or publication detailing or X-raying the infrastructural problems of the supranational courts of the continent. However, there is no doubt considering the low level of infrastructures in the continent and its low financial standing, that Africa's regional or supranational courts will have challenges in terms of infrastructure. The annual reports of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice attest to this by stating that: It appears certain that there are fundamental problems with the judges' house. The walls and paints on the ground floor of all the houses have peeled off or are in the process. There are serious plumbing problems which demand immediate rectification. Construction works on the social centre annexed to the quarters have stalled. A portion of the road leading up to the quarters is not tarred; it is literally unusable during the raining reason since it becomes muddy. Having stated that the court house was completed this year and in fact it was ready for commissioning in February, this was the major infrastructural activity for the year.[45]

With regard to computerization, vehicle acquisition and telephone services, the report went further and stated as follows:

> The court is urging the executive secretariat to complete the internet connectivity programme it embarked upon. The court badly needs the internet services to enable it quickly access legal developments going around the world….
> Two new vehicles were acquired for the court, when funds become available more vehicles will be acquired for use. It is rather unfortunate to recall that the judges still do not have telephone service at their residence.. The long delay is due largely to the fact that it is a new area so it involves a massive connection to the entire area and partly due to insufficient funding.[46]

It can be rightly stated that even though these infrastructural problems of road, structural problems connected to judges' quarters, computerization, vehicle acquisition and telephone service, etc noted above are challenges listed for ECOWAS court of justice or associated with it, they may not be traced solely to the ECOWAS court or peculiar to it.

---

[45] Community Court of Justice ECOWAS, 2004, *Annual Report*, 28
[46] *Ibid,* 29

There is no doubt that other regional or supranational courts have similar problems as Africa's Economic and Infrastructural problems are not peculiar to any court or country.

Lack of Judicial Independence

It cannot be stated with certainty that Africa's regional supranational courts really enjoy independence. The above assertion is based on the fact that some factors that can guarantee the independence of a court is lacking in Africa's Supranational Courts.

Two factors can be identified as responsible for the above assertion. They are:

1.   Funding and execution of the court's judgment

The first is Funding: Funding is very crucial for the independence of any court. This is because at the national levels many courts have lost their independence as a result of funding by their executive arms of government. It is a well-known aphorism that he who pays the piper dictates the tune. The issue of funding and its adequacy has been identified and noted. To augment an inadequate fund from member countries that owns them, many of these regional courts resort to reliance on external sources like donations and grant from western owned bodies or organizations. For example, the following report was made in the annual reports of the ECOWAS Community of justice thus:

> In terms of external funds the court received the sum of US $300,000 in 2009 as payment of the second installment of the Ford Foundation Grant. Ford Foundation remains the only financial partner of the court since 2007. In 2007 it donated a US $600,000 assistance budget to the court. This financial facility covered a two year period, from June 2007 to 32 May, 2009.[47]

There is no doubt that Western countries and their donor agencies give to countries or courts or other organizations in Africa to undermine or interfere with their independence. The well-known examples are the IMF and the World Bank. Receiving grants, aid or donations from Western countries or their donor agencies by supranational or regional courts will affect their independence in the discharge of their duties.

Another area that may affect the independence of these supranational courts is that of execution of judgment. Many of these supranational courts do not have their own internal mechanisms for the execution of their judgments. For example, as in the case of the OHADA Common Court of Justice, it has been noted that the national authorities of the members states are

---

[47] Community Court of Justice ECOWAS, 2009-2011, Annual Report, 33.

responsible for affixing the execution of its judgment order, and are enforced under the same conditions as decisions made by domestic courts of member states.[48]

With regards to the ECOWAS Community Court of justice, it has been noted also that it is incumbent upon the domestic courts of each member state to see to the enforcement of decisions of the court of justice of ECOWAS, and to carry this out each member state is required to designate on its territory, the competent national authority entrusted with receiving and implementing decisions of the court.[49]

The SADC Tribunal has the same procedure for enforcement namely through the national court and that led to the frustration of the judgment obtained by Campbell and the cited case of *Campbell Vs Government of Zimbabwe*.

The case of Campbell clearly showed that the procedure of enforcement clearly interferes or affects the independence of the supranational courts. The African court on Human and Peoples' Rights also has the problem of lack of internal mechanism for enforcement as the council of ministers plays a great role in enforcement of their judgments/decisions. Another writer identified the area that affects the independence of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. It is Article 4 which vests it with jurisdiction on Advisory opinion and then the provision which watered it down by saying that:

> Provided that the subject matter of the opinion is not related to a matter being examined by the Commission.

The above proviso and its effect on its independence was identified by Wahab Egbewole thus:

> … The proviso has totally removed the seeming independence that the court ought to enjoy like any judicial outfit, it is imperative for a proper discharge of their duties that they must have unfettered discretion to look into any matter that has semblance of the abuse of human rights. It is most humbly submitted that the African Court being seized of a matter should take such a matter away from the purview of the Commission. This position could be likened to the ouster of jurisdiction in the municipal realm Jurisdiction is fundamental and is jealously guarded by courts. This should be the attitude of the African Court.
>
> This submission is grounded on the fact that the court could be likened to the judicial arm of the organization of African Union though with a limited scope.

---

[48] Summary of Report of the Compendium of the International Conference on "The law in the process of integration in West Africa," *op cit*, 17.
[49] *Ibid,* 16

All necessary encouragement should be given to it to perform to its limit in order to stamp out the rampant abuse of human rights from the continent.[50]

It can thus be seen that from the factors listed herein that the regional courts in Africa have some areas of challenges in terms of their independence.

Recommendations

To solve the problems facing Africa's Supranational Courts, the following suggestions or recommendations are germane or apt:

a. To ensure that access to Africa's supranational or Regional courts are not limited to the few privileged rich, there is the need to establish a Legal Aid Centre for each of the Regional courts to assist the citizens of the various regions who lack the financial wherewithal to secure the enforcement of their fundamental human rights in the courts.

b. **Creation of Public Awareness**: There is the need for African nations who own the supranational courts to keep working on public awareness campaigns since as pointed out earlier there is high rate of illiteracy in the continent. The awareness should be to sensitize the citizens on their rights and duties under the various laws. The African nations can partner with civil society organizations to do so. It has been pointed out that even judges and lawyers are not familiar with the legal instruments which established the courts and the rules of procedure applicable to some of them.[51] In other words this public awareness highlighted above should also be extended to legal practitioners and judges in form of workshops and conferences.

c. **Need for Improvement in the Enforcement of the decisions of the Courts:** Judgment enforcement is one of the cardinal reasons that make successful litigants enjoy the fruits of their judgment both at the national and supranational level. As rightly pointed by Professor E. C. Ngwakwe: "The difficulties encountered in the enforcement of judgments of the supranational courts constitute a serious discouraging factor for

---

[50] Wahab O. Egbewole, 'African Court Protocol and Development of Human Right in the Continent in *Ilorin Bar Journal, IBJ*, Vol 1, No.1 *Nigerian Bar Journal*, 2002, 55-56.
[51] Falana, F., ECOWAS Court: Law and Practice, *op cit, ii*.

prospective litigants who might be working to try the option of approaching the courts for legal redress of their rights".[52]

d.   **Adequate Funding:** It has been noted that funding is one of the constraints faced by Africa's supranational courts. There should be adequate funding provided by member states. In this regard, it is hereby recommended that member states of the bodies should be compelled to pay their statutory dues or contributions necessary for running of the courts. Any member that fails to pay as at and when due should be reported to the United Nations organization for imposition of sanctions. This is because if adequate funding is provided, these regional courts will not rely on any external body for aid or donation as this will in the end enhance their independence.

It is the view of this writer that if these recommendations are taken note of by African Leaders and the Heads of the Supranational, the courts concerned (African Supranational Courts) will be in a position to compete with the other Supranational Courts in Europe and America.

---

[52] Ngwakwe, E.C. "Lawness of African Law, A trajectory of Advances and Reverse in the Dialectics of African Law for African Development", *op cit,* 113 – 114.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY AND GRASS ROOT DEVELOPMENT IN IJEBU-ODE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, OGUN STATE, NIGERIA.

Adebajo, Adeola Aderayo, PhD
adebajoaa@tasued.edu.ng & adebajoade@gmail.com

Kunle Olawunmi, PhD
myafricantour@gmail.com
&
Osikoya Adepelumi Funsho
osikoyafunsho@gmail.com

Abstract

The quest for local government autonomy which stems from the need to facilitate development at the grassroots level is hampered by socio-economic challenges. Despite involvement of people in politics at the local level, it has not translated to development. Adopting the localist theory, the paper investigated the implications of lack of autonomy on grass root development in Ijebu-Ode local government. Descriptive research design was employed. A total of one hundred copies of questionnaire were administered. Interview and questionnaire were used to collect primary data while secondary data was used too. Purposive and simple random sampling techniques were used to select the respondents/participants. The primary data collected were analysed using simple percentage. It was discovered that constitutional contradiction, erosion of power of local government, joint local/state government account system, misappropriation of funds, political interference, among others, are the major factors affecting the actualization of local government's autonomy in Ijebu-Ode. It was established that the Ijebu-Ode local government lacks autonomy which affects its socio-economic development at the grassroots level. Among others, the paper recommended that state/local government joint account system be stopped, financial leakages curtailed, Ijebu Ode local government should generate and control its finances.

Keywords: **Autonomy, development, grassroots development, local government, local government autonomy.**

Introduction

The local government as the third tier of government is saddled with the responsibilities of providing and delivering essential services to the people at the grassroots level, in order to ensure development. As the third tier, local government is strategically placed to carry out this function due to its proximity to the people at the grassroots, which enhances its ability to easily articulate and aggregate the demands of the people. This implies that the local government is the major source by which the people at the grassroots satisfy their common needs and problems (Doho, Ahmed, & Umar, 2018, pp. 44-51). The local government, therefore, plays a central role in enabling the achievement of development at the grassroots level. However, most development programmes are designed and implemented without giving attention to the exact needs of the people at the grassroots; as many programmes in Ijebu-Ode local government area were comprehensively designed in great detail at the outset, and managed through centrally controlled systems and procedures of administration, many of which fell short of achieving their intended goals. The failure of the local government councils has made the citizens to lose trust in government as an institution. In some areas, council officials are better known for the harassment of citizens rather than meeting their needs.

The struggle for autonomy by local government in Nigeria is a recurring issue, as old as the history of local government creation itself. Although, the local government is not sovereign unlike independent nation-states: it is a subordinate government, which derives their existence and power from the laws enacted by the superior government. The nature and structure of transactions or interactions between the three tiers of government determine the degree of autonomy. Yet, the principle of autonomy is an important issue for local governments because they cannot function efficiently without appreciable elements of autonomy (Adeyemo, 2019, pp. 231-249). As a result, the link between the autonomy exercised by the local government council and the dimensions of development experienced by citizens is very significant. Existing literature on local government administration prior to 1976 showed the existence of the institutions as mere field units, as was clearly stated by Eme and Izueke (2017) that the states have continued to encroach upon what would have been the exclusive preserve of local governments. There was so much dictation by the state government, undermining good initiatives for socio-economic development at the local level. This development informed the 1976 reforms, with the guarantee of third tier status in the constitution (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1976). Unfortunately, state governors do not subscribe to this independence of the local council, as they have done all within their power to ensure emasculation of the councils, so that they can utilize their federal allocations. Ayoade (2015), in his view argued that the instrument that gave the governors the power of control over the councils is the state/local

government joint accounts. Once this umbilical cord is broken, the councils can be in a position to develop their areas socio-economically.

The political interference and control of the state and federal governments in Ijebu-Ode local government cannot be over emphasized, negating the principle of division of power. It does not only affect the administration of Ijebu Ode local government area, but as well as the people at the grassroots, who are neglected in receiving their own portion of the national entitlement, which is expected to reflect in terms of development in the area. Both the state and federal governments control it through introduction of the integrated staff system including the finance of the council (Ahmad, 2012, pp. 73-96). It also lacks freedom to impose local taxes, generate revenue within its assigned sources, allocate its financial and material resources, as well as determine and authorize its budget. In addition, the statutory allocation which the council receives through the State-Local Government Joint Account is controlled by the state government. The state government makes deductions from the local government council's share from the federation account for services which have been transferred to the local government. The fragile financial position of the local government for delivery of services has degenerated into a split structure. At one end, Angalah (2013, pp. 143-147), and Arugu and Okorie (2014, pp. 112-113) noted that it is the unstable and dwindling economic resources of the local government; while at the other hand, the mounting pressure by the people for the provision of expected services. In essence, the full realization of local government autonomy has over the years been unsuccessful thereby affecting socio-economic development in Ijebu Ode and its environs. Although, studies have been carried out on the roles of local government in grass root development, there seems to be paucity of literature on how lack of local government autonomy affects socio-economic development particularly in Ijebu Ode local government area. Hence, the paper investigated how lack of autonomy affects socio-economic development in Ijebu ode local government area.

The central objective of the study is to investigate how lack of local government autonomy has affected grass root development in Ijebu-Ode area, Ogun state. The specific objectives are to: identify and discuss the factors affecting autonomy in Ijebu-Ode local government area and find out how lack of autonomy has affected grassroot development in Ijebu-Ode local government area.

Theoretical Framework

The paper adopted the localist theory as an explanatory framework. The proponents of the theory include Leopard Kohr, Wandell Berry, Kirkpatrick Sale and James Howard. However, Jones and Stewart, are major proponents of the localist theory. The localist perspective develops a forceful case for autonomous elected local authorities. The proponents opined that local government is grounded in the belief that there is value in the spread of power and the involvement of many decision makers in many different localities. Therefore, diffusion of power is a fundamental value and local authorities as elected bodies, can represent the dispersion of legitimate political power in the society. It was further proposed that there is strength in diversity of response, needs vary from locality to locality, and local government allows the differences to be accommodated. According to the proponents, local authorities can learn from each other different patterns of provisions, experimenting and pioneering. The localist theory, according to Ibietan and Ndukwe (2014, pp. 90-94), maintains that autonomy should be retained at the local level instead of concentration of political power in the central government. The theory also emphasizes that government policy initiatives should be geared towards encouraging grassroots socio-economic development.

In another perspective, the localist theorist also posited that a nation is nothing other than the complex localities that make up its existence. In other words, the development experienced at the national level is the sum total of the growth at the localities within its jurisdiction (Wills, 2015, pp. 188-189). From the localist viewpoint, it is understood that the development of a nation is not necessarily a matter of top-bottom approach, which is from the federal government to the local entities. Hence, this theory helps us understand the need to prioritize local activities and initiatives by creating an enabling framework that supports bottom-top approach to development. Wayne (2016) perceived that the theory advocates for the devolution of power and resources from the federal government to the component units, particularly the local government in order to empower the community dwellers. Though, this may tend to pose another challenge as the Nigerian system concentrates all its powers in the federal government, diminishing the powers which the local entities have to act independently in the development of the various communities. Localism goes against the centralization of power at the federal level. The local governments, being the closest to the people, can fully engage in development programmes that will impact the lives of people directly. Unfortunately, this is not the case in the Ijebu-Ode, as the local government is continually being subdued by the state government due to its lack of autonomy.

However, this theory is criticized on the assumption that a nation is nothing other than the complex localities that make up its existence. The assumption reduces the important role of national institutions in the discharge of their duties to the citizens. This in essence is against the functionalities and relevance of the national government. In the same vein, emphasizing local autonomy, without consciously enumerating the roles of the political personnel, makes it appear too abstract in nature. Also, the theory can be criticised on its prescriptive assumption of full autonomy which can lead to domestic authoritarianism, implying that if political power is concentrated in the hands of local power holders, it may lead to dictatorship.

Literature Review

Local Government Autonomy and Grassroots Development

Local government autonomy is identified with the qualities of self-assertion, critical reflection, responsibility, absence of external causation, and knowledge of one's own interest; it is also thought of, in connection with actions, beliefs, principles, reasons for acting, and rules (George, 2014). In the perspective of Odo (2014, pp. 63-65), local government autonomy is the act by which each government enjoys a separate existence and independence from the control of the other governments (state and federal). Autonomy requires not just the legal and physical existence of an apparatus of government like a legislative assembly, governor or court, but that each government must exist not as an appendage of another but as autonomous entity in the sense of being able to exercise its own will in the conduct of local affairs. This means that autonomy would only be meaningful if and where each level of government is not bound by the constitution to accept dictates or directives from another. To Carr (2015, pp. 60-66) autonomy is not just the legal and physical existence of an apparatus of government like a legislative assembly, the executive, the judiciary, etc but each tier of government must exist not as an appendage of another.

Odoh (2019, p. 12-19) views autonomy in the context of local government administration as the ability and capacity of local governments to act towards defined goals. This implies that autonomy has to do with relative discretion enjoyed by local governments in regulating their own affairs. Local self-government is to give the majority of the people the opportunity to participate in the political process in which they determine their own development. By implication, local government autonomy is the root of political and socio-economic development at the grassroots, hence, autonomy is seen as a catalyst for empowerment of rural areas in Nigeria. The 1999 constitution and the Guideline for the 1976

Local Government Reform recognized local government as the third tier of government in Nigeria with substantial autonomy from the state and federal governments. However, experience over the years has shown that in practice the local governments in the country are deprived of their autonomy through complex interference, especially by the state governments that meddle into finance, appointment and siting of developmental projects (Arugu & Okorie, 2014, pp. 143-147). In an effort to amend sections 7 and 162 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the National Assembly recommended the establishment of a special federal account, in which the 774 local government areas would draw their federal allocation, as a result of lack of autonomy experienced by the tier of government. That is the more reason why Ngozi and Tajudeen (2015, pp. 85-91) asserted that local government seems to be a lease of life from the hand of state government, enabling their financial autonomy. These, among others, intend to reposition the autonomy of local governments for efficient local administration.

Akpan (2013) further argued that the nature and character of the political system largely determine the kind of autonomy the state government devolves to the local government. Hence, the local government should be a unique political structure and the degree of autonomy it enjoys from federal and state government is congruent with the politics of the state. In a contrary view, Doho, Ahmed and Umar (2018, pp. 44-51) averred that the joint account chaired by the state posed a very serious challenge to the local governments, especially the first eight years of the fourth republic, as the state governments mismanaged federal allocations to the various local governments. That is the more reason why it is important the 1999 constitution should be reviewed on the provisions of the State Joint Local Government Account System, so as to enable local governments to access their federal allocations directly. Finance is the foundation of autonomy of local governments, the more reason the other tiers have continued to withhold it, knowing full well that without financial resources, the third tier would come begging, forgetting other reliable aspects of autonomy. In the opinion of Ayodele and Adams (2012, pp. 1-12), local governments have become notorious for corrupt practices hindering their full acquisition of autonomy, as many of those who are to fight for the autonomy have been wining and dining with those who plunder resources. However, corruption should not be a hindrance to local government authorities in order to be able to initiate and implement developmental policies, programmes and projects. Hence, there is need for effective and efficient institutional mechanisms in all the 774 local governments in Nigeria to curb corruption

at the local level of governance through effective operations of the EFCC and ICPC in order to build trust and ensure sanity in financial appropriation.

Odo (2014, pp. 63-65) argued that grassroots development is a self-generating process of socio-economic and political development in which the rural inhabitants themselves are actively involved and share in the cost and benefits of such development. The essential elements of grassroot development include poverty reduction, rising incomes, increase in health and nutrition status of the people, provision of quantitative and qualitative basic education, improved agricultural activities, provision of infrastructural facilities, amongst others (Tagunna, 2017; Zakariyah & Danjuma, 2019, pp. 41-45; Ering, 2021). It is the responsibility of the local governments with the active co-operation of the state and federal governments to target improving the welfare of the masses within their areas of jurisdictions. From the viewpoint of Akanni (2017), grassroots development is a process through which the local government extends or initiates development at the rural, village and primary source of society. It involves the development of rural people in such a continuous manner so as to enable them to utilize their intellect, technology and other resources effectively and efficiently for further development of themselves and others (Adegboye, 2013). Deducing from the foregoing, grassroots development encourages bringing an improved standard of living to the inhabitants with notable and reasonable changes in all ramifications at the local level of government. So, grassroots development is a multi-dimensional process involving important changes in social structures, conditions of life, as well as the involvement of the rural dwellers in decisions that affect people's lives. In this way, it is an effective strategy of addressing the basic needs of the people at the local level of governance. Eze (2017, pp. 46-49) argued that through the nudge of the government of the day and participation of the inhabitants of the locality, the society experiences a positive constant change but in the case of Nigeria, local governments are bedevilled with challenges which weaken their capacity and ability to achieve developmental objectives. Hence, developmental projects at the local level become unachievable as a result of lack of inclusion of the local communities by the government in the conception, design and implementation of such projects. As averred by Uguru (2011), local governments are unable to carry out their constitutional duties to the local communities which manifests in poor service delivery. Hence, grassroots development will only be achieved by local governments in Nigeria provided they can mobilize internally generated revenue devoid of exploitation and corruption (Agbaegbe, 2014, pp. 162-207). In achieving socio-economic development at the local level, there must be trained, competent and dedicated staff, reliable data, for the revenue generation

and collection, appropriate system of monitoring and enforcing revenue targets, detecting fraud and other financial misrepresentation. While focusing on evaluating the causes of development degradation with regards to local government autonomy, Okoye (2019, pp. 12-14) attested to the insincerity of council staff on field assignment, which poses greater threat to the existing development, as many of them usually divert collected councils fund for their operations.

Research Methods

This study adopted descriptive survey research as a master plan to obtain data that will provide answers to the research questions. Relevant data were obtained directly from the respondents and participants using a validated questionnaire and interview. A self-structured questionnaire that contained a list of carefully selected and ordered items to elicit the required data in answering the research questions was deployed. A sample size of 100 copies of questionnaire were administered to the respondents including academics, politicians, staff of Ijebu-Ode local government council, non-governmental officials (NGOs) and residents from ages 20 and above in Ijebu-Ode local government, Ogun state. A total of ninety-three (93) copies of the validated questionnaire were retrieved from the field. Purposive sampling technique was used in selecting the participants in order to organise those who have in-depth knowledge on the subject matter. Ten participants were engaged in a structured interview. The retrieval rate of the questionnaire was 92.5%. Ten participants were drawn from the same group of respondents on which the questionnaire was administered. Two participants each from academics, politicians, staff of Ijebu Ode local government, non-governmental organisation officials and residents were purposely selected and engaged in-depth interview before the instrument was administered, its purpose was explained and the consent of the participants was sought. All ethical facts were taken into consideration in the course of the study. The data obtained were analysed using the simple percentage and content-analysis, in line with the objectives of the study.

Results

Results of the analysis of research question one showed that 68.6% of the respondents felt that constitutional contradiction makes it difficult for Ijebu Ode local government to operate autonomously. Meanwhile, 31.2% of the respondents thought that constitutional contradiction makes it difficult for Ijebu Ode local government to exercise autonomy over its matters. 88.8% of the respondents felt that erosion of power of the local government affects its

autonomy. While 10.8% thought that erosion of power does not affect the autonomy of Ijebu Ode local government. 91.8% of the respondents believed that the state/local government joint account system affects the autonomy of Ijebu Ode local government. Meanwhile, 8.6% felt that state/local government joint account system does not affect the autonomy of Ijebu Ode local government. 93.3% thought that misappropriation of funds allocated to Ijebu- Ode local government affects its autonomy in carrying out its responsibilities. 88.4% believed that political interference affects the autonomy of Ijebu Ode local government while 10.7% thought that political interference does not affect its autonomy.

The analysis results of research question one showed that 84.9% of the respondents thought lack of autonomy affects non-implementation of developmental programmes to better the lives of rural people in Ijebu-Ode local government, while 15.1% felt that lack of autonomy affects non-implementation of developmental programmes in Ijebu Ode local government. 80.6% of the respondents believed that lack of fiscal autonomy affects construction of drainages and sewages across the local government area. Meanwhile, 15.1% perceived lack of fiscal autonomy as affecting construction of drainages and sewages across the local government. 82.8% of the respondents thought that lack of autonomy by the local government engenders non-provision of health care delivery at the local level, while 17.2% thought otherwise. 89.3% felt that lack of autonomy affects disposal of waste in Ijebu Ode local government. 73.1% thought lack of autonomy affects good management of market stalls across the local markets in Ijebu Ode. 83.9% felt unemployment among the youths in the local government is due to lack of autonomy. 16.2% believed that unemployment of the youths is due to lack of autonomy of the local government. 85.4% thought that the deficit of infrastructural facilities at the local level is due to lack of autonomy of Ijebu-Ode local government while 22.3% perceived otherwise.

Discussion

The result of the findings presented above revealed that constitutional contradiction is the major factor affecting the actualization of local government's autonomy in Ijebu-Ode local council. This implies that the same constitution which seems to have recognized local government in Nigeria as the third tier, with democratically elected personnel to manage its affairs in Section 7 (1) of 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, has also in section 8 of the same constitution placed local government under the state. Another factor

affecting local government autonomy, as revealed, is godfatherism which allows imposition of godsons in offices who, in line with the views of Enigbokan (2019), Fasugba (2020), and Eneanya (2012), continually perpetuate neo-patrimonial, clientilist and vested interests at the local level of governance.

As revealed by the respondents, constitutional contradiction, erosion of power of local government, joint local/state government account system, misappropriation of funds and political interference are the factors affecting local government autonomy in Ijebu Ode. Lack of autonomy affects the implementation of developmental programmes, construction and management of drainages and sewages, provision of the health care services, management of public schools and market stalls and provision of infrastructural facilities. In addition, high level of poverty is prevalent among the rural dwellers due to lack of autonomy by the local government to embark on socio-economic programmes and this confirms the assertion of Chukwuemeka, Ugwuanyi, Ndubuisi and Onuoha (2014, pp. 33-38) and United Nations Development Programme (2018)

One of the local government officials pointed out that corruption by the elected public officers affects granting of autonomy to local government, not only in Ijebu Ode, but in other environs in Nigeria. In a contrary opinion, a local government official pointed out that corruption as a political infection should not be considered a factor affecting the acquisition of local government autonomy. Stressing further, she noted that in spite of the fact that corruption is prevalent at the federal and state levels of governance, it does not affect their autonomy in the implementation of policies that usher in development. So, corruption is not an excuse to be deployed in granting access to autonomy by the Ijebu Ode local government. The finding corroborates the assertions of Afegbua (2018), Osifeso (2020), Uche (2017), and Oladosunmu (2018), which stated that the inherited liabilities in governance is more prevalent at both state and federal levels of administration than the local government, yet, their autonomy is not reduced or affected.

Deducing from the interview, revenue sources which could bring about growth in the locality have been hijacked by the Ogun state government without due compensation. Consequently, Ijebu Ode local government is totally dependent on the federal and state governments, controlling its administration through the state government office of local government affairs, ministry of local government and local government service commission.

The government agencies deny Ijebu Ode local government the autonomy of self-dependent administration thereby affecting socio-economic development locally. The issue of the State-Local Government Joint Account has given Ogun state powers of control of resources belonging to the local government to state governments. The perception of the participants corroborates Otoghile and Edigin (2011, pp. 119-129), Okafor, Chukwuemeka and Udenta (2015, pp. 14-15) and Doho (44-51), Ahmed and Umar (2018) viewpoints that financial affinity between the state and local governments in Nigeria cripples local government power to undertake any meaningful developmental projects without the approval of the state.

It was also gathered during the interview that grassroots development can be engineered through virtues, knowledge and skills cultivated by the people through political participation, capacity building and prompt release of funds from the federation account and state revenue to Ijebu-Ode local government. The finding confirms the assertion of Smith (2014), Osisioma (2015), Castro (2018, pp. 5-11), and Okoye (2019, pp. 12-14), that undue interference in local government affairs has continuously undermined local government autonomy in exercising their constitutional duties as entrenched in the fourth schedule of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria. As revealed, revenue items which serve as major sources of revenue for Ijebu-Ode local government such as rates collection and revenue attractions from Ita-Osun and Oke-Aje markets have been hijacked by the Ogun State government through its Internal Revenue Service. Encroachment of Ogun state government into Ijebu-Ode local government administration has affected service delivery at the grassroots level.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that lack of autonomy of Ijebu Ode local government affects grass root development. Ijebu Ode local government lacks control over its resources particularly through the state/local government joint account system, hence, cannot carry out its constitutional functions of delivering good governance to the people. Thus, there is no "average autonomy"; it is either autonomy or dependence (Adam, 2017, pp. 46-60; Olayinka, 2017). Since, Ijebu-Ode local council lacks independence, not even in the area of generating funds, grassroots development could have been said to have been in place, as the instrument for every successful planning, which is finance, is lacking. For instance, many primary schools which are to be directly maintained by Ijebu-Ode local government have turned to open fields, as classes are exposed to direct sunlight and rain. This has a negative impact on the intellectual development of many of these pupils, which has a greater impact on the society itself.

One of the basic issues to be handled with all seriousness is the issue of political will, which in return affects Ijebu-Ode local government. This is owing to the fact that the will of the politicians is not, in most times, the will of the people, who have given the mandate. The request of local government input, which comprises the achievements, efficiency and potential needs of the local government, ultimately determines the extent to which the local government estimate for the next financial year will be realized. This must be in accordance with the interest of the federal and state governments, in order to get many of the grassroots projects approved. This, hence, brings to fore the interference of the external bodies, especially, that of the state government, such as local government service commission. Therefore, based on the findings of the study, it can be concluded that Ijebu-Ode local government's inability to fully take charge in some of its affairs, due to lack of autonomy, has contributed to its current state of growth. Based on the findings, the following recommendations were made:

i.   To start with, the state/local government joint account system should be stopped in order to allow the third tier to have access and control the use of its financial resources for optimal socio-economic development. Also, financial leakages should be curtailed if not completely eradicated in Ijebu Ode local government in order to have more funds to execute concrete developmental projects. Political interference by the state and federal government officials should be reduced to the barest minimum so that the executive of Ijebu Ode local government will be able to initiate and implement laudable programmes and projects that will transform the lives of the people.

ii. The local government should embark on generating revenue that will be directed towards socio-economic development and that is why it is important that the state government should be rolled back in collecting revenues that belong to the local government. Federal and state governments should consider Ijebu-Ode local government and other 773 Local governments in Nigeria as fountain of national development; thus, the accumulation of grassroots development brings about the growth of the nation. Therefore, more focus should be given to them, in making them a part of the system, through proper granting of autonomy.

iii. Bailout funds from the federal government should be extended to local governments in Nigeria, in ensuring that local governments come out of their debts. The state government should inculcate the habit of considering the local governments where necessary, especially when it comes to debt issues. Ogun state government, for instance, can intervene by helping to pay the staff based on contract, such as contract staff in medical or health and works departments.

iv. Spending limit of the local governments in Nigeria, as imposed by the state governments, should be reviewed, with adequate cognizance and reference to the needs of these local people. The appointment of caretaker committees or transition committees as fondly used in perpetuating incivility at the grassroots should be avoided.

This idea is too crude to be used in actualizing autonomy, even development at the grassroots. Thus, it should be abandoned. In other words, the appointment of caretaker committees or transition committees as fondly used in perpetuating incivility at the grassroots should be avoided. However, democratically elected executives and legislators should display political will and commitment, if voted to office.

v. The issue of autonomy has been noticed to be a legal one; therefore, the constitution should clarify and close the existing contradictory gaps relating to local government power, functions and financial independence particularly in Ijebu Ode local government. Adequate personnel capacity should be entrenched in Ijebu-Ode local government. It is not a novel that the Ijebu-Ode local government and other 773 local governments in Nigeria are restricted to recruiting, disciplining and promoting staff between grade levels 01 - 06, while the senior staff of grade level 07 and above are handled by the Local Government Service Commission, which is a body subjected to the state. This form of human relations in operation should be revisited, and if need be, be jettisoned. Supervisory councillors overseeing the construction and maintenance of roads, drainages, among others, should be appointed on merit in order to deploy their knowledge and skill on social service delivery in Ijebu Ode.

References

Adam, A.A. (2017). An overview of local government autonomy and its functions in Nigeria, *Greener Journal of Social Science, 7*(4), 46-60.

Adegboye, S. D. (Eds.). (2013). *Issues in local government administration in Nigeria.* Enugu: Tamaza Publishing Co. Ltd.

Adeyemo, D.O. (2019). Local government autonomy in Nigeria: A historical perspective, *Journal of Social Science,* 10(2), 231-249.

Afegbua, A.A. (2018). *Local government administration: Principles and practice in Nigeria*. 2nd ed. Ile-Ife, Nigeria: University of Ife Press.

Ahmad, W. (2012). Local government autonomy in Nigeria: Struggles and challenges, *Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal*, 5(5), 73-96.

Agbaegbe, Y.A. (2014). Local government financial autonomy in Nigeria: The state joint local government account, *Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance,* 1(11), 162-207.

Akanni, G.F. (eds.). (2017) *The role of local government in the development of rural and urban centres*. Ibadan, Nigeria: Codat Publications Ltd.

Akpan, F. (2013). Politics of local government autonomy in Nigeria reloaded, *European Scientific Journal,* 9(35), 8-21.

Angalah, P.A. (2013). Impact of existing inter-government fiscal relation on effective service delivery at the grassroots in Nigeria, *International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Science, 3*(1), 112-113.

Arugu, A. and Okorie, O. (2014). Local government and rural development in Nigeria: Case study of Bayelsa state (1999-2014), *Nigerian Journal of Public Administration and local government*, 11(1), 143-147.

Ayoade, A. (eds.) (2015). *Local government autonomy and its effectiveness in Nigeria.* Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: University of Malaya Press

Ayodele, C. and Adams, A.J. (2012). Challenges of managing local government finance in Nigeria, *Research on Humanity and Social Science,* 2(3), 1-12.

Carr, J.B. (2015). Local government autonomy and state reliance on special districts governments: A reassessment, *Political Research Quarterly Available,* 5(2), pp60-66.

Castro, V.C. (2018). Traditional development of grassroots in sub-saharan Africa',ji *International Journal of Business and Social Science,* 9(9), 5-11.

Chukwuemeka, E. O., Ugwuanyi, B.I., Ndubuisi, O.P., and Onuoha, C.E. (2014). Nigeria local government: A discourse on the theoretical imperatives in a governmental system, *An International Multidisciplinary Journal*, 8(2), 33-38.

Doho, A.W., Ahmed, A., and Umar, A. (2018) 'Local government autonomy in Nigeria: Struggles and challenges', *Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal,* 5(5), pp44-51.

Eme, O.I., and Izueke, E. (eds,) (2017) *Local government and fiscal autonomy for local government in Nigeria*. Awka, Anambra: NAU Press.

Eneanya, A.N. (eds) (2012) *Local government administration in Nigeria: A comparative perspective.* Lagos, Nigeria: University of Lagos Press.

Enigbokan, A.O. (eds) (2019). *The theory of local government administration.* Lagos, Nigeria: Asbot Press.

Ering, B.M. (eds) (2021). *Concept of social economic development.* Ibadan, Oyo: Shawly007 Prints.

Eze, C.A. (2017) '*Local government administration and grassroots development in Nigeria: A theoretical appraisal', Journal of Political Science and Leadership Research*, 3(2), pp46-49.

Fasugba, H.M. (eds) (2020) *Financial management and autonomy in Nigerian local governments*. Ibadan, Oyo: University Press PLC.

Federal Republic of Nigeria (eds) (1976) *Guidelines for local government reforms.* Kaduna: Government Printer.

George, A.J. (eds) (2014) *Key concept: Autonomy.* Albany, NY: Oxford University Press.

Ibietan, J., and Ndukwe, P. (2014) '*Local government administration in Nigeria and the localist theory: Exploring the nexus', Research Academy of Social Science,* 1(4), pp90-94.

Ngozi, N., and Tajudeen, A.O. (2015) 'Operation of state local government joint account and financial autonomy of local government in Nigeria's fourth republic', *International Journal of Innovation Research and Development,* 4(11), pp85-91.

Odo, L.U. (2014) '*The challenges of local government autonomy in Nigeria', International Journal of Advanced Studies in Ecology, Development and Sustainability,* 2(1), pp63-65.

Odoh, I.E. (2019) 'Local governments in Nigeria: Relevance and effectiveness in poverty reduction and economic development', *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development*, 1(1), pp12-29.

Okafor, C., Chukwuemeka, E., and Udenta, J.O. (2015) 'Developmental local government as a model for grassroots socio-economic development in Nigeria', *International Journal of Art and Humanity,* 4(2), pp14-15.

Okoye, F. (2019) 'Local government autonomy in Nigeria', *Nigerian Journal of Public Administration and local government,* 2(3), pp12-14.

Oladosunmu, J.A. (eds.) (2018) *Local government autonomy: A guide to principles of nation building.* Ibadan, Oyo: Onibonoje Press and Book Industries Ltd.

Olayinka, A.A. (2017) 'Local government bill'. *The* Guardian, 11 April.

Osisioma, B.C. (eds.) (2015) *Growth and development at the grassroots in Nigeria: The past, the present and the future. Lagos, Nigeria: NAU Press.*

Osifeso, B. (2020) '*Nigeria of better today', Punch Newspaper*, 14 January.

Otoghile, A., and Edigin, L.U. (2011) 'Local government administration and development: A survey of Oredo local government area of Edo state, Nigeria', *An International Multi-Disciplinary Journal,* 5(3), pp112-119.

Smith, W.K. (eds.) (2014) *Sustainable development in Nigeria: The role of social capital, participation, and science and technology.* Lagos, Nigeria: All Wide Print.

The 1999 constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria. Lagos: Federal Government Press.

Tagunna, A.C. (eds.) (2017) *Fundamental issues in community development and local government*. Owerri: Versatile Publishers.

Uche, O.O. (eds.) (2017) *Nigerian culture and socio-political development of the grassroots.* Enugu: EAP Publishers.

Uguru, S.A. (2011) *Local government autonomy in Nigeria: Its implications for the federal structure.* Oyo, Nigeria: NISER.

United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] (2018) *Human development indices and indicators: 2018 Statistical Update.* Washington, DC: Communications Development Incorporated.

Wayne, Y. (eds.) (2016) *Populism to localism.* New York, U.S.A: New Bloom Publisher.

Wills, J. (2015) 'Populism, localism and the geography of democracy', *Geoforun Journal,* 62(1), pp188-189.

Zakariyah, Y.K., and Danjuma, A. (2019) 'Developing alternative sources of finding local government in Nigeria during the period of global economic recession', International Journal of Business and Management, 2(3), pp41-45.

Stakeholder Management Approach and Poverty Reduction in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: Examining Multinational Oil Corporations and Host Communities
By

Ben Tantua, PhD
Department of Economics,
Niger Delta University, Bayelsa state
&

Blessing Ose Oligbi, PhD
Department of Economics and Development Studies
Igbinedion University, Okada, Edo state
blessing.oligbi@iuokada.edu.ng

Abstract

This study examines the stakeholder management policies of multinational oil corporations and their relationships with host communities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria between 2015 and 2021. It adopts a non-positivist qualitative approach from reviews of secondary literature to argue that the development intervention policies of multinational oil companies seem to place more emphasis on economic interest over the welfare and livelihoods of host communities as reflected in the continued agitations in the Niger Delta region. We conclude by arguing that the policies and activities of multinational oil companies through their corporate social responsibility have not so far mitigated the underlying causes of the lingering hostilities/ relationships with host communities. We therefore recommend that the multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta should view communities as non-stakeholders with legitimate rights as equal partners, whereby they are treated with relative importance, within the lens of corporate reaponsibilities rather than corporate social responsibility (CSR).

Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). development interventions, multinational oil companies, Niger Delta, stakeholder theory

Introduction

The ethics of doing business by Multinational Oil companies (MNCs) in host oil bearing communities in the Niger Delta region have continually raised concerns in terms of community development and building peaceful relationships. More so, the strategic stakeholder management policies of MNCs that should be of mutual benefit and interest to both parties are being questioned (Ite, 2005; Waritimi, 2012; Tantua 2015). These concerns are more pronounced when slogans of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) are mentioned, with host oil bearing communities often feeling aggrieved or marginalised (Igali, 2023) despite the activities carried out by Oil corporations in the region. What seems to bother many communities is that relationships with Oil corporations in the Niger Delta is not a symbiotic one, as communities often feel worse off, with Multinationals viewed as being comfortable

with adopting discretionary and charitable activities rather than engaging in the sustainable growth and development of these communities. Thus, there is the need to critically examine the myriad concerns of communities in terms of attaining mutual and beneficial goals, especially within the context of social responsibilities of Oil corporations. In other words, we review how the responsibilities and practices of Oil corporations can impact positively in building sustainable growth and relationships with host communities

In broad terms, business and society are interwoven in roles and responsibilities (Barney & Harrison, 2020). This interdependence is seen as a symbiotic relationship (Fredrick, 2006), whereby a fundamental change in one brings a change in the other. Such relationship makes it possible for either both parties to be better off or worse off (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Therefore, business and society have a responsibility towards each other in terms of seeking mutual understanding and beneficial outcomes, as the activities of business or corporate organisations do have positive or negative impact on their immediate environment. The positive impacts of corporations are often expressed through patronage or relationships within their environment, whilst negative impact of corporate policies and activities are often reflected in actions of conflict or protest (Waritimi, 2012). This view of impacts and relationship between corporate organisations and society has, over time, influenced debates and discussions about a stakeholder approach to strategic management between corporate business organisations and their immediate environment. This is even so when issues or concerns of decision making or development policies of business corporations may affect individuals/groups and vice-versa (Freeman, 1984). Thus in this paper, we argue for a strategic approach to stakeholder management framework that informs a paradigm shift in explaining how changes in external environment are impacted or influenced by the activities of business corporations (Emshoff, 1978; McCaskey, 1982). In other word, the stakeholder approach enables firms and individuals/groups to understand how policy or decision impact on both the activities of business corporations and their external environment. Therefore, the approach emphasises the need for corporate organisations to manage their relationships not only with their economic stakeholders but also with the non-economic stakeholders of their business environment (Freeman, 1984). Consequently, the stakeholder perspective informs a variety of debates regarding the intersection of business and society, as it attempts to describe how individuals and groups cooperatively engage in value creation or aligning values, norms, and ethics as mechanisms to produce efficient and effective relationships. According to Bret Crane (2020), stakeholders can influence the extent to which other stakeholders are willing to make

themselves vulnerable to cooperation or engage in future exchange relationships. He views corporations as an ecosystem with interconnected networks of relationships, whereby a firm's action may have both direct and indirect consequences. Crane argues that trust is fundamental to all stakeholders, as it enhances mutual benefit and productive relationships that facilitate the creation of value. In addition, any business cooperation that aims to achieve long term success would depend on the relationship with the people around its immediate environment (Freeman & McVea, 2005).

Altman (1998) observed that corporations have increasingly become active with communities by establishing community relations departments that are charged with the responsibility of building relationships and giving corporations a human face. This increasing attention to communities by corporations shows the significance of such constituencies, and steps to understanding their issues. However, Dunham et al. (2006) note that a breakdown in relationships between corporations and communities can be challenging, given that the task of evaluating moral claims and developing appropriate responses to community stakeholder groups is complex and confusing. Nevertheless, the stakeholder approach encompasses individuals and groups within the market and non-market or business environment, as a narrower view focuses mostly on individuals and groups in a firm's market environment. The non-market stakeholders are those individuals and groups who do not necessarily engage in direct economic transactions with the firm, but are affected by or can affect its strategic objectives (Lawrence & Weber, 2011). They are secondary stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995) that include community, various levels of government, nongovernmental organisations, special interest groups, or the general public. Therefore, our concern here is communities in the Niger Delta region. Community is defined in relation to geography (Hillery, 1955; Lee & Newby, 1983) and characterized primarily by identity that represents individuals or groups that share a sense of belonging, based on a set of shared beliefs, values, or experiences.

The above background informs the context and aspects of the lingering quest for development by host oil bearing communities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, where the relationships between Oil multinational companies and host communities are seen as skewed in ways that leave the host communities worse off (Kilgour, 2002; Ikein 2003; Obi 2003; Orubu et al., 2004; Ite, 2005). Also, the region's vast potentials for development, ranging from crude oil to fishing and farm produce, have not enhanced the necessary managerial and institutional capacities to guarantee considerable levels of livelihoods (Tantua, 2009), in host oil bearing communities of the Niger Delta region. Based on the aforementioned, the following sections of this paper

review the relevance of the stakeholder theory and approach as against the concept of Cooperate Social Responsibility (CSR) which we argue has been over flogged both in the literature and discourse concerning relationships/development of host communities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

Literature Review

Theoretical Background (Stakeholder Approach)

The term 'stakeholder' is defined as those individuals/groups without whose support an organisation would cease to exist (Freeman, 1984, p.13). Scholars such as Gray et al (1996) define stakeholder as individuals or group of persons that can be influenced by, or can itself influence the actions of an organisation. This definition has raised questions as to whether stakeholders are confined only to those that are crucial for the achievement of corporate objectives, or those considered as an entity affected by corporate actions (Friedman & Miles, 2006), given that not all stakeholders can affect or be affected by activities of business entities. In normative terms, stakeholders are individuals/groups that are affected (positively or negatively) by operations of corporations (Clarkson, 1991). They have a stake in terms of environmental risk, improved livelihoods, or conflicts from the activities of firms. Also, Mitchell et al. (1997) argues that a stakeholder is any individual or group that possesses either the power to influence, or having legitimate claims with a firm. Similarly, Carroll and Buchholtz (2006) note that while stakeholders may be affected by the actions, decisions, policies, or practices of business corporations, they might also affect the organizations.

A common thread in the definitions is the recognition of not just legitimate stakeholders, but stakeholders that can influence or be affected by a firm's policy or objectives. From a business point of view, there are certain individuals and groups with legitimate, direct interest in, or claim from the activities of business corporations. Thus, the stakeholder approach also takes cognisance of the attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency (Agle et al., 1999) which reflect stakeholders' salience across all stakeholder groups. Moreso, behaviours of managers could impact on stakeholder attributes, as Harvey and Schaefer (2001) argue, that managers do tend to consider stakeholders with institutional powers as most important. Thus the institutional power of stakeholders/ communities is significant to how multinational corperations perceive and react to stake holders / community demand in terms of legitimacy or urgency. This corroborates the argument that the attributes of power legitimacy and urgency determine

162

which stakeholders is given attention (Mitchell et al., 1997). It becomes necessary, therefore, for managers to understand the concerns of individuals and groups within the immediate environment. In addition, the idea behind stakeholder approach is for mangers to formulate and implement processes that satisfy all parties as well as achieve the long-term objective of business corporations, given the uncertainty and interconnected nature of the business world we live in.

Furthermore, Magness (2008) argues that decisions which are motivated by the presence of legitimacy, power, and urgency, are outside an ethical framework, given that the right of corporations to exist is conferred upon them by society through social contract, but only when the value system of the company is perceived to be congruent with that of the society in which it operates (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Thus, rights can be revoked if the company is thought to have breached any of the terms of its social contract (Deegan, 2002 in Magness, 2008). According to Magness (2008), legitimacy provides the normative base for determining who or what really counts in the minds of decision-makers. Freeman (1984, p. 64), however, argues that analysing stakeholders in terms of the organisation perception of power is not enough, as stakeholder analysis should go beyond managerial or organisational perception of who or what constitutes a stakeholder to incorporate individuals and groups who may be or are affected by the achievement of a firm's objectives. As observed by Donaldson and Preston (1995, p. 76), stakeholders are defined by their legitimate interest in the corporation, rather than simply by the corporation's interest on them.

The Use of Stakeholder Approach

The idea of stakeholder theory emerged from the pioneering work at Stanford Research Institute (SRI) in the early 1960s. It informs creative judgment, intuitive reasoning, and engagement of people in any form of business relationship (Slinger, 1999). It is about understanding the interests and concerns of employees, customers, communities or society at large, in order to develop a broad objective of business activities (Freeman & McVea, 2005). The approach gives priority to those individuals or groups who can affect or are affected by the operations of corporations, given that the corporate world consists of economic and the non-economic environment that are embedded in a socio-political and cultural context. This makes decisions of multinational corporations critical to the wellbeing and livelihoods of communities in their immediate environment. Thus, the strategies of multinational corporations are argued to impact on the immediate environment (Baron, 2003), as whatever decisions that are made

influence the behavioral performance and relationships with their relevant stakeholders. In other words, corporations are in the best position to assess the likely impact of business activities in their their immediate environment, given that effective business strategies inform a guide to the behavior of corporate entities.

Also, success of business corporations cannot be singled out in isolation from their immediate environment, as their activities directly or indirectly impact on the environment. Taking a normative/prescriptive view, (Donaldson & Preston, 1995), the stakeholder approach involves accepting that the interests of all stakeholders are of intrinsic value to corporations, as it informs the moral or philosophical guidelines for operation and management of corporations. Therefore, a key argument of the stakeholder theory is that each stakeholder group has a right to be treated as an end in itself, and not as a means to some other end, in determining the future direction of business corporations. In other words, the normative stakeholder approach emphasises the importance of investing in the relationships and shared values/principles with those who have a stake in business corporations or firms (Freeman & McVea, 2005). Also, Frederick (2006) argues that the confrontation between corporations and various social constituents often relates to issues of values which arise when the pursuit of corporate objectives impinges on individual/groups stakeholders' values.

However, within the context of the Niger Delta, the challenges of Multinational Oil corporations are mostly triggered by negative effects of business activities that the community's attention is often drawn to. These negative side effects of profit seeking behavior of firms impose social expectations that threaten the survival of Oil companies in the region. Nevertheless, the stakeholder approach provides corporations with a framework that takes a macro view of its constituents and environment to determine the actions or behaviours that trigger changes in business environment. It requires business corporations to understand the key issues of concern, and the extent stakeholders can go to prevent firms from achieving their objectives (Freeman, 1984). In sum, the stakeholder approach takes cognisance of the various individual/groups voices by firms listening to what they have to say. The approach is not one-sided, where cooperations passively adapt to the expectations and claims of individual stakeholders or groups, as it is more about maximising profits whilst building good relationships.

Methodology

This paper engages a secondary qualitative approach from existing literature to examine the relevance of stakeholder management theory, as against the use of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) framework by Multinational Oil companies towards reducing poverty in host communities of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. We attempt to provide a normative description from reviews of literature, the relevance and use of Stakeholder theory with a critique of CSR within the context of development interventions by Multinational Oil companies in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. We then proceed to discuss within the theoretical lenses of stakeholder approach and extant empirical literature on development interventions in the Niger Delta region to arrive at a conclusion.

The Stakeholder Approach Vs Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

The stakeholder theory/approach is not the same as corporate social responsibility, which often focuses on social causes such as the environment or how a firm invests in the immediate community. The stakeholder theory is "corporate responsibility" (Graham, 2020), as opposed to corporate social responsibility, where firms demonstrate their responsibility through their decisions and actions with respect to their stakeholders (Freeman et al., 2010). Moreso, the stakeholder approach questions how corporations actually view their stakeholders and what rationales are used for making judgments about their relative importance (Barney & Harrison, 2020). On the other hand, CSR is viewed as social responsibility of business which encompasses the economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic expectations that a given society has of an organisation (Carroll, 2021). However, it is mainly considered as a public relations exercise, where money is spent by business corporations on social initiatives than on social activities (Morsing, 2003; Smith, 2003). Consequently, most business corporations find it difficult to 'walk the talk' when it comes to implementing CSR (Grayson & Hodgson, 2005), CSR is viewed as nothing more than the voluntary social and environmental aspect of responsibility carried out by firms. It is seen as contributing to human helplessness that encourages a demanding attitude from communities and society (Galant, 2017). It is simply an activity to show that corporations are familiar with local issues and environmental concerns. In addition, CSR is about maximizing profits and building good relationships with communities in which they operate.

According to Galant (2017), CSR is nothing more than corporations appearing as having consciousness by allocating money to areas that are seen as underdeveloped. Within the context of this paper, CSR activities are not sustainable, especially in the Niger Delta where oil companies operate in a complex and conflict prone environment. Conversely, removing CSR activities in the Niger Delta is tantamount to complete collapse of community development in the region, thus the concept of CSR is a double-edged sword. More so, the CSR activities in the Niger Delta are mostly unrelated to the business of profit or oil exploration activities that should propel sustainable growth and skills technology development of communities. Again, CSR is seen as a barrier to meaningful conversation (Freeman & Liedtka, 1991) and having outlived its usefulness (Freeman & Velamuri, 2006), as it focuses exclusively on corporations. On the other hand, a stakeholder approach means accepting that firms do have relationships and creating wealth through engagement instead of trying to meet the diverse expectations of local communities. It sees business corporations as embedded in society with networks of relationships, taking into account the legitimate interests of those groups and individuals who can affect (or be affected by) their activities.

In today's business environment, firms have responsibilities towards a wider range of stakeholders, such as governments, consumer advocates, local community organisations, media, and public authorities by promoting a more inclusive business relationship. In sum, maintaining and developing good relationships is at the core of stakeholder approach as it proves to explain the popularity of terms like "partnerships" and "stakeholder dialogue". In sum, the Cooperate Social Responsibilities (CSR) policies and practice in the Niger Delta region continue to be a subject of discourse, as Multinational Oil companies continue to adopt numerous measures and strategies towards building peaceful relationships and improving livelihoods of communities. Interestingly, Oil companies' strategies and approaches towards ensuring peaceful coexistence and development of their host communities continue to evolve in accordance with challenging realities. Their strategies have evolved from Community Assistance (CA) approach in the early 1980s to what is currently called a General Memorandum of Understanding (GMOU) with host communities. Despite all these, they are often labelled or criticised for the growing levels of inequalities, poverty and environmental degradation in their areas of operation. In addition, CSR activities of Multinationals have more or less remained at the level of opaque and self-dictated moral code (Igali, 2023), with a quick commitment to meet official legal requirements of governments. Also, given that Multinational Oil companies in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria do not have any legal code regarding how

they should relate with host oil communities, they are seen to use their own estimation of what is just and moral as the overriding interest of host communities.

Multinational Corporations & Development Interventions in Niger Delta (Poverty Reduction)

Multinational Corporations, (MNCs), also referred to as Transnational Corporations (TNCs) are large private sector companies that operate businesses with parent companies mainly situated in developed countries, where the bulk of their research is conducted and profits are repatriated, with affiliates in other foreign (domestic) countries mostly in the developing countries. They are the driving force behind economic globalization and a tool of economic and human development, with ability to manipulate their environment and influence economic growth in developed and developing countries. The economies of some MNCs sometimes exceed that of most developing countries in which they operate. In 2000, the corporate revenue of Exxon Mobil, one of the world's largest MNCs was larger than the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of more than 180 developing countries (Gabel & Bruner, 2003). In addition, over 90% of global corporations have their parent companies located in developed, industrialized and wealthy nations of America, Europe and Japan (Gabel & Bruner, 2003; Curtis, 2001). Also, multinational corporations are of increasing importance to the world economy (Gabel & Bruner, 2003; Curtis, 2001). They are the force behind international productions and trade, collectively responsible for one third of all global trade and produce an enormous range of goods and services for international markets and sometimes for the local markets where they operate (Lodge & Wilson, 2006). As a result, an estimated 70% of all global trade involves at least one or more MNCs occurring usually in the most dynamic sectors of national economies such as energy, telecommunications, information technology, electronic consumer goods, transport, health, banking and finance (Curtis, 2001). Furthermore, they are known to influence the livelihoods of millions of people in developed and developing countries (Curtis, 2001) as they directly employ nearly 90million of the world's population and indirectly provide source of livelihoods for almost 200 million people (Gabel & Bruner, 2003; UNCTAD, 2000; World Investment Report, 1999).

However, the impact of development project or programme interventions by governments, multinational corporations and other agencies in communities of the Niger Delta region, have continued to stir debates and discussions. The numerous programmes of interventionist agencies with varied slogans, all aimed at delivering short, medium- or long-term goals of

reducing poverty are often criticised by scholars (Okoko, 1996; Okowa, 2000; Orubu, Odusola et al., 2004; Omeje, 2005; Ogun, 2006) for having no significant impact on the welfare and livelihoods of host oil bearing communities. The emergence of militancy, the lingering tension and grievances between communities and multinational oil companies and continued gas flares and environmental pollution in the region (Orubu et al., 2004; Watts, 2004; Tantua, 2015), all attest to the fact that the relationship between oil multinational corporations and host communities is frosty. On the other hand, slogans of the Millennium and Sustainable development goals, whose objective is to eradicate extreme poverty and ensure sustainable livelihoods of present and future generations, seem lost within the context and paradox of oil wealth in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Thus, reducing poverty to its barest minimum remains a major challenge and concern at both regional and international levels. In this regard, Oil multinational corporations are not left out in the pursuit of attaining the sustainable development goals of reducing poverty globally.

Consequently, MNCs in the Niger Delta are partners in pursuit of reducing poverty through relationship building, strategies and approaches with host oil bearing communities. Although oil companies continue to operate in a complex socio-political environment, they cannot be absolved of the blames of decrepit livelihoods in host communities, despite their varied interventions of building schools, training youths, providing water, agricultural schemes, and so on (Ikein, 2003). In addition, the roles and responsibilities of oil companies to their host communities in the Niger Delta region have been a source of discussion and debates for decades. The discourse often shows that Oil companies seem to place more emphasis on economic interest over the welfare and livelihoods of host communities as reflected in the frequent protests and agitations across communities in the Niger Delta region. Whilst Oil companies are not governments that should take responsibility to govern and improve the welfare and living conditions of their immediate host communities, they continue to be at the front burner of discussions on poverty in the region. Moreso, the legion of literature and debate on corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the Niger Delta, with emerging concepts such as Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Poverty Reduction, leave a vacuum from reflection of decrepit livelihood patterns, frightening youth unemployment, and increase in anti-social activities such as drug abuse, prostitution, kidnapping, etc. in most oil-bearing communities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

Scholars have argued that Oil companies' policies/practices or community relations make it part of the problem and solution to poverty in the Niger Delta region (Ikein, 2003; Orubu et al.,

2004; Ite. U, 2005, Idemudia & Ite 2006; Idemudia 2014), as their presence in the Niger Delta region has inadvertently fed poverty, violence and corruption (SPDC, 2004). Specifically, Shell's approach to community assistance/development in terms of providing drinking water, health care, skills training, education and scholarship etc., is said to be nothing but corporate philanthropy (Ite, 1996; Ite ,2006), that is '*one off gifts*' from ad hoc projects rather than support for sustainable development interventions in the Niger Delta region. Thus, its approach lacks coherence and coordinated plans, as well as the participation of communities in the decision-making process (Tantua, 2009), as its relationship with communities seems based on what SPDC felt the communities lacked or Shell's perception of poverty in the region (Ite, 1996; Frynas, 2005). This disposition leaves host communities to be seen, more or less, as spectators in the decision making and development process. It creates a dependency culture whereby communities begin to see development interventions not as charity but as a form of rent for the exploitation and pollution of their immediate environment. Nevertheless, multinational corporations such as SPDC, have evolved their strategy and approach to community relations. The approach seems to have assumed more responsibilities to embrace local knowledge, and participation (SPDC 1999).

Contrarily, governments who are the enablers of business practices are involved in a complex relationship with oil multinationals in the Niger Delta region. Whilst they are the regulators of business activities, the government's roles and responsibilities greatly inform the communities culture of dependence on foreign multinational corporations. Communities are no longer seen as making independent decisions with the ability to implement project interventions, as the MNCs are seen to control host communities' economic activities (Frynas, 2000). Thus, multinational corporations can make significant direct or indirect contributions to poverty reduction in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, despite the very complex dynamics in terms of policy management and decision making in the region. Although government failures and poor macro-economic planning, may be a major obstacle to MNCs' approach to poverty reduction in the region (Frynas, 2005), MNCs adopt different management strategies in dealing with the dynamic forces of change in the region.

Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

The social responsibilities of business organisations have become increasingly recognised globally. Therefore, business and society do have a symbiotic relationship, in the sense that a fundamental change in business affects society and vice versa. This interdependence may

possibly result in one party being better off and the other worse off or both parties better off. Thus, multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria need to understand the concerns of their host communities in order to develop a holistic framework necessary for attaining their short and long-term objectives as well as addressing the myriad concerns of host communities in order to achieve a mutual beneficial goal. From the reviews of development interventions thus far, the relationship of multinational companies in the Niger Delta region seems to be lopsided as host oil bearing communities often feel aggrieved or marginalised. Besides, Oil and politics are an inevitable pair in Nigeria vis-a-viz Niger Delta region, hence, the relationship between oil companies and host communities occurs within a context of power over resource wealth. Oil companies are viewed as powerful rich tenants that do exclude communities from oil benefits within the rungs of decision policy making.

The power relations of the MNCs are also reflected in the poor environmental standards in the region, attesting to the weak institutional political will on the part of the Nigerian state. (Orubu et al., 2004). These dissatisfactions have led to claims and counter claims between oil companies and host communities, as communities continue to sign documents such as a global memorandum of understanding (GMOU) with oil companies for the provision of various human and physical development projects. Yet, there is very little or no significant impact, as the earnings from oil revenues do not reflect on the welfare and livelihoods of oil-bearing communities. Curiously, the legion of literature and discussions on cooperate social responsibility (CSR) in the Niger Delta, with emerging concepts such as Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Poverty Reduction, leave a vacuum from reflection of decrepit livelihood patterns, frightening youth unemployment, and increase in anti-social activities such as drug abuse, prostitution, kidnapping, etc. in most oil-bearing communities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria (Tantua 2009).

From the reviews of literature herein, we conclude by arguing that the activities and behaviours of Multinational Oil companies in the Niger Delta region impact negatively on host oil bearing communities, given the continued material deprivation and socio-economic conditions that often drive communities into conflict with oil companies. Moreso, the amounts of monies spent by Oil multinationals via Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives have not so far mitigated the underlying causes of the lingering hostilities/relationship between communities and oil companies. Thus, the efforts of Oil companies through its CSR initiatives have not met desires of communities, their increased participation in decision making or improved communities' access to the distribution of resource governance and wealth in the Niger Delta region. Perhaps,

multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta ought to view the interest of non-market stakeholders (communities) as having intrinsic value with institutional power and legitimacy, whereby communities have right to be treated as an end in itself and not as means to some other end.

References

Barney, B. J. & S. Harrison, J. (2020). Stakeholder theory at the crossroads, *Business & Society* **59(2) 203–212**.

Carroll, B., A. (2021). "Corporate Social Responsibility and the COVID 19 Pandemic: Organisational and Managerial Implications." Strategy and Management **14**(3): 315-330.

Emshoff, J. (1978). Experience Generalised Decision Models. Philadelphia: , Wharton ARC Working Papers.

Fredrick, W. C. (2006). Corporations, Be Good! The Story of Corporate Social Responsibility. Indianapolis, Dog Ear Publishing. .

Freeman, R. E. (1984.). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Marshfield, MA., Pitman.

Frynas, J., G. (2000). Oil in Ngeria: Conflicts and Litigation between Oil Companies and Village Communities. New Brunswick (USA) and London (UK), Transaction Publishers

Frynas, J., G. (2005). "The false development promise of corpoarate social responsibilty: Evidences from Multinational Oil companies." International Affairs **81**(3): 581-598.

Galant, M. (2017). "The Stakeholder Theory As A Starting Point for the Critique of Corporate Social Responsibility." Social Responsibility(3): 464.

Graham, S. (2020). "The influence of external and internal stakeholder pressures on the implementation of upstream environmental supply chain practices." Business & Society **59**: 351-383.

Idemudia, U. (2014). "Corporate Community engagement strategies in the Niger Delta region: Some critical reflections." Extractive Industries and Society **1**(2): 154-162.

Idemudia U and U. Ite (2006). "Corporate-community relations in Nigeria's oil industry: Challenges and imperatives. ." Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management **13**(4): 194-206.

Igali, G. (2023). Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Transformation in Africa.

Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Transformation in Africa. Niger Delta University , Amassoma, Nigeria.

Ikein, A. (2003). "Socio-Economic and Environmental Challneges and the quest for Sustainable Development in Nigeria's oil rich Niger Delta: A Commentary."

Ite, U. E. (1996). Summary thoughts on Shell community relations workshop. Unpublished Workshop Report, . Cellars Hotel, Cape Town, South Africa, Shell Internaional limited London.

Ite Uwem, E. (2006). "Changing Times and Strategies: Shell Contribution to Sustainable Community Development " Sustainable Development.

Ite. U, E. (2005). "Poverty Reduction in Reaource-Rich Developing Countries: What have Multinational Cooperations got to do with it?.." Journal of International Development **17**: 913-929.

Kilgour, E. (2002). "Shells Impact in the Niger Delta " Environmental Review.

McCaskey, M. (1982). The Executive Challenge. Marshfield,, Pitman Publishing Inc.

Obi, C. (2003). No Longer at ease: Intellectuals and the Crisis of Nation-Statism in Nigeria in the 1990s, CODESRIA.

Ogun, P. (2006). "Land and Forest resource use in the Niger Delta: Issues of regulation and sustainable managemnt " Resource Management.

Okoko, K. (1996). "Revenue Allocation and Oil producing states in Nigeria." Springfield **1**.

Okowa, W. (2000). Oil and Systemic Corruption Port Harcourt, Page Publishers

Omeje, K. (2005). "Oil Conflicts in Nigeria: Contending Issues and Perspectives of Local Niger Delta Issue." New Political Economy **10**(3).

Orubu, O. C., et al. (2004). "The Nigeria Oil Industry: Environmental Diseconomies, Management Strategies, and the Need for Community Involvement." Human Ecology **16**(3): 203-214.

Pfeffer J and G. R. Salancik (1978). The External Control of Organizations. New York, Harper & Row. .

SPDC (1999). People and the Environment ,1998. SPDC.

SPDC (2004). People and Environment,2003, SPDC Annual Report. SPDC.

Tantua, B. (2009). An assessment of the potential of participation in rural development projects in an oil led economy in Nigeria. Instutute of Biological, Environmental and Rural Sciences (IBERS0. Aberystwyth, ABERYSTWYTH UNIVERSITY. **Master of Philosophy**

Tantua, B. (2015). Oil Governance in the Niger Delta: Exploring the Role of the Militias.

Social and Policy Sciences, . BATH, UK, University of BATH. **PhD**.

Waritimi, E. (2012). Stakeholder Management in Practice: Evidence from the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry. Business Administration. Durham University, Durham University. **Doctoral thesis**.

Watts, J., M. (2004). "Antinomies of Community: Some thoughts of geography, resources and empire " Royal Geographic Society.